
### INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

### 2018 EMERGENCY WATCHLIST





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# **EMERGENCY WATCHLIST OVERVIEW**

### Purpose and Use

The purpose of the IRC's annual Emergency Watchlist is to provide a catalogue of the countries at greatest risk of a humanitarian emergency in the coming year as a result of conflict or natural disaster. The Watchlist is used to focus the Emergency Unit's decision-making around country prioritization for emergency preparedness work, as well as ongoing analysis and monitoring. Should an emergency occur, the IRC's Emergency Classification System allows the organization to provide an objective measure of scale and severity of the emergency, and recommend an emergency response stance; framing decisions around whether to respond, what level of resources to allocate, and under what management structure.

The Watchlist represents our "best guess" read of the potential for humanitarian emergencies across the globe and is an important element of our analysis framework.

### Methodology

The Watchlist considers conflict and natural hazard risk and is based on an assessment of the risk of an event resulting in humanitarian impact. As such there are three risks considered in the Watchlist: **Conflict Risk**, **Natural Hazard Risk** and **Humanitarian Risk**.

The Watchlist uses data from INFORM's Index for Risk Management indices as the foundation for its country selection. It then substantiates the data with information gathered from other identified sources.<sup>1</sup> The justification for the chosen sources is drawn from the reputation and rigor of the data and the organization that produces it.


All three types of risk are analyzed for each country on the 2018 Watchlist, producing both a numeric score (on a scale of 1-10 with 10 being the highest level of risk), as well as qualitative analysis. Note that the qualitative analyses vary in their depth based on the quantitative level of a particular risk.

To acknowledge variations in levels of risk among the 23 countries presented in the 2018 Watchlist, we have divided them into two groups: a "top ten" list which reflects the principal countries of concern, followed by the remaining 13 countries. These two groups are presented in alphabetical order.

The concept of presenting the top ten list of countries is new to the IRC's Watchlist this year. The IRC will be testing the utility of this concept. In the year to come we will devote more analytical resources to the top ten countries. All Watchlist countries will, however, continue to uniformly receive emergency preparedness investments and indeed all IRC countries may receive support for emergency response following a classified emergency.

While many sources are used, in addition to INFORM the other key data sources are: Verisk, ACAPS, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, and the Council on Foreign Relations.

# Watchlist Country Name




**Conflict Risk**, **Natural Hazard Risk**, and **Humanitarian Risk** are each scored for every country on the Watchlist. Each score is on a **scale of 1 to 10**, with 10 being the highest level of risk. These scores are comparable between countries and based on combined data from the following sources:

- Conflict Risk: Verisk, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Council on Foreign Relations
- Natural Hazard Risk: Verisk
- Humanitarian Risk: INFORM and ACAPS

**Conflict Risk** and **Natural Hazard Risk** are a comparative score of how likely the country is to suffer large-scale conflict or natural hazards, respectively, in the coming year.

**Humanitarian Risk** is how likely such conflict or natural hazard, if it occurs, is to affect a large-scale population who will need humanitarian assistance. For example, Nigeria has medium conflict (5) and natural hazard (5) risks, and as compared to other countries these risks are serious, but not as severe as places such as Yemen (10) or the Philippines (8), respectively. However, due to the population density and pre-existing vulnerability of the population of Nigeria if they do experience conflict or a natural disaster, the humanitarian risk is quite high (8).





**Vulnerablity** 

Office

Population

# 2018 **TOP TEN** WATCHLIST COUNTRIES

# Afghanistan

35.53N

In Afghanistan levels of conflict are expected to increase, while there is significant risk of multiple types of natural disasters, and a general population with extremely high levels of vulnerability to either threat.

### **Conflict Risk**


Afghanistan remains in conflict. Violence and insecurity continued across Afghanistan in 2017 and will carry into 2018. In 2017 the government shifted its strategy, focusing on urban centers and pulling back from rural outposts. The retreat enabled the Taliban to operate and expand unobstructed in rural areas resulting in a shift of 19 districts from government to Taliban control. Once in control, Taliban stepped up opium production, a reported 87% increase compared to 2016. The increase in production is likely to supply the group with additional funds to purchase arms in 2018 as well as provide an incentive for recruitment.<sup>2</sup> This coupled with a noticeable shift in tactics by the Taliban and other militant armed groups, increasingly targeting mosques, shrines and other places of worship as well as religious leaders will likely result in an upward trend in civilian casualties.<sup>3</sup> The Taliban is not the only armed group

operating in Afghanistan, the Islamic State (IS) is also present and often at odds with both the Taliban as well as government forces attempting to rid the country of militant groups. If the IS presence in Afghanistan continues to grow, it's possible that the government could find themselves teaming up with the Taliban against IS providing a backdoor for possible ceasefire negotiations in the future.

US involvement in Afghanistan increased in 2017, following a new strategy unveiled on August 21. US forces have and will continue in 2018 to take a more active combatant role and increase the use of airstrikes. According to NATO Resolute Support, the United States conducted 2,400 air strikes from January to September 2017, the most since 2014.<sup>4</sup> This will continue in 2018 and will have an impact on civilian casualties. Elections are scheduled for July 2018 and are likely to fuel insecurity and bouts of violence as well as be a target for anti-government elements.

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Afghanistan is at risk for several natural hazards; earthquakes, flooding, drought, landslides, and avalanches.<sup>5,6</sup> More than three decades of conflict married with environmental degradation and insufficient investment in disaster risk reduction activities have contributed to an overall vulnerability. On average, natural disasters affect an estimated 200,000 in Afghanistan annually.<sup>7</sup>



### **Humanitarian Impact**

Displacement due to violence and insecurity continues across the country with 338,108 people reported displaced in 2017.<sup>8</sup> Refugee returns, both forced and voluntary, continued in 2017 from Pakistan, Iran and Europe. These numbers are expected to continue in 2018.<sup>9</sup> The level of vulnerability of returnees is influenced by type of return and the country of departure. Those voluntarily arriving in Afghanistan from Europe often receive financial assistance before arrival. This is not the case for those being forcibly returned from Pakistan and Iran, many of whom may not have sufficient coping capacity or resources to sustain themselves. Many of those returning from Pakistan and Iran have never lived in Afghanistan and are unfamiliar with the current conflict dynamics and community tensions which may place them at further risk. In addition, their vulnerability places additional strains on depleted resources targeting displaced and those affected by natural disasters and conflict. Food insecurity is also a major humanitarian concern, with an estimated 9.3M people food insecure and around 7.5M people facing Crisis and Emergency levels. According to an Integrated Food Security Phase Classification, IDPs, host communities, undocumented returnees and landless households are most vulnerable and the worst affected.<sup>10</sup>

- <sup>3</sup> https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama\_report\_on\_attacks\_against\_places\_of\_worship\_7nov2017\_0.pdf
- <sup>4</sup> https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/quarterlyreports/2017-10-30qr-section3-security.pdf
- <sup>5</sup> http://www.gndr.org/programmes/advocacy/365-disasters/more-than-365-disasters-blogs/item/1449-types-of-recent-disasters-in-afghanistan.html
- <sup>6</sup> INFORM's risk assessment has a projected risk for earthquakes at 9.2, floods 7.1, drought 7.6 with an overall natural hazard risk of 6.0.
- <sup>7</sup> https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/natural-disasters-C
- <sup>8</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-weekly-field-report-6-12-november-2017-enps
- <sup>9</sup> https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/voluntary-and-forced-returns-to-afghanistan-in-201617-trends-statistics-and-experiences/
- <sup>10</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ipc\_afghanistan\_national\_level\_acture\_analyssi\_2017\_final\_report.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Humanitarian Overview, Afghanistan, ACAPs (pg7)

### **Central African Republic**


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The Central African Republic suffers from a continuation of violence and insecurity coupled with large-scale displacement. Elections in 2018 increase the risk of an escalation of these trends.

### **Conflict Risk**

The conflict situation in CAR saw an initial uptick in 2016 which continued in 2017 and is expected to remain so, if not increase in levels of severity in 2018. Elections held in early 2016, spurred hopes that the sectarian conflict, which has plagued the country since 2013, would finally end. Those hopes were quickly dashed when clashes erupted again in November 2016. The level of violence and insecurity has steadily increased, hundreds have died, and tens of thousands have been forced from their homes amid escalating violence. Armed groups control some 80% of the country, making it difficult not only to avoid the conflict, but also to gain access to affected populations.<sup>11</sup> Many in the country blame the latest violence, in part, on the new government's failure to satisfy the armed groups' demands for political representation and amnesty.



Continuing a trend that began in 2015, armed groups are turning on themselves, and in some cases teaming up with their former opponents.<sup>12</sup> Antibalaka, frequently referred to as "self-defense" groups, have also expanded. In August 2017, the UN raised alarms about seeing "early warning signs of genocide."<sup>13</sup> Targeted attacks in 2017 on humanitarian and peacekeeping personnel, resulted in the deaths of 13 aid workers and 14 UN peacekeepers. This limits humanitarian space and negatively impacts relief operations across the country.<sup>14</sup> This is worrying trend that is likely to carry into 2018 making it necessary for humanitarians to use even more caution and adjust their operations accordingly.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Central African Republic is among the 10 countries globally facing the highest levels of risk in the Climate Change and Environmental Risk Atlas.<sup>15</sup> The country is prone to flooding which has led to significant structural and humanitarian impacts.<sup>16</sup> Such an occurrence took place in September 2017 in which an estimated 800 dwellings collapsed. The presence of armed groups in the area compounded the vulnerability of those affected by the flooding.<sup>17</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

The longstanding conflict caused displacement of over a million people in 2017 both internal and cross-border.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, the conflict has fueled food insecurity: around 2.4M people are in need of food aid to survive, the largest population in need per capita globally.<sup>19</sup> Food prices, particularly imported food and livestock, have increased in conflict-affected areas. Staple foods, maize and cassava have seen a price inflation of 133% and 92% respectively.<sup>20</sup> The increase is attributed to limited crop yields as a result of crop destruction and disruption of farming due to armed group activity. Civil insecurity will continue to have a negative impact both on agricultural production and market activities in 2018 and will likely lead to further displacement.

- <sup>13</sup> http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/sees-early-warning-signs-genocide-car-170807215828039.html
- <sup>14</sup> https://www.usaid.gov/crisis/central-african-republic
- <sup>15</sup> https://www.unisdr.org/archive/51902
- <sup>16</sup> https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2017-000134-caf
- <sup>17</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/west-and-central-africa-2017-flood-impact-18-oct-2017
- <sup>18</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/rca\_ocha\_112017\_snapshot\_1.pd
- <sup>19</sup> http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/08/sees-early-warning-signs-genocide-car-170807215828039.html
- <sup>20</sup> https://www.acaps.org/country/car/crisis–analysis

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-42279395


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/the-central-african-republic-could-be-on-the-brink-of-a-bloodbath/2017/10/09/b26e59d0-a7bf-11e7-9a98-07140d2eed02\_sto ry.html?utm\_term=.ab6db5154ab4

# Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo continues to suffer from political instability as well as outbreaks of violence by armed groups, particularly in the eastern part of the country. As a result of protracted instability there is a high risk of food insecurity. Elections are scheduled in 2018 and are likely to be contested, with a risk of election violence.

### **Conflict Risk**

Despite the presence of UN peacekeepers, militant groups, estimated at more than 70 within the eastern part of the country, continue to terrorize communities and control weakly governed areas.<sup>21</sup> Other militia groups, such as the Bana Mura, are linked to the government – exacerbating civilians' frustration with the government that claims to be tackling armed groups when in fact they are supporting them and using them to their advantage. Eastern DRC is also a mineral rich area, with some groups financing their activities by exploiting the country's rich natural resources.



4

The situation is complicated by an economic downturn and political uncertainty with President Kabila remaining in power beyond his electoral mandate. The presidential election was originally scheduled for November 2016 but was delayed by the electoral commission who argued that they needed more time to update voter registration and make sure that all election related materials such as voting boxes could be delivered. This announcement came at the end of President Kabila's constitutional mandate and the Supreme Court subsequently ruled that he could maintain power until the new elections on December 23, 2018.<sup>22</sup> This was viewed by many as a clear attempt by Kabila to remain in power which in turn stoked rebellion and lawlessness in the Kasai region, Tanganyika, North Kivu, Kongo Central and Kinshasa. Kasai region (comprised of five provinces) saw one of the largest population movements driven by conflict in 2017. The Congolese government has faced criticism with reports of massive human rights violations including rape, detainment of children,<sup>23</sup> summary executions, and torture at the hands of the government forces (FARDC). In February, videos were released showing FARDC soldiers shooting unarmed civilians<sup>24</sup> including several women, confirming suspicions of government violence against civilians and human rights abuses.

A growing concern for 2018 is the increased risk of confrontation between radicalized youth, (some of which have formed armed groups) and government forces. This is currently ongoing in the Kasai region with the Kamuina Nsapu. However, if areas that are already teetering on the brink of insecurity should host such groups, not only could it lead to further conflict and insecurity, but it is possible that it could spill over into neighboring countries.<sup>25</sup>

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

The DRC is exposed to volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, flooding, and drought. Vulnerability to these hazards is exacerbated by poverty and political insecurity.<sup>26</sup> Between December 2016 and January 2017 severe flooding caused by over a month of rain led to the fatality of 50 people and damaged nearly 3,000 dwellings.<sup>27</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

The situation across DRC deteriorated in 2017, deepening and expanding the humanitarian crisis in previously unaffected areas and chipping away at the coping mechanisms of people in areas already impacted.<sup>28</sup> On 20 October 2017, the UN declared an L3 emergency across South Kivu, Tanganyika and Kasai. More than 1.7M people were displaced in 2017 with an average daily displacement rate of 5,500. The total combined number of internally displaced now reaches 4.1M with the anticipation that this number will grow in 2018. Around 7.7M people are facing severe food insecurity, a 30% increase from the same time last year. Close to 2M children are affected by severe acute malnutrition. These numbers are likely to continue into the coming year. Disease outbreaks are also of concern, with cholera affecting tens of thousands of people every year. In addition to domestic drivers of humanitarian need, DRC also hosts more than half a million refugees, including from Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Rwanda and South Sudan.

- <sup>21</sup> https://www.cfr.org/interactives/global-conflict-tracker#l/conflict/violence-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo
- <sup>22</sup> http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/uncertainty-drc-sets-election-date-replace-kabila-171109074747003.html
- <sup>23</sup> http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha\_drc\_kasais\_situationreport\_12042017\_en.pdf
- <sup>24</sup> https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/world/africa/democratic-republic-congo-massacre-video-.html?\_r=0
- <sup>25</sup> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/30/congo-violence-fuels-fears-of-return-to-90s-bloodbath
- <sup>26</sup> https://www.gfdrr.org/en/congo-democratic-republic
- <sup>27</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/central-african-republic/west-and-central-africa-weekly-regional-humanitarian-snapshot-24-0
- <sup>28</sup> OCHA, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OFTHE CONGO OVERVIEW, November 2017


### Iraq



Conflict leading to displacement and massive ongoing humanitarian needs will continue in 2018 despite a victory over the Islamic State (IS) in 2017.<sup>29</sup> It's likely there will be a shift in affected areas as the government winds down operations against IS and focuses on internal territorial disputes between the government and the Kurds.

### **Conflict Risk**

Military operations to combat IS dominated most of 2017 with Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi claiming victory on 9 December. This happened shortly after the government took control of the entirety of the Iraq-Syria border. Civilian casualties appeared to be significantly decreasing to levels not seen in more than five years with 114 and 117 reported in by the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)<sup>30</sup> in October and November respectively. This could signal a possible downward trend in civilian causalities for 2018. Important for the year to come, IS remains a strong presence in some desert areas of western Iraq and with cells based in the mountainous areas that stretch from just northeast of Baghdad to Tal Afar in the northwest.



The Kurdish region of Iraq has historically been the base from which humanitarians launched responses as well as the location of many IDP camps and safe areas. However, following an independence referendum on 25 September 2017 in which the Kurds attempted to secede from Iraq, the Iraqi Security Forces teamed with the Iranian backed Hashd al-Shaabi to storm Kirkuk -causing many Kurds to flee. Further complicating an already volatile area, in December, violence broke out between Hashd al-Shaabi and Kurdish fighters near Tuz Khormato in Salah al-Din, with mortar fire reported in the town on at least two separate occasions.

Iraq parliamentary elections will be held in May 2018. Iraq's last parliamentary elections were held in 2014 and saw the ruling Shiite National Alliance form a coalition government with the Kurds and Sunnis. It is not clear whether the Kurdish parties will join the Iraqi elections, following the region's vote to leave Iraq in September.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Iraq is vulnerable to flooding, drought and earthquakes. Construction of dams and other water-holding facilities in upstream Turkey and Iran, combined with increasingly erratic rainfall across the region, mean the amount of water flowing in key Iraqi rivers has fallen by at least 40% in recent decades, making water scarcity a key concern.<sup>31</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

Humanitarian needs will continue in 2018 as the Iraq government continues to reposition itself following the takeover of Mosul, Hawija and Tel Afar and families begin to return home. Many will need assistance for reconstruction in areas that were heavily bombed as well as temporary shelters while they rebuild. Those remaining in camps will continue to need full services.

Iraq's Sunnis have been hit harder than perhaps any other group by the rise and subsequent fall of the Islamic State. Whole communities have been displaced and families split apart. Community leaders have fallen away - either through association with IS, or outright joining the group. Others were killed in the fighting, or arbitrarily detained on questionable grounds. This means that the parliamentary elections could prove consequential and likely see some of the most competitive elections Iraq has seen. There could be a shift away from identity with more focus on the many needs of Iraq's Sunnis, many of whom are displaced and in need of assistance.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup> IS and ISIS are used interchangeably within this document.


- <sup>30</sup> http://www.uniraq.org/index.php?option=com\_k2&view=itemlist&layout=category&task=category&id=159&Itemid=633&lang=en
- <sup>31</sup> http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha\_drc\_kasais\_situ ationreport\_12042017\_en.pdf
- <sup>32</sup> https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2017/11/27/iraqs-sunnis-and-the-2018-elections

### Myanmar

Myanmar's ethnic tensions led to violent confrontations in August 2017 and resulted in a government crackdown causing massive displacement, which human rights experts have termed a genocide. The government continues to deny any wrongdoing and justifies military operations as counter-terrorism measures. There is a high risk that the government will continue to target ethnic Rohingya communities leading to both continued displacement and humanitarian needs in 2018.

### **Conflict Risk**

On 25 August 2017, armed Rohingya militants, part of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), attacked border guard police with IEDs and guns. The attack resulted in a massive government crack-down that led to the deaths of an estimated 6,700, including 730 children under the age of five,<sup>33</sup> and the displacement of more than 624,000 ethnic Rohingya from Rakhine State. The cause of the violent outburst is rooted in the longstanding marginalization and suppression of ethnic Rohingya by the government. Grievances of the Rohingya include lack of livelihood opportunities, restriction of movement, and failure by the government to recognize Rohingya as a legitimate ethnicity – effectively making them stateless.



Rakhine State is not the only hotspot in Myanmar. Kachin State, on the border with China, is also home to the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) which has lead several attacks on Myanmar soldiers and outposts in the region. The ceasefire which collapsed in 2011 has resulted in a small series of military engagements leading to the displacement of around 100,000. It's likely that the KIA, along with other separatist groups such as the TNLA (Ta'ang National Liberation Army) and RCSS (Reunification Council of Shat State) in Shan State, could see the situation in Rakhine State as an opportunity to stretch the government's military thin by attempting to suppress multiple groups at once, but it's unlikely that they will unite under one leadership and due to their geographical spread are unlikely to create a large-scale conflict.

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### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Myanmar regularly experiences cyclones, storm surges, floods, landslides, earthquakes, drought and forest fires. Monsoon rains and increased water levels in major rivers cause seasonal floods. In 2017, 13 out of 14 states were affected with an estimated 217,000 temporarily displaced and/or evacuated persons because of flooding while around 74,000 remained displaced towards the end of the year.<sup>35</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

As the situation in Myanmar has somewhat stagnated, with the government refusing to acknowledge participation in massive human rights violations or admit to any repressive measures, there is limited active conflict. However, due to the scale of the atrocities that took place in October 2016 and then again in August 2017, the ongoing fear of reprisals by both government authorities as well as the Buddhist majority population, many Rohingya continue to flee across the border to Bangladesh. Limited data is available on the humanitarian conditions in areas predominately inhabited by Rohingya due to humanitarian blockades by the government. However, based on population estimates of 3.1M, nearly a quarter of the population of Rakhine has fled across the border to Bangladesh, with estimates that another 100,000 could flee in 2018 as a result of continued violence and insecurity.

While there are estimates of displacement, it's unlikely that there will be a repeat of the level of last year's violence seen in Rakhine, if only because a large percentage of the population has now left the area. As such, there is moderate risk of continued conflict with the population remaining in need of support – such as housing for those who lost their homes due to clearance operations which razed villages, as well as access to water and sanitation, food aid and psycho-social support.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/14/6700-rohingya-muslims-killed-in-attacks-in-myanmar-says-medecins-sans-frontieres

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> http://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jan/07/rohingya-insurgents-say-they-have-no-option-but-to-fight-myanmar

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2017-000091-mmr

### Nigeria

Nigeria is at high risk in 2018 of continued armed conflict, displacement and food insecurity, including possible famine, driven by conflict with Islamic insurgents, and natural hazards.

### **Conflict Risk**

In January 2017, Nigeria's president announced victory over Boko Haram (BH) despite continued attacks by the armed group. While BH did lose ground in 2016, precipitating a shift in tactics from large-scale prolonged armed clashes, to sporadic attacks, the level of attacks in 2017 remained the same as 2016. Attacks often come in the form of suicide bombings and IEDs.<sup>36</sup> UNICEF has noted an increase in the use of children and infants to carry-out suicide bombings raising significant protection concerns.<sup>37</sup> With Boko Haram showing resilience in the face of continued government offensives, it is clear that north-eastern Nigeria will see continued violence throughout 2018.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**


Nigeria is vulnerable to flooding during the rainy season, which spans from June to September. In 2017 the Niger and Benue Rivers overflowed causing destruction and displacement.<sup>38</sup> This is a trend likely to continue within the next year as climate change influences weather patterns and rainfall.

### **Humanitarian Impact**

Around 1.7M Nigerians remain displaced with the majority located in Borno State. Food security is a primary need for those in displacement. Nigeria experienced famine level food insecurity in 2017. Despite projected average to above-average yields for upcoming harvests in most areas of Nigeria, insecurity continues to impact agricultural production and food availability in the northeast, resulting in the risk of famine levels in inaccessible areas.<sup>39</sup>

Due to a perceived improvement in the security situation as a result of the government's declaration of victory over Boko Haram, Nigerian refugees previously hosted in Cameroon, Niger and Chad have begun to return, furthering the demand for humanitarian relief and straining the current capacity of humanitarian agencies. However, humanitarian access remains challenged by the increased use of IEDs and suicide bombings as well as general access to areas where Boko Haram is active, particularly northeastern Nigeria; also home to the largest percentage of those in need. Outbreaks of cholera and hepatitis E in 2017 were exacerbated by the lack of healthcare facilities, without further improvement these are likely to continue in 2018.

<sup>36</sup> ACAPs Humanitarian Overview 2018: Nigeria, pg30 <sup>37</sup> UNICEF 8/22/17 <sup>38</sup> floodlist.com/africa/nigeria-floods-kogi-september-2017 <sup>39</sup> usaid.gov/nigeria/food-assistance



### South Sudan

South Sudan remains volatile with limited hope for peace in 2018. The Government and the opposition continue to vie for control over the country while inter-tribal conflicts around resources persist.

### **Conflict Risk**

The security situation in South Sudan continued to deteriorate in 2017. Violence persisted both between the government's SPLA and the main armed opposition SPLA-IO as well as inter-tribal/ communal conflicts precipitated by cattle raids linked to tribal territorial shifts as a result of population movements and diminishing resources.<sup>40</sup> Many of the armed groups have splintered off and localized further complicating peace negotiations as well as negotiations for humanitarian access.<sup>41</sup>

Conflict has hindered food production, and violence has cut off major trade routes contributing to hyperinflation. As an example, fuel costs have increased by 266% since 2016. Due to continued conflict and insecurity, harvest yields are expected to be below-average further exacerbating food insecurity.

Humanitarian access is challenged by the ongoing conflict as well as continued targeting of aid workers by armed groups. Abductions continue while fighting has forced aid workers to relocate, disrupting humanitarian assistance.


#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

South Sudan faces seasonal drought and flooding. Both hazards are compounded by ongoing insecurity where civilians are unable to enjoy free movement to their fields to plant or harvest, and then unable to sell what little they do reap from the land. Flooding in and around displacement camps has accelerated the risk of disease outbreaks.

### **Humanitarian Impact**

Conflict induced displacement continues across the country with 2.1M fleeing to neighboring countries while 1.9M remain internally displaced at the end of 2017.<sup>42</sup> As fighting continues there is a high risk of internal and cross-border movements as civilians attempt to flee the violence and insecurity. The number of acutely food insecure people has increased to 6M—half of the population.

In every state in the country, food insecurity is at either crisis or emergency levels. The situation on the ground may even be far worse as access to some of the most hard-hit areas is restricted. IASC Early Warning, Early Action and Readiness Analysis indicates that the risk of return to famine



conditions remains possible within the first six months of 2018.

South Sudan's current cholera outbreak is the longest, most widespread, and deadliest outbreak in the country since its 2011 independence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> https://africacenter.org/spotlight/south-sudan-conflict-drives-massive-population-movement/

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> ACAPs Humanitarian Overview 2018; South Sudan pg., 40.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/South\_Sudan\_2018\_Humanitarian\_Needs\_Overview.pdf

### Syria



The continuation of the civil war, which is entering its 7th year and the cross-border war against the Islamic State (IS) has created high levels of humanitarian needs. There is also growing concern that the tensions between the United States and Russia could play out in Syria and Iraq under the guise of anti-terror operations. This could increase the civilian death toll as the use of airstrikes would likely increase.

### **Conflict Risk**

A political resolution to the ongoing Syria conflict remains elusive as the 8th round of the UN-backed Geneva talks took place without any meaningful steps forward as the Government constrained discussions to counter-terrorism efforts. The Government maintains a siege of Eastern Ghouta, where an estimated 393,000 Syrians remain, living under worsening conditions.

As countries begin to scale down their military support in the war against IS, this could leave more room for the Government of Syria and the armed opposition to continue their fight with limited international oversight.


Military offensives against opposition fighters continue across the country suggesting that the Government remains committed to pursuing a military agenda despite appearances of diplomatic talks with rebel factions. Indeed, despite repeated efforts to revive the Geneva process throughout 2017, conflict activity has actually broadly risen throughout the year.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Syria is prone to earthquakes and drought. According to the UN an estimated 2 to 3 million people are food insecure. Drought has played a significant part in that as it has in combination with the ongoing conflict impact cultivation of the country's barley crop.

### **Humanitarian Impact**

The humanitarian community recorded 1,240,626 displacements in the last 12 months from affected areas of northern and southern Syria.<sup>43</sup> With further conflict foreseen during 2018 additional displacement of civilians around the front-line areas in the northwest of the country is expected.



Conversely, IDP returns are also likely in 2018, particularly in areas that have been cleared of IS. There is concern about the safety of areas, specifically the possible presence of landmines and IEDs in homes and areas formerly occupied by IS.<sup>44</sup> The UN has indicated that the needs of returnees includes urgent supply of food, water and other assistance, and the UN is concerned about the possibility of disease spreading due to lack of appropriate sanitation.<sup>45</sup>

<sup>43</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/171206%20syria%20flash%20update%20cccm%20snfi%20protection.pdf

<sup>44</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-crisis-northeast-syria-situation-report-no-19-6-november-10

<sup>45</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/171206%20syria%20flash%20update%20cccm%20snfi%20protection.pdf

### Venezuela



2

Venezuela is experiencing high levels of food insecurity and a health crisis that has been precipitated by a near economic collapse. Political insecurity and the humanitarian situation are driving both cross border and internal displacement. With elections scheduled in 2018, the situation is likely to continue to deteriorate.

### **Conflict Risk**

Venezuela is experiencing its deepest crisis in recent history, the result of two decades of economic downturn resulting in deterioration of salary and purchasing power, and a now-chronic scarcity of food and medicine.<sup>46</sup> Inflation has put the price of basic goods out of reach for many, resulting in widespread hunger and malnutrition.<sup>47</sup>


Insecurity manifested in April 2017 following protests against President Maduro and his government, particularly in regard to failing to address the growing inflation rate leading to large-scale food insecurity. The demonstrations were initially peaceful but grew in severity of violence as time passed.

The crisis has led many Venezuelans to cross international borders to access functioning markets; this movement has recently included people fleeing into both Brazil and Colombia.

Before April, most Venezuelans were fleeing their country's severe economic crisis rather than political persecution, and were therefore unlikely to qualify for refugee status. That has since changed with several countries acknowledging the conditions within Venezuela as severe enough to warrant at the minimum temporary protection. A UN human rights team conducted interviews with individuals in Venezuela who reported widespread and systematic use of excessive force with 124 deaths and 1,958 reported injuries as well as 5,051 arbitrary detentions of demonstrators.<sup>48</sup> In several of the cases reviewed by the UN Human Rights Office, there were credible reports of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees by security forces, amounting to several cases to torture.<sup>49</sup> President Maduro's increasingly authoritarian rule means it is likely more Venezuelans may qualify for international protection over the coming year.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, mudslides, and cyclones are a risk for Venezuelans.



#### **Humanitarian Impact**

The extent of the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela is difficult to assess as the government has tried to cover it up by enforcing a near-total blackout of health statistics, and by creating a culture in which doctors are often afraid to register cases and deaths that may be associated with the government's failures.<sup>50</sup>

The limited information that is known indicates that malnutrition continues to increase across Venezuela. According to Caritas, 15 in 100 children are severely malnourished and 280,000 children are at risk of dying due to malnutrition in the states of Zulia, Vargas, Miranda and Capital District.<sup>51</sup> In one year, acute malnutrition in the infant population (0 – 5 years) has increased from 8% to 14.5%.

An estimated 78% of hospitals are experiencing medicine shortages including 75% that lack medical and/or surgical equipment and supplies.<sup>52</sup> There is no information on the number of fatalities related to the lack of medicines but the increase in disease is evident with the number of malaria cases increasing by 63.1% in the last year. The dire situation is also reflected in the number of people fleeing the country. Many travel to neighboring Colombia to receive food and medical attention; in October alone more than 110,000 left the country. It is estimated that about half a million Venezuelans have entered Colombia in 2017, mostly looking for access to food (80%), medicines or health care.<sup>53</sup> With no end in sight and elections to be held in 2018, it's likely that the situation will continue to deteriorate. Without official recognition from the government, most humanitarians will likely resort to setting up along the border to assist as Venezuelans make day trips for supplies.

- <sup>46</sup> https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/amid-economic-crisis-and-political-turmoil-venezuelans-form-new-exodus?utm\_content=buffer7931f&utm\_medium=social&utm\_ source=twitter.com&utm\_campaign=buffer
- <sup>47</sup> https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/amid-economic-crisis-and-political-turmoil-venezuelans-form-new-exodus?utm\_content=buffer7931f&utm\_medium=social&utm\_ source=twitter.com&utm\_campaign=buffer
- <sup>48</sup> http://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/un-human-rights-team-s-findings-indicate-patterns-rights
- <sup>49</sup> "Tactics used included electric shocks, beatings, including with helmets and sticks while handcuffed, hanging detainees by the wrists for long periods, suffocation with gas, and threats of killings and in some cases threats of sexual violence against the detainees or their families." (OHCHR, 8 August 2017)
- <sup>50</sup> https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/12/17/world/americas/venezuela-children-starving.htm
- <sup>51</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/venezuela-complex-emergency-dg-echo-echo-daily-flash-4-december
- <sup>52</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/venezuela-complex-emergency-dg-echo-echo-daily-flash-4-december

<sup>53</sup> Ibid

### Yemen

Yemen is experiencing unprecedented levels of food insecurity, disease outbreak and overall humanitarian need. It is considered the world's largest food security emergency. This is compounded by nearly 1M affected with cholera with the background of continued conflict. The death of former President Saleh, continued Houthi missile attacks targeting Riyadh and the increase in higher level political tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran, suggest a very strong likelihood of an escalation of the conflict in 2018.

### **Conflict Risk**

In March 2015, a coalition of Arab nations – led by Saudi Arabia and with the support of the UK and US – began a bombing campaign in Yemen in a bid to stop Houthi rebels from taking control of the country. The US government is simultaneously targeting Al Qaeda militants operating within Yemen.

The Houthis, backed by Iran, vie for control of the country at times fighting off the territorial gains of IS backed groups and at other times sharing space, while Saudi Arabia continues to implement

repressive measure preventing food shipments and carrying out indiscriminate attacks. The conflict is likely to intensify in 2018 as both parties are unwilling to step down.


On 4 December 2017, Yemen's former President Ali Abdullah Saleh was killed by Houthi fighters after an attempt to negotiate with the Saudi government for the removal of the Saudi blockade that is exacerbating food insecurity. The Houthi rebels considered this move an attempt to undermine their position and authority. The Houthis have since continued to target Riyadh through the use of missiles which has resulted in intensified counter-attacks. This most recent intensification of political moves, and tit-for-tat violence, suggests a volatile foundation upon which this otherwise stagnant conflict will surge into 2018.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Yemen has historically been affected by cyclones and cyclone induced flash flooding.

### **Humanitarian Impact**

An estimated 8M people are suffering from severe food insecurity including 400,000 children while 80% of the country lacks access to food, fuel, clean water and health care.<sup>54</sup> Saudi Arabia continues to try to block commercial shipments from entering the country which hinders access to food as Yemen relies heavily on imports to survive. This will have large-scale humanitarian implications in 2018.



Two million remain in displacement and with no end in sight for the conflict displacement is sure to increase.<sup>55</sup> Despite the ongoing conflict, regular migration flows between the Horn of Africa and Yemen have surged as well, with 10,000 migrants entering the country each month many with the hope of reaching Saudi Arabia.<sup>56</sup> This not only drains local resources which are already scarce if not non-existent, but also provides a huge protection concern as many of these migrants may be unaware of the conditions in which they are arriving and become vulnerable to attacks by armed groups as well as the general humanitarian concerns that affect the local population.

<sup>54</sup> www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/12/21/one-million-people-have-caught-cholera-in-yemen-you-should-be-outraged/?utm\_term=.79ec6d2c5f19

<sup>55</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/yemen/humanitarian-catastrophe-looms-yemen-over-33-million-displaced-crisis-began

 $^{56} www.reliefweb.int/report/yemen/humanitarian-catastrophe-looms-yemen-over-33-million-displaced-crisis-began$ 

## 2018 REMAINING WATCHLIST COUNTRIES

### Bangladesh

The humanitarian needs of the estimated 655,000 Rohingya refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 2017 provide a high risk for a humanitarian crisis in 2018 as response capacity is overwhelmed by the numbers and extent of the needs. There is also a high risk of natural disasters such as cyclones, typhoons, flooding and severe storms. Compounding the situation is the risk of a complex emergency; flooding affecting refugee camps causing secondary displacement, and further vulnerabilities in 2018.

### **Conflict Risk**

Bangladesh is not currently experiencing high levels of violence or insecurity. While a Bangladeshi outbreak of conflict is not expected in 2018, there is an undercurrent of fear that the increasing number of Rohingya refugees, some accused of being members of the Islamic radical group the Arakan Rohingya Solidarity Army (ARSA), could bring instability and insecurity to the country. This extends to a foreseen risk of ARSA launching cross border attacks into Myanmar from refugee camps in Cox's Bazaar, Bangladesh; this in turn could result in retaliatory attacks from the Government of Myanmar security services or its proxies against positions within Bangladesh.


#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Bangladesh is prone to flood related disasters with much of the country built on low-lying and flood-prone areas, making it particularly vulnerable to seasonal monsoon rains.<sup>57</sup> Approximately 80% of Bangladesh's yearly rainfall will occur from June to October, and by the end of monsoon season, almost one third of the country is underwater.<sup>58</sup>

164.67 M

In 2017, the IFRC estimated that 700,000 homes were partially or totally destroyed and up to a third of its terrain – much of it farmland – was left submerged, raising fears of a coming food shortage.<sup>59</sup> Bangladesh also experiences Severe Cyclonic Storms, the most recent was Cyclone Mora which hit in May 2017 and affected 3.3M people leaving an estimated 500,000 in need of humanitarian assistance.<sup>60</sup> The most severely affected area was Cox's Bazar, the Rohingya refugee settlement near the border with Myanmar.

According to the Asian Development Bank<sup>61</sup> 31.5% of Bangladeshis live below the national poverty line. For communities living hand-to-mouth, the slightest drop in crop production can prove devastating for rural/agricultural communities.



#### **Humanitarian Impact**

The humanitarian situation for Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh remains dire, with some 655,000 refugees newly arrived since 25 August 2017.<sup>62</sup> At least 58% of them are children.<sup>63</sup> On 10 November, MSF reported the first case of diphtheria in Cox's Bazar. With currently inadequate infrastructure and overcrowding within the refugee camps, the risk of additional disease outbreaks is real.

While the pace of arrivals has slowed down, thousands of refugees continue to arrive every week, adding pressure on already stretched resources on the ground. The arrivals are anticipated to continue in 2018 with the needs of those already in Bangladesh mounting due to a lack of access to assistance and few coping mechanisms available.

While Bangladesh struggles to respond to the refugee crisis, the humanitarian impact of floods in host populations must also be a concern. For example, in 2017, floods in northern and central areas of the country between August and September affected around 8.6M people.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>57</sup> www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/asia/bangladesh-south-asia-floods

- <sup>58</sup> www.plancanada.ca/monsoon-season-in-bangladesh
- <sup>59</sup> www.cnn.com/2017/09/01/asia/bangladesh-south-asia-floods
- <sup>60</sup> www.reliefweb.int/disaster/tc-2017-000058-bg
- <sup>61</sup> www.adb.org/countries/bangladesh/poverty
- <sup>62</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/bangladesh/iscg-situation-update-rohingya-refugee-crisis-cox-s-bazar-14-december-2017
- 63 Ibid
- www.blogs.redcross.org.uk/appeals/2017/08/bangladesh-people-struggle-worst-monsoon-floods-years

### **North Korea**

Political tensions between the United States and North Korea continue to escalate. Meanwhile donor fatigue and UN sanctions are likely to have a devastating impact on the civilian population in 2018 with a high risk of contributing to famine like conditions as seen in the 1990s. The country is already experiencing high levels of food insecurity related to drought with 41% (10.5M people) of the country currently food insecure.

### **Conflict Risk**


The ongoing tensions between North Korea and the United States escalated in 2017 with both leaders resorting to name calling and demonstrations of military prowess. North Korea has fired 23 missiles during 16 tests since February.<sup>65</sup> Experts indicate that with each launch North Korea is further perfecting its technology.

In response to the growing threat of a hostile nuclear North Korea, the United States, along with its regional allies, urged tougher sanctions on North Korea.<sup>66</sup> On September 11th, the UN Security Council

approved sanctions that would cap annual imports of refined petroleum products (such as gasoline and diesel) to 2M barrels, an estimated 56% drop in importation.<sup>67</sup> At the same time, the sanctions include a total ban on crude supply to North Korea beyond what China provides through the Dandong-Sinuiju pipeline. Experts hypothesize that the cut in oil imports to North Korea may have no immediate impact on the nuclear program as authorities could divert oil from other non-military sectors such as manufacturing and agriculture. This move would directly impact the civilian population. Specifically, a diversion of fuel from the agricultural sector could impact food security within an already vulnerable context. The new sanctions also limit the ability of North Korea to send laborers to work abroad and impose an asset freeze on three North Korean entities. In addition, sanctions have had an unintended effect on humanitarian assistance, by disrupting banking channels aid groups use to access funds, forcing long delays or cancellations. Sanctions have also impacted healthcare and access to services preventing the import of chemotherapy medication and equipment for people with disabilities.<sup>68</sup>

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

The FAO reported in 2017 that the country is experiencing its most severe drought since 2001. While this has a direct impact on food security, another major consideration is flooding. Major flooding has taken place across the country every year from 2010 to 2016 and will continue into the foreseeable future.<sup>69</sup>



3

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

The risk of a humanitarian crisis on the Korean peninsula is high, both from the threat of a conflict as well as consequences of high levels of food insecurity as a consequence of international sanctions. The current food security situation is dire with an estimated 10.5M, or 41% of the population, considered food insecure. The majority of the population lives in rural areas supported by agriculture with food rations supplied by the government and WFP. Due to the growing international attention on the nuclear program and the ever present ethical dilemma of providing aid to a country that prefers to prioritize weapons over feeding its people, there has been a significant drop in donor interest in supporting efforts in North Korea. In November 2017, the WFP cutback nutrition programs targeting 190,000 children due to lack of funds. This comes after the program had already scaled back programs to the point of only meeting the bare minimum to make a nutritional impact on beneficiaries.<sup>70</sup> The FAO raised concerns in July 2017 of a possible shortage of cereal crops due to drought, which will significantly impact the food supplies for winter.<sup>71</sup> Because the levels of food insecurity are already high, it would not take long before the population was affected. As in the 1990s, this is likely to lead to large-scale internal displacement and cross-border movements into China.


- <sup>65</sup> http://www.cnn.com/2017/05/29/asia/north-korea-missile-tests/index.html
- <sup>66</sup> www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-10/japan-backs-u-s-proposal-to-target-north-korea-s-oil-supplies
- <sup>67</sup> www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-09-12/sanctions-to-cut-north-korea-fuel-imports-as-crude-keeps-flowing
- <sup>68</sup> http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/01/09/donors-lose-appetite-north-korean-food-aid
- <sup>69</sup> www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/08/28/commentary/world-commentary/north-koreas-impending-perfect-storm
- <sup>70</sup> http://www.irinnews.org/analysis/2018/01/09/donors-lose-appetite-north-korean-food-aid
- <sup>71</sup> www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/1ace72a2-a462-4a71http://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/1ace72a2-a462-4a71-abb2-17a937fcOa87/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-17a97/-abb2-1

### **El Salvador**

El Salvador is likely to see an increase in levels of humanitarian needs associated with mass deportations, specifically from the United States and Mexico as well as internal displacement related to gang violence. Homicide rates will continue to rise, and may hit record numbers during the election, scheduled for 4 March 2018. There is also significant risk of natural disasters.

### **Conflict Risk**

El Salvador is suffering from widespread violence and displacement linked to gang-related activity. Since 2014, after the end of a government-brokered truce with the MS13 and Barrio 18, the country has one of the highest global homicide rates with an average of 4 deaths per 15 minutes.<sup>72</sup> The state has tried to counter this trend by implementing security policies that prioritize repressive measures nicknamed the "Iron Fist" and they have also promoted the creation of elite police units.<sup>73</sup> Despite the measures by the government, gang-violence and extortion is rampant and will continue to impact communities into 2018.



3

The State Government and the Central Government have separate positions on displacement. In late 2017, the State Government indirectly recognized gang-violence as a driver of displacement in three Supreme Court cases. This is significant, as it is a shift in the state's position on displacement from denial to indirect recognition which could play a role in the future in how the state responds to displacement. However, the Central Government continues to ignore the issue in favor of taking a harder stance on crime and gangs to stem violence. As elections near it's likely that the hard stance could result in an increase in violence against gangs as well as gang retaliation.

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

El Salvador is located on the Pacific "Ring of Fire" – an area of the Pacific Basin with a large number of earthquakes and volcanic eruptions – and prone to natural hazards and susceptible to the effects of climate change, including hurricanes. A 2010 report by UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination ranked El Salvador as the most vulnerable country in the world, with 95% of the population at risk from natural disasters.<sup>74</sup> Land degradation and soil erosion, exacerbated by recurrent flood and drought, adversely impact agricultural production, further affecting the livelihoods of the rural poor.<sup>75</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

The displacement rate across El Salvador is significantly underreported. This is likely the result of both individuals concerned for their safety and unwilling to seek assistance as well as the Central Government and State Government's failure in the past to acknowledge gang-violence as a driver of displacement. Youth, women, and girls are particularly vulnerable to threats, intimidation and violence, including rape. Members of the LGBTI community are also highly vulnerable.<sup>76</sup>

In addition to displacement, other vulnerable groups include those returning following deportation from the United States and other countries because of failed asylum claims. According to IOM,<sup>77</sup> 20,840 were returned to El Salvador in 2017 from January to September. Of those, 13.9% of adults and 27.1% of children reported insecurity as the motivation for migration.

- <sup>74</sup> theguardian.com/journalismcompetition/el-salvador-disaster-planning
- <sup>75</sup> gfdrr.org/el–salvador
- <sup>76</sup> ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=21985&LangID=E
- <sup>77</sup> reliefweb.int/report/el-salvador/el-salvador-cifras-oficiales-de-retornos-enero-septiembre-2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> nytimes.com/2017/07/15/opinion/sunday/latin-america-murder-homicide.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> insightcrime.org/news-briefs/el-salvador-extend-extraordinary-anti-gang-measures-2018

### **Ethiopia**

Ethiopia faces risk of an escalation in inter-ethnic tensions between the Oromia and Somali regions and large-scale humanitarian needs associated with drought and food insecurity in 2018.

### **Conflict Risk**

Following intense anti-government protests that took place throughout 2016, the government imposed a 10-month state of emergency, which was lifted in July 2017. While this heightened state of alert calmed most of the restive areas in the Oromia region, it did not stop cross-border clashes in the Oromia and Somali areas, which share a 1,400-kilometer border.

In September 2017, protests turned violent leaving an estimated 18 dead, though some claim the number was as high as 40.<sup>78</sup> The unrest and insecurity that followed drove hundreds of thousands from their homes, with media reporting upwards of 200,000 displaced, however humanitarian aid workers in the camps spoke of 400,000.<sup>79</sup>


In a surprise move in the early days of 2018, the government announced that it would be freeing political prisoners and closing a notorious prison camp. This promising sign appears intended to stave off future violent political protests and observes will monitor this closely to see how successful a strategy it proves to be.<sup>80</sup>

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

In addition to conflict, Ethiopia faces high risk of drought and other weather-related crises. In 2016, Ethiopia experienced a near famine in the highlands but it was averted through additional food aid and humanitarian support. In 2017, the drought pushed towards the lowland region, particularly the area bordering Somalia. The drought, brought on by warming temperatures in the Indian Ocean has ravaged the flocks of the herders in the region and left people without food and water.<sup>81</sup>

### **Humanitarian Impact**

At the beginning of 2017, 5.6M Ethiopians were in need of food aid, primarily in the south and southeast of the country. That number recently jumped to 8.5M as a result of displacement and ongoing food insecurity exacerbated by drought and disease outbreak.<sup>82</sup> Ethiopia's Somali region accounts for 25% of the Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) admissions of the national SAM caseload.<sup>83</sup>



4

Water scarcity in lowland areas of Oromia, Somali and Afar regions is critical. Approximately 2.7M people will need emergency water supply, using water trucking into early parts of 2018.<sup>84</sup> In addition to internal displacement and massive food and water insecurity, Ethiopia is also host to the second largest refugee population in Africa, accommodating 893,938 registered refugees (the majority from South Sudan) and asylum seekers as of 30 November 2017.<sup>85</sup> This places an additional burden on the government and aid agencies as a large percentage are dependent on humanitarian assistance.

- <sup>82</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-weekly-humanitarian-bulletin-7-august-2017
- <sup>83</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/situation\_report\_no.13\_-\_july\_2017\_\_0.pdf
- <sup>84</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-water-trucking-gap-analysis-2017-25-may-2017
- <sup>85</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/unhcr-ethiopia-factsheet-november-2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> irinnews.org/analysis/2017/11/08/ethnic-violence-displaces-hundreds-thousands-ethiopians

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> irinnews.org/analysis/2017/11/08/ethnic-violence-displaces-hundreds-thousands-ethiopians

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>80</sup> washingtonpost.com/world/africa/ethiopia-to-release-all-political-prisoners-close-camp/2018/01/03/3001251e-f07a-11e7-95e3-eff284e71c8d\_story.html?utm\_te m=.0d61a8182f76

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/01/ethiopia-is-facing-a-killer-drought-but-its-going-almost-unnoticed/?utm\_term=.49e1e11a37e

### Libya

Libya is at high risk of continued conflict and displacement in 2018 driven by internal territorial disputes between the UN-backed government and the Libyan National Army. Irregular migration through the country will also continue, leading to massive protection concerns and humanitarian needs.

### **Conflict Risk**

Positive signs appeared in 2017 between the UN-backed government and the leader of the Libyan National Army. In July, the leader of the Libyan National Army and Libya's prime minister of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) agreed on a ceasefire in order to hold elections in 2018. The ceasefire does not extend to the LNA and GNA combating the Islamic State (IS).<sup>86</sup> As such, clashes are on-going between the LNA and militant groups as well as the GNA-led forces and IS.

In 2017, more than 20,000 people were newly displaced by conflict while around 199,091 remained in displacement.<sup>87</sup> According to reports, the number of IDPs has decreased throughout 2017 due to

large-scale returns.<sup>88</sup> New displacement in Sabratah in September 2017 saw an estimated 11,350 displaced due to insecurity and an outbreak of violence, however around 90% had returned by November. Smaller scale, short-term displacement combined with the large-scale returns could signal a possible shift in humanitarian needs in the coming year.


Libya is both a country in conflict as well as a transit point of departure for migrants from neighboring and West African countries who wish to seek a better future in Europe by crossing the Mediterranean. This trans-Mediterranean migration route has helped to fund the militant groups operating in Libya through fees and bribes paid to them for smuggling and trafficking. Over 400,000 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in Libya are particularly exposed to abuse and human rights violations as armed groups engage in smuggling, trafficking and exploitation.<sup>89</sup>

### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Libya is at risk of widespread drought.

### **Humanitarian Impact**

The humanitarian crisis in Libya is largely defined by acute needs prompted by conflict and insecurity and human rights violations faced by migrants, refugees and asylum seekers. Areas of concern include official and non-official detention facilities where refugees, migrants and asylum seekers are kept while either waiting for family members to pay bribes to smugglers or for deportation. This is coupled with an environment of deepening vulnerability for



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the population at large, with a rapid deteriorating economy and public sector.90

According to the latest UN and partners' needs analysis, 1.1M people, of whom 378,000 are children and 453,000 are women of reproductive age (15-49), require life-saving humanitarian assistance and protection. Food security, access to water, and protection mechanisms for displaced and migrants will continue to dominate the needs for 2018. As the displacement numbers fall aid agencies will likely shift more towards providing assistance to migrants in detention facilities and those awaiting return to their countries of origin.

<sup>86</sup> ACAPs Humanitarian Overview 2018, Libya pg. 26.

<sup>87</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/unhcr-flash-update-libya-9-15-december-2017

<sup>88</sup> DTM Libya Round 12, August 2017

<sup>89</sup> Humanitarian Needs Overview 2018; Libya, November 2017, <http://www.unocha.org/libya>


<sup>90</sup> ACAPs Humanitarian Overview 2018, Libya pg. 26.

### Mali

Mali is at high risk of violence and insecurity in 2018 related to a growing presence of terrorist organizations as well as competition over scarce resources leading to inter-communal violence.

### **Conflict Risk**

The UN and other humanitarian agencies are increasingly worried about worsening levels of violence and insecurity including growing threats of terrorism, criminality and inter-communal tensions in northern and central Mali.<sup>91</sup> The Group of Support to Muslims and Islam (GSIM) has become the biggest jihadi group in the Sahara, and is now operating in Mali. It is a coalition comprised of AQIM, Ansar Dine, Macina Liberation Front & Mourabitounes Coalition (also known as Group for the Defense of Islam and Muslims).<sup>92</sup> The new coalition has expanded terrorist activities within Mali. The armed groups have targeted military posts and government officials and as a result, the military has scaled down its presence, providing minimum security in the affected areas, leaving residents vulnerable to armed groups and insecurity.<sup>93</sup>



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Insecurity and population movements have exacerbated competition over scarce resources and led to the creation of local self-defense groups. This has in turn fueled inter-communal violence. Neighboring Niger and Burkina Faso are likely to be impacted as terrorist groups expand the area under their control causing civilians to flee.

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Mali is vulnerable to flooding and droughts.

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

Communities are impacted through protection risks as well as challenges associated with limited access to public services, documentation, shelter, water, education and food security.<sup>94</sup> One in four people are food insecure with one in ten children suffering from acute malnutrition in Mali. Areas particularly affected by food insecurity are the conflict-affected regions of Kidal, Timbuktu, Mopti and Gao.<sup>95</sup> Approximately 1.2M people need support to access water, sanitation and hygiene. The delivery of basic services is hampered because local authorities are either absent or lack the capacity to meet people's needs, and the security situation in parts of the country is hampering the delivery of aid to vulnerable people. Due to the expansion of the militant groups to central Mali, needs are likely to continue into 2018 and could in fact escalate in the event of further territorial expansion by the coalition group.

<sup>91</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/mali/worsening-mali-security-situation-damaging-human-rights-un-expert-finds-after-visit

<sup>92</sup> www.trackingterrorism.org/group/jamaa-nusrat-ul-islam-wa-al-muslimin-group-support-islam-and-muslims-gsim-aqim-ansar-dine-maci

<sup>93</sup> www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/sahel-malis-crumbling-peace-process-and-spreading-jihadist-threat

<sup>94</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/mali/mali-unhcr-operational-update-november-2017


<sup>95</sup> Preliminary results of the National Food and Nutrition Survey (ENSAN) 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/wfp-mali-country-brief-october-2017

## Mexico

Humanitarian risk in Mexico is driven by forced internal displacement associated with gang violence. Additionally Mexico faces high risk of natural disasters, particularly earthquakes, focused in densely populated urban areas, where humanitarian impact would be substantial.

#### **Conflict Risk**

Mexico, like El Salvador, is affected by gang and crime related violence contributing to displacement and migration. A decade-long war between the Mexican authorities and the drug cartels led to a 'decapitation' of the larger cartels as their leaders have been captured and imprisoned. With a dearth of leadership, the cartels have splintered into dozens of smaller groups, waging war against each other for dominance. Unfortunately, this has resulted in a larger toll on the population – with Mexico suffering its highest murder rate in a century, in 2017.<sup>96</sup> This represents a clear failure of President Nieto to meet his 2012 campaign promise to reduce the murder rate. So far, none of the presidential candidates for the 2018 election have produced any new ideas on how to tackle the violence, leading to an expectation that it will continue to grow.<sup>97</sup>



While the community support many of the former cartels, support which was often attributed to security has deteriorated with the fragmentation of the cartels, it has not led to more community support for policing or better control of the gang violence.<sup>98</sup> Communities have taken multiple approaches, none of which have been fully successful. Some have rejected the government and installed their own private militias – stemming the violence but hampering public services. Others have re-organized police departments and built community relations - but rely on the will of temporary political figures.<sup>99</sup> Without a functional national strategy to stem the violence, which many believe is the result of weak and corrupt government, Mexico is likely to continue to see record levels of violence in 2018.

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#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Mexico is prone to earthquakes and experienced several strong quakes in 2017 measuring 8.2 and 7.1 magnitudes. Mexico's population density in urban areas combined with poor infrastructure, generates high risk for casualties and large-scale humanitarian impact in the aftermath of an earthquake.

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

Violence and natural hazards are expected to threaten an increased number of vulnerable Mexicans in 2018 as humanitarian needs of those displaced by violence grow, and an increasing number of Mexicans return to Mexico from the US while others from Central America arrive to seek asylum. Chiapas State, located in the southeast of the country is home to more than 5,000 displaced persons in dire conditions. Many have little or no access to drinking water or sanitation in addition to disease outbreaks.<sup>100</sup> Violence and insecurity have escalated to the point of causing schools and roads to close in some areas.

There has been a recent shift in government policy towards recognizing forced displacement caused by gang activity. Mexico's National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) issued Recommendation No. 39/2017 in November 2017.<sup>101</sup> This is the first official recognition by a Mexican authority of forced internal displacement because of violence in Mexico. It is hoped this move will increase services and protection mechanisms for forcibly displaced persons across Mexico.

In addition to the existing humanitarian situation within the country, in 2018 Mexico is expected to see a dramatic increase in arrivals of deportees from the United States. This will occur with the end of both the Temporary Protection Status program, which focused heavily on individuals from the Northern Triangle and the Differed Action for Childhood Arrivals program, which targeted children of immigrants who were brought to the US by their parents or family members enabling them to remain in the US to work or study. It is expected this population will need access to specialized services tailored towards reintegration. Additionally, many irregular migrants who would otherwise have transited through Mexico on their way to the US are expected to remain in Mexico in 2018, increasing the need for assistance. Mexico has reported a 150% increase in asylum applications since Trump was elected.<sup>102</sup>

<sup>96</sup> www.usnews.com/news/best-countries/articles/2017-12-08/splintering-of-cartels-in-mexico-pushes-deadly-violence-to-record-levels

<sup>97</sup> ibid

<sup>98</sup> www.nytimes.com/2018/01/07/world/americas/mexico-state-corruption.html

<sup>99</sup> ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/mexico/desplazamiento-forzado-en-chiapas-la-protecci-n-de-la-infancia-es-el-deber-de-todos

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=22433&LangID=E

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> www.cnn.com/2017/07/24/americas/trump-effect-mexico-southern-border/index.html

## Niger

Niger is at high risk for Boko Haram activity and attacks, and resultant new and protracted displacement during 2108. Niger is also at high risk of flooding – causing massive displacement, large-scale destruction and impacting livelihoods and food security.

#### **Conflict Risk**


Increasing insecurity coupled with protracted displacement in the Diffa region due to Boko Haram attacks within the context of sustained poverty and inadequate basic social services are ripe conditions for further humanitarian needs. Boko Haram continues to operate in the southeast region of Diffa on the border with Nigeria<sup>103</sup> where more than 240,000 refugees and displaced persons are sheltered.<sup>104</sup> Nigerien authorities were planning to transfer thousands to camps further away from the Nigerian border where Boko Haram operates as reported in July 2017, though it does not appear that the government has carried out those plans.<sup>105</sup> Despite alarmist scenarios, Boko Haram has failed to extend its influence beyond the Diffa region.<sup>106</sup>

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Niger's rainy season which spans from February to September often leads to large-scale flooding which precipitates landslides. According to experts, climate change in the Sahel is creating warmer conditions where the atmosphere can hold more moisture, often increasing the volume of rainfall. In 2017 alone, the season's rainfall increased by 84% from levels seen in 2010.<sup>107</sup> Above average rainfalls are expected to negatively impact agricultural yields and likely to lead to flooding in some areas.<sup>108</sup>

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

The number of people in need of humanitarian assistance is expected to increase to 2.3M in the next year, an increase of 400,000 from 2017. The needs analysis shows the persistence of five major crises: food insecurity, malnutrition, epidemics, floods and population movements. Nutrition indicators have deteriorated sharply, with more than 1.7M people expected to be in need, an increase of 250,000 over 2017. The 2017 Global Hunger Index reported that approximately 19% of children under five are acutely malnourished while 43 percent of children younger than five years of age are chronically malnourished.<sup>109</sup>



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<sup>103</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/niger/unicef-niger-humanitarian-situation-report-october-2017

- <sup>104</sup> www.doctorswithoutborders.org/article/struggling-survive-diffa-niger
- <sup>105</sup> www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/boko-haram-suspected-deadly-niger-attack-170703141614373.html
- <sup>106</sup> www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/niger/245-niger-and-boko-haram-beyond-counter-insurgency
- <sup>107</sup> www.reuters.com/article/us-niger-floods-aid/niger-floods-leave-tens-of-thousands-homeless-as-rebuilding-lags-idUSKCN1BU19Z
- <sup>108</sup> www.fews.net/west-africa/niger/food-security-outlook/june-2017
- <sup>109</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-food-assistance-fact-sheet-updated-november-28-2017

## Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT)

Tensions were inflamed in late 2017 leading to wide-scale protests in OPT and other Palestinian held areas. These tensions will continue in 2018 with the likelihood of escalation to armed conflict. Humanitarian needs will increase as Israel attempts to block assistance as a means of suppressing an uprising/intifada.

#### **Conflict Risk**

In 2017, as the occupied Palestinian territory (OPT) entered its 50th year of occupation, humanitarian needs remained high. Tensions continue in East Jerusalem while the West Bank, and Gaza continue to experience restrictions and deprivations stemming from the blockade imposed since 2007.

OPT is likely to see a significant increase in conflict and violent outbreaks in 2018, specifically related to the US shift in position on Jerusalem and a perceived lack of interest in supporting peace negotiations between Israel and Palestine.<sup>110</sup>

Despite the political upheaval and the violent demonstrations that have taken place in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza strip, experts challenge inferences to a third "intifada" or large-scale uprising.<sup>111</sup> The biggest obstacle to a united front from the Palestinian communities and a declared intifada is the lack of a common agenda among the three Palestinian communities (East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza strip). While they are challenging different status quos those most likely to instigate conflict would be those in East Jerusalem who are also more directly impacted by the new decision.

Hamas is calling for an intifada, but only in the West Bank and Jerusalem where they don't have control. However, a declared intifada runs contrary to the interest of the Palestinian Authority (PA) on which tens of thousands of officials and security personnel rely on for their livelihood as they coordinate with Israel. This suggests that while we consider it unlikely that an official intifada will be declared, violence is expected to increase in the coming year.

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

OPT is vulnerable to earthquakes, floods, landslides, droughts and desertification.

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#### **Humanitarian Impact**

Restrictions on Palestinian movements and access to basic services and humanitarian assistance is expected to continue, and likely to increase, throughout 2018.<sup>112</sup>

The 1.9M Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip are vulnerable and in need of some level of humanitarian assistance. This need is expected to grow in 2018 if violence increases as expected. For example, access to water is limited to only a few hours every two or four days, power shortages continue with use only available for six to eight hours a day. Such power shortages also hinder the delivery of essential services. Healthcare services in Gaza continue to struggle to meet the needs of the population, facing challenges including the lack of adequate stocks of lifesaving medicines and supplies.<sup>113</sup> Another 3M Palestinians living in the West Bank and are expected to be impacted if violence escalates as expected.

<sup>110</sup> www.npr.org/2017/12/08/569468916/palestinian-president-says-u-s-no-longer-qualified-to-broker-peace-talks
<sup>111</sup> www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.828100

<sup>112</sup> www.ochaopt.org/content/un-report-occupation-main-cause-humanitarian-needs-occupied-palestinian-territory
<sup>113</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/occupied-palestinian-territory/world-health-organization-who-appeal-occupied-palestinian

2018 IRC EMERGENCY WATCHLIST

## Pakistan

Continued counter-terrorism operations and armed conflict in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) as well as a high risk for natural disasters such as earthquakes, flooding and landslides remain a risk in Pakistan. The government shut down more than 29 major humanitarian organizations during 2017. With narrowing humanitarian space and continued fragility and need, the risk of humanitarian crises in parts of Pakistan during 2018 is meaningful.

#### **Conflict Risk**

The Northwest Region of Pakistan (the areas bordering Afghanistan (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA)) is affected by large scale displacements due to insurgency. While more than 1.5M internally displaced persons (IDPs) had returned to their places of origin following an acceleration of returns over the past two years, over 253,000 people remained displaced as of September 2017.<sup>114</sup>

Pakistan also hosts 1.1M registered and an estimated 750,000 unregistered Afghan refugees.<sup>115</sup> Since


2015, a sharp increase both in returns of registered refugees and deportations of undocumented refugees by Pakistani authorities has been recorded. While returns and deportations are expected to continue in 2018, there will remain a large and comparatively vulnerable refugee population in need of humanitarian assistance throughout the year.

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Pakistan frequently experiences multiple natural disasters in a given year. Over the last few years, the province of Sindh has been repeatedly affected by both floods and drought, further decreasing food security and livelihood opportunities.<sup>116</sup> Pakistan is also located in the Indus-Tsangpo Suture Zone. This region has the highest rates of seismic activity and largest earthquakes in the Himalaya region.<sup>117</sup> In the past year, Pakistan has had 125 earthquakes.<sup>118</sup> Many earthquakes impact densely populated areas increasing the risk of injuries and fatalities.

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

In December the Interior Ministry sent letters to 29 major international non-government organizations (INGOs), telling them to shut their offices and leave within 60 days.<sup>119</sup> The government has given no justification for the demand despite its far reaching consequences.<sup>120</sup> This is likely to have a significant impact on displaced and vulnerable populations in the coming year. The humanitarian situation is characterized by high levels of malnutrition coupled with limited access to water, sanitation and medical services, gravely compromising the health and coping capacities of vulnerable communities.



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**HUMANITARIAN RISK** 

There will continue to be a need for assistance for registered and unregistered Afghan refugees in Pakistan – in particular protection against forced deportation and punitive measures taken by the government to force Afghan refugees out of the country. The decrease of INGOs in the country is likely to exacerbate the humanitarian conditions of the Afghan refugees.

<sup>114</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/echo-factsheet-pakistan-november-2017

<sup>115</sup> www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/13/pakistan-mass-forced-returns-afghan-refugees

<sup>116</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/echo-factsheet-pakistan-november-2017

<sup>117</sup> www.dawn.com/news/1215636

<sup>118</sup> www.earthquaketrack.com/p/pakistan/recent

<sup>119</sup> www.tribune.com.pk/story/1583668/1-pakistan-orders-29-foreign-ngos-leave-country-within-60-days/

<sup>120</sup> www.ft.com/content/72b3c858-e184-11e7-8f9f-de1c2175f5ce

2018 IRC EMERGENCY WATCHLIST

## **Philippines**

The Philippines is at risk of experiencing further conflict in areas controlled by the New People's Army. Conflict is also a concern in Muslim majority areas, where fears of Islamic extremism have risen following the attack on Marawi by the IS affiliated armed group Abu Sayyaf and Maute Group. Additionally, the Philippines is at risk of experiencing natural disasters.

#### **Conflict Risk**

At the end of October 2017, the military declared the end of the conflict between Abu Sayyaf Group, the Maute Group and government forces.<sup>121</sup> Despite the end of the conflict, the government announced a continuation of martial law in Mindanao. The extension came shortly after the President halted efforts to reach a peace deal with the underground Communist Party of the Philippines, whose armed unit (the New People's Army) has stepped up attacks in remote communities on Mindanao and elsewhere.<sup>122</sup> While the siege of Marawi has ended, many areas of the city remain closed off to returns. Thousands remain displaced, the majority staying in municipalities east of Lake Lanao<sup>-123</sup>

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

The Philippines is at risk of typhoons, tropical cyclones, flooding, landslides, tropical depressions and volcanic earthquakes and eruptions.

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

The continuation of martial law in Mindanao has the potential to lead to repressive measures by the government towards civilians suspected of being linked to terrorist organizations. Overall, in 2018 it is expected the greatest needs will be associated with persons displaced as a result of natural disasters with a smaller number of people displaced from the conflict in Marawi.



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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/10/marawi-siege-army-kills-abu-sayyaf-maute-commanders-171016072551985.html

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> www.nytimes.com/2017/12/13/world/asia/philippines-martial-law-duterte.html?\_r=0

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> www.reliefweb.int/report/philippines/marawi-unable-return-home-thousands-remain-dependent-aid-2-months-after-conflict

## Somalia

Somalia is at risk of continued targeted attacks by AI Shabaab, ongoing conflict and insecurity driving displacement, as well as a high risk of food insecurity related to lack of rainfall/drought.

#### **Conflict Risk**

Somalia continues to be a complex emergency with the country beset by conflict and insecurity as well as seasonal debilitating drought. While drought has contributed to higher numbers of displaced within the past year the number affected by conflict is also significant (171,000). Al Shabaab, an Al Qaeda linked militant group, has expanded its presence around the major cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo.<sup>124</sup> While Al Shabaab has expanded they have also ramped up their attacks, targeting densely populated areas, markets and IDP camps. There has also been an increase in inter-tribal violence stemming from scarce resources.

# CONFLICT RISK NATURAL HAZARD RISK HUMANITARIAN RISK

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Somalia has been affected by below average rainfall since November 2016. This has driven more than half a million people into displacement.<sup>125</sup> The risk of catastrophic food insecurity in Somalia is high and there are already reports of deaths and illnesses caused by drought-related factors.<sup>126</sup> Children are particularly at risk, and 944,000 children are currently acutely or severely malnourished.<sup>127</sup>

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

Overall, more than 6.2M people are in need of humanitarian aid including 3.4M children. It is estimated that 232,000 children will suffer from Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in the next year.<sup>128</sup> Water-shortages, lack of access to basic healthcare and disease outbreaks will continue into 2018. The humanitarian situation is likely to continue to deteriorate while humanitarian access will suffer impediments as a result of the increased presence of Al Shabaab around key urban centers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>124</sup> ACAPs Humanitarian Overview 2018: Somalia

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> UNHCR November 2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> http://www.unhcr.org/591ae0e17.pdf

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> Ibid

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/somalia/unicef-somalia-humanitarian-situation-report-19-15-30-november-2017

## Sudan

Escalation of conflict in the border areas with South Sudan, an influx of refugees from the worsening crisis in South Sudan, as well as increased concerns over food security are risks for 2018. In addition, Sudan is a transit country for irregular migration to Europe and has recently increased repressive and punitive polices towards asylum seekers and migrants as deterrence measures increasing protection concerns for this population.

#### **Conflict Risk**

Conflict, political repression and public corruption undermine stability and peace throughout Sudan as an estimated 2.6M remain displaced in Darfur alone.<sup>129</sup> The government continues to affirm its commitment to a ceasefire in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, while the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) accuses the Sudan Armed Forces of breaking this ceasefire and attacking its positions.<sup>130</sup> The Sudanese government rejects these claims.

In addition to internal conflict, Sudan is also grappling with refugee returnees with nearly 2,000 returned

in 2017 and more expected in the next year. There are also growing concerns over the Sudanese government's collaboration with the European Union which has promised \$100 million to stem irregular migration via Sudan towards Europe. In particular, there is concern (and some documented cases) that the financial incentives provided by the EU could help fund repressive/ negative policies such as physically punishing asylum seekers as well as imposing onerous fines and deporting asylum seekers without due process or a fair hearing.<sup>131</sup> Around 500,000 refugees from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia are believed to be in the country.<sup>132</sup>

In addition, Sudan is hosting refugees from its neighbor, South Sudan. An estimated 32,000 South Sudanese have arrived since 2017.

#### **Natural Hazard Risk**

Sudan is susceptible to drought and floods which have occurred frequently in Sudan's history and contributed significantly to population displacement. A growing concern is the ongoing process of desertification, driven by climate change, drought, and the impact of human activities.<sup>133</sup> In Sudan, desertification is clearly linked to conflict, as there are strong indications that the hardship caused to pastoralist societies by desertification is one of the underlying causes of the current war in Darfur.



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HUMANITARIAN RISK

#### **Humanitarian Impact**

Individuals in protracted displacement will continue to rely on humanitarian services into 2018 with an overall 4.8M in need.<sup>134</sup> Issues of food insecurity for vulnerable populations will remain as well as protection concerns. The new area of humanitarian concern going into 2018 is protection of asylum seekers within Sudan. In addition, an overlooked case of cholera in East Sudan could result in outbreaks in other locations as the government has downplayed the situation as acute watery diarrhea limiting the scope of assistance for humanitarians.<sup>135</sup> Towards the end of 2017, there were also increased reports of suspected cases of dengue fever alluding to a possible outbreak in 2018.<sup>136</sup>

- <sup>130</sup> http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?iframe&page=imprimable&id\_article=64165
- <sup>131</sup> https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/feb/27/eu-urged-to-end-cooperation-with-sudan-after-refugees-whipped-and-deported <sup>132</sup> Ibid
- <sup>133</sup> https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/sudan/03\_disasters.pdf
- <sup>134</sup> https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/OCHA\_Sudan\_Humanitarian\_Bulletin\_Issue\_26\_%2820\_November\_-\_3\_December\_2017%29.pdf
- <sup>135</sup> https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-s-cholera-epidemic-14-659-infected-292-dead
- <sup>136</sup> https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-bulletin-issue-27-4-17-december-2017

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> https://enoughproject.org/conflicts/sudan