

INTRODUCTION

This year marks the negotiations of the 21st replenishment of the World Bank's International Development Association (IDA21), the **largest single source** of development finance for the world's poorest countries. This is the first replenishment of IDA since the World Bank launched its updated **mission** to eliminate extreme poverty on a livable planet. The Multilateral Development Banks' (MDB) reform spotlight has largely been on the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development - the World Bank's lending arm for middle-income countries. However, extreme poverty and climate impacts are increasingly concentrated in low-income countries (LICs), particularly those experiencing conflict. Given this **new geography of extreme poverty** and the central role that IDA plays, the Bank's success in accomplishing its new mission depends on a replenished and reformed IDA that can finance and deliver results in these settings.

Over the last three decades, the number of people living in extreme poverty globally has dropped by more than half. At the same time, it has soared by over 80% in the 13 countries defined by the United Nations (U.N.) as **least developed countries** (LDCs) and by the World Bank as **conflict-affected** (see Box 1).¹ Despite making up only 7% of the global population, these **13 conflict-affected LDCs**—all IDA **recipients**—are home to almost one-quarter of the world's extreme poor. Extreme poverty cannot be eradicated globally if it continues to rise rapidly in these conflict-affected LDCs. By the World Bank's own projections, up to **two-thirds** of those living in extreme poverty globally will live in fragile and conflict-affected countries by 2030, the target year for the fulfillment of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These countries are also among the most climate vulnerable; as such, they endure **climate finance inequalities** and are the least prepared to withstand climate impacts.

IDA is one of the few sources of grants and highly concessional loans for these 13 countries, given their debt burdens and lack of creditworthiness. IDA financing also is a value for money option for donors thanks to its hybrid model, which turned every U.S. dollar contributed during IDA20 into about **four USD of support for client countries**. However, this model, which compensated for dwindling donor contributions, is threatened by high interest rates and the deepening debt of IDA countries. To meet the growing need and build resilience against recurring conflict and climate shocks, this **decade-long** decline in donor contributions must be reversed. For the Bank to fulfill its mission, IDA needs both an ambitious donor replenishment and reforms to maximize its reach and impact in these countries. Bank leadership and shareholders should prioritize changes to IDA's performance-based criteria and to the Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) Envelope to increase conflict-affected countries' access to IDA financing. They should also realign IDA's crisis-relevant financing mechanisms such as the Crisis Response Window to ensure that 1) allocation criteria are better informed by risk and vulnerability and 2) relevant policy tools that drive risk-informed action are better integrated.

Increases and improvements in financing are necessary but insufficient. While IDA financing commitments to these 13 countries are steadily increasing, the share of commitments actually disbursed is lower than for other, more stable IDA countries. The "disbursement gaps" reveal the delivery challenges the Bank faces in these conflict-affected contexts, including the limits of its government-first approach. These settings require an adapted approach that is informed by the expertise and experience that humanitarians and other non-government actors can offer. Trialing new ways of partnering in conflict-affected LDCs, building a higher risk

Cover image: Laila, 28, and her 2-year-old daughter, Zahra, outside their home in Afghanistan. Laila's husband works on potato farms as a daily wage worker and tries to find odd jobs to earn enough to afford food for their family.



¹These countries are: Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen.

tolerance and easing fiduciary requirements will help the Bank implement high-level partnership commitments articulated in the Bank's **Evolution Roadmap**, diversifying partnerships and reaching communities otherwise in danger of being left behind.

RECOMMENDATIONS: To ensure that the IDA21 replenishment is an opportunity for the Bank's leadership and shareholders to fulfill its own ambition for reform and help galvanize the role of IDA in eliminating extreme poverty on a livable planet, three key areas for action are recommended:

- Donors should commit to an ambitious IDA21 replenishment by pledging contributions that exceed the IDA20
 amount and put IDA on track for tripling its size by 2030 to offset the negative impacts of high interest rates and
 worsening debt in IDA recipient countries.
- 2. World Bank leadership and donors should refine and realign IDA finance mechanisms for conflict-affected LDCs by ensuring that financing levels are better informed by assessments of risk, vulnerability and accessibility to other sources of finance. They should also ensure these levels align with other Bank policy-making and analytic tools.
- 3. The World Bank should improve the disbursal and delivery of IDA by expanding non-government partnerships to realize commitments in the Evolution Roadmap. An essential next step would be to build evidence of approaches to partnerships by trialing partnership pilots in conflict-affected and fragile countries.

Box 1: The "new geography of extreme poverty"

The 13 countries representing **the new geography of extreme poverty include:** Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Mozambique, Myanmar, Niger, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Yemen. These countries are facing a "polycrisis" in which climate change, fragility, conflict, worsening gender inequality, the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, economic downturns and a worsening debt crisis are intertwined.

WHY IDA?

Low cost, high quality and value for money

While aid budgets are under pressure and Official Development Assistance **(ODA) overall** is not keeping pace with escalating needs, IDA provides vital resources to LICs, including the 13 conflict-affected countries that benefit from its highly concessional loans and grants. Six of these 13 countries only qualify² for IDA grants given their debt status—revealing the lifeline IDA provides in these conflict settings. IDA is also a key source of climate finance, providing 58% of all climate finance committed in these 13 countries.³

²The following countries are eligible for IDA grants only due to their debt status: Sudan is in debt distress; Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Sudan are at high risk of debt distress. ³IRC calculation from 2021 climate-related development finance committed from bilateral, multilateral and private philanthropic sources, OECD DAC. Updated 20 April 2023. https://oe.cd/development-climate

Between 2020 and 2022, almost one-quarter of all IDA climate commitments targeted these 13 countries—a stark illustration of the countries' disproportionate climate vulnerability and finance needs.⁴

IDA offers three key strengths

- 1. IDA client countries themselves recognize the unique value of MDBs including IDA and consider the availability of finance at better-than-market terms as a key function. This is highly relevant for indebted LICs that are ineligible for IBRD loans⁵ and for conflict-affected countries that struggle to secure private investments due to high risk and volatile markets. IDA is therefore one of the rare sources of highly concessional finance available.
- 2. IDA is not just low-cost, it is high-quality. IDA was ranked third in the Quality of ODA (QuODA) 2021 index, which assesses how bilateral and multilateral development partners score against development effectiveness principles—ranked right after the International Fund for Agricultural Development and African Development Fund.⁶ It received high marks for how well allocations respond to long-term development challenges and for promoting domestic ownership and use of national systems.
- 3. IDA is a value-for-money choice for donors, with each U.S. dollar mobilizing approximately USD 4 for recipient countries. IDA's hybrid financing model allows it to reuse the resources from loan repayments (reflows) as new finance and to borrow against its loan portfolio from capital markets and bilateral partners at concessional rates. This has enabled IDA to extend more in financing than it receives from donors. This leverage had allowed IDA to increase its resources⁷ even as donor contributions have declined over the past 10 years.⁸ The current IDA cycle, IDA20, is expected to raise an envelope of USD 93 billion, with donor commitments amounting to USD 23.5 billion, while borrowing would provide USD 33.5 billion and reflows and other internal resources would provide USD 36 billion.

REPLENISH IDA21 WITH AMBITIOUS DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Unfortunately, the worsening global debt situation and rising interest rates are eroding the hybrid financing model's ability to offset the decline in donor contributions. World Bank leadership and donors already responded by introducing rules for IDA20 that limit eligibility for IDA grants to countries in or at high risk of debt distress only, and countries at moderate risk of debt distress

"The truth is, we are pushing the limits of this important concessional resource, and no amount of creative financial engineering will compensate for the fact that we need more funding."

World Bank President, Ajay Banga

are now eligible for loans only. However, with almost 50% of all IDA countries already in or at high risk of

Between 2012 and 2023, the UK reduced its commitments to IDA by 50% (from USD 4.2 billion to USD 2 billion) and the US by 15% (from USD 4.1 billion to USD 3.5 billion). Other G7 donors that reduced their pledges by more than 10% include Italy, Germany, Australia and Canada.



⁴ IRC calculation from Development Initiatives' World Bank project list with climate coefficients. https://devinit.org/blog/opening-up-world-bank-climate-finance-data/

⁵ The World Bank Group Finances webpage shows that between fiscal years 2015 and 2023, the 13 countries considered in this briefing did not receive IBRD loans.
⁶ QuODA 2021 ranked the performance of ODA bilateral and multilateral donors based on 17 indicators that assess four dimensions of quality of aid: 1) prioritization (how well allocations are targeted to respond to long-term development challenges); 2) ownership (how well providers work with and through partner countries to promote domestic ownership and use of national systems); 3) transparency and untying (the timeliness and comprehensiveness of reporting on ODA activities and whether procurement is tied to domestic contractors) and 4) evaluation (the quality of provider learning and evaluation systems).

The IDA19 (2017-19) replenishment was 50% higher compared to the overall envelope of IDA17 (2014-2016).

debt distress—and likely to grow in the face of recurring socioeconomic and climate shocks—the demand for IDA grant financing is growing. In the long term, this would further limit IDA's ability to borrow against its equity and reuse loan reflows, compromising the long-term stability of its **hybrid financing model.** With donor contributions **down** by about 11% between 2012 and 2023, as **World Bank President Ajay Banga put it,** "The truth is, we are pushing the limits of this important concessional resource, and no amount of creative financial engineering will compensate for the fact that we need more funding."

IDA21 replenishment action:

- Recognizing the central role that IDA has to play in eliminating extreme poverty and responding to the effects of climate change, donors should commit to an ambitious IDA21 replenishment by pledging contributions that exceed the IDA20 amount of USD 23.5 billion to put IDA on track for **tripling its size by 2030**, in line with the Independent Experts Group's recommendations to the G20. Ambitious donor contributions are required to compensate for high interest rates and massive debt burdens in many IDA client countries and to sustain IDA's ability to leverage donor resources.
- To ease the debt burden for IDA countries, the recently introduced **Climate Resilient Debt Clauses** should be expanded to conflict-affected LDCs and other highly climate-vulnerable IDA countries.

REFINING IDA ALLOCATION CRITERIA AND REALIGNING IDA FINANCING

MECHANISMS

IDA overall commitments to conflict-affected LDCs almost tripled in size from fiscal year 2015 until 2021.9 Furthermore, the dedicated additional **FCV Envelope**, which supports the Bank's **FCV Strategy** and provides additional resources to countries facing conflict and instability, rose by almost 17% from IDA19 to **IDA20.**¹⁰ While these increases are positive, most IDA resource allocation decisions are subject to the performance-based allocation (PBA) system (see Chart A), which favors stable settings. PBA criteria take into account a country's per capita income as well as other indicators of strong state capacity such as progress on key policy reforms related to budgetary and financial management, public




Above: Seada Abdi, a mother of nine children, tending to her goats in Kebri Beyah, Somali region where drought forced her family and animals to resettle in an internally displaced persons camp.

⁹IRC analysis of World Bank financing data: FY18-23 IDA Commitments by Country and Windows, available at https://ida.worldbank.org/en/ida-financing ¹⁰In IDA20, the <u>FCV Envelope</u> amounted to USD 8.8 billion, up from USD 7.5 billion in IDA19. The World Bank reported that, in IDA20 as of fiscal year 2024 Q1, USD 2.1 billion has been provided to 12 countries and USD 1,464 million provided to seven countries via the Prevention and Resilience Allocation: Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, DRC, Mozambique and Niger; USD 356 million to three countries via the Turn Around Allocation: Central African Republic, The Gambia and Somalia; and USD 295 million to two countries via the Remaining Engaged in Conflict Allocation: South Sudan and Yemen.

administration, social inclusion and resource mobilization. A focus on these factors disadvantages countries experiencing conflict, which can stretch or undermine those functions. Further, PBA focuses on population size, which can channel resources toward densely populated MICs, which are often less dependent on IDA because of their access to additional financing options. While the FCV Envelope is designed to offset this disadvantage by offering an additional boost to countries constrained by conflict and instability, progress toward strategies to prevent conflict or violence or to transition away from fragility during IDA19 was reported as uneven and delayed due to political shocks and operational challenges. This underscores the limitations of the World Bank's operational approach in FCV settings.

There are additional IDA financing mechanisms (known as "windows") that provide further resources in support of IDA-financed projects. Several of these windows made significant commitments to conflictaffected LDCs over the past three years. In particular, the Crisis **Response Window** (CRW)¹¹ allocated a steadily increasing share of commitments to conflictaffected LDCs-an average of 40% of its overall commitments. The **Window for Host Communities** and Refugees (WHR) supported

host communities and refugees with



an average of 45% of commitments allocated to conflict-affected LDCs. These windows, along with FCV allocations, are therefore critical sources of finance for these countries, allowing them to respond to a range of crises, improve essential services, support refugees and host communities and accelerate the recovery from COVID-19.

These financing instruments, which taken together are an increasingly vital source of funding for conflict-affected countries, could be further refined to ensure maximum impact in these settings. The IDA21 replenishment cycle offers an opportunity to establish stronger evidence-based decision rules on how financing levels are set, identify clearer eligibility criteria for windows and increase coordination with other World Bank policy-making and analytical tools—such as **Country Climate Development Reports** (CCDR)—to create a comprehensive toolkit that is bigger than the sum of its parts. Alongside the launch of the World Bank Gender Strategy, the replenishment also provides an opportunity to share data and methodologies on investments in and outcomes for gender equality. Currently, it is unclear (across World Bank financing, including IDA) which parameters an investment is measured against to qualify as "contributing to gender equality." It is also difficult to find consistent and aggregate information on the gender-specific objectives of projects, how the Bank performs against these and if and how women and girls in FCV settings are reached.

[&]quot;IRC analysis of World Bank financing data: FY18-23 IDA Commitments by Country and Windows, available at: https://ida.worldbank.org/en/ida-financing. The IRC analyzed window commitments to the 13 conflict-affected LDCs 13 between FY2020 and FY2023.

IDA21 Replenishment action:

- Maintain and reinforce FCV, climate change, gender and development as <u>special themes</u>, which—together
 with their related policy commitments—are key to driving IDA resource allocation in FCV countries and
 delivering on the Evolution Roadmap's ambition to increase the Bank's **focus** on FCV.
- Maximize the impact of IDA finance mechanisms in conflict-affected LDCs by increasing resources for the CRW and ensuring financing levels are better informed by assessments of risk, vulnerability and accessibility to other sources of finance. Seize opportunities for enhanced coherence with and integration of other Bank policy and analytic tools. For example:
 - Within the Crisis Response Window (CRW), the Early Response Financing (ERF) level should be increased and funding caps raised. Financing levels should be informed by an evidence-based analysis of anticipated demands and risks, drawing on analytic tools, including the Bank's own Country Climate Development Reports (CCDR).
 - The recently launched **Crisis Preparedness and Response Toolkit** can be deployed to support conflict-affected LDCs to undertake institutional crisis preparedness reforms, more rapidly access financing and develop the credible crisis preparedness plans currently required to access ERF. Following the **Toolkit's launch** and ahead of the IDA21 replenishment, the Bank has the opportunity to clarify how it will repurpose resources and define how expanded partnerships with non-government actors could expedite interventions during crises.
 - Incentivize policy reforms that drive refugee inclusion (e.g., labor market access, education and health care) via the Window for Host Communities and Refugees (WHR) by linking the World Bank Refugee Policy Review Framework to concessional finance allocations to incentivize refugee-inclusive policy changes.

DISBURSING AND DELIVERING IDA

While IDA's commitments to conflict-affected LDCs have been increasing, its spending record—or share of commitments disbursed—in these countries still lags compared to other, more stable IDA countries. Overall, commitments disbursed to non-fragile countries doubled between fiscal year 2007 and fiscal year 2019, while disbursements to fragile countries increased by only **44%** during the same period. During IDA19, the share of commitments disbursed to conflict-affected LDCs was only 50%, compared to almost 70% for other, more stable IDA countries.¹²

Between fiscal years 2015 and 2022, the share of commitments disbursed was only 51% for South Sudan, 41% for Somalia and 49% for the DRC; across the 13 conflict-affected LDCs, the share of commitments showing as disbursed was 62%, leaving 38%-equivalent to USD 21.2 billion-as undisbursed during this period.¹³

¹³ Ibid. The IRC analyzed commitments and disbursements to the 13 countries of focus between IDA17 and IDA19.



¹² IRC analysis of World Bank financing data: Historical IDA Commitments and Disbursements, available at: https://ida.worldbank.org/en/ida-financing. The IRC analyzed commitments and disbursements to the 13 countries of focus and the other IDA countries during IDA19.



An IRC staff member and a child eating ready-to-use therapeutic food in the Olol village in Somalia, where the share of commitments disbursed was only 41% between fiscal years 2015 and 2022.

These disbursement gaps can be explained in large part by the Bank's low risk threshold and its operating model that primarily works with and through national governments. This government-first approach can lead to **project delays and suspensions**, especially in conflict-affected states. Limited experience and expertise in delivering in conflict settings, or in areas inaccessible to governments, can lead to concentrations of IDA projects in relatively safe and stable areas rather than in conflict-affected communities, where needs are often highest.

Therefore, a fit-for-purpose IDA21 will require the Bank and its stakeholders to address the gaps in delivery and finance in conflict-affected LDCs. To accomplish its new mission, the Bank must move quickly on its **commitment** to expand partnerships with diverse non-government stakeholders. The IRC has outlined a spectrum of **partnership models** that could inform the operationalization of this commitment and support the Bank in reaching marginalized populations in conflict-affected countries at scale.

The Bank's **midterm review of its FCV strategy** acknowledges that, while the Bank has increased its presence in FCV countries, challenges remain to maximize its impact in these contexts. The independent **evaluation** of the Bank's engagement in situations of conflict highlights the value of non-government partnerships in delivering impactful IDA projects in FCV countries and overcoming delays caused by insecurity.

However, non-government partnerships remain ad hoc and face implementation challenges due to perceived fiduciary risks or impractical reporting requirements. For instance, low **fiduciary risk thresholds** have led to the Bank interrupting operations; **reporting arrangements** requiring notification of any significant incidents that could adversely affect the implementation of a project are impractical in conflict-affected countries where security incidents frequently arise.

Fully leveraging the agility, expertise and community engagement that humanitarian agencies and other civil society actors can offer in these settings will require the Bank to reconsider its approach to fiduciary risks

and reporting requirements. For example, the Bank should adapt or simplify its risk control and reporting requirements in FCV countries where non-government partners have proven experience and capacity to deliver and have been positively assessed and verified by major U.N. or other donors. This would enhance efficiency and drive focus toward results. It would also enable the Bank to ensure the continuity of vital basic services and meet basic needs. At the same time, it would pave the way to adapting the intervention over time, leading toward longer-term sustainable development and, where appropriate, contributing to long-term state system strengthening.

Needs and vulnerabilities in conflict-affected LDCs are high and progress toward achieving the **SDGs** slow because conflict erodes public services, constrains governments and inhibits development and resilience. Consistently achieving **results** in line with the IDA special themes while ensuring that no one is left behind

relies on innovation and expertise in delivering services and securing development outcomes for the hardest to reach. In view of the concentration of extreme poverty in these hard-to-reach communities, this should be a Bank priority. Humanitarian partners can offer contextual understanding, specific skills and expertise in achieving impact at scale in these contexts. They can also prioritize evidence-based innovation, complementarity with national actors, risk analysis, flexibility and adaptability in design and inclusion of women, girls and other marginalized groups in implementation. Humanitarian partnerships in social protection and education illustrate how interventions that further World Bank priorities can support impactful results and government system strengthening (see Box 2 and Box 3).



Six-year-old Siraj from Baghdad, Iraq, writes his name using an Ahlan Simsim activity sheet at a school readiness program that was made possible through partnering with the Iraqi Ministry of Education.

IDA21 replenishment action:

- The Bank should trial new approaches to its fiduciary and reporting requirements via partnership pilots in FCV countries, building on its previous partnership experiences. Pilot countries can be identified according to levels of need, state capacity to deliver services in particular sectors, the Bank's own strategic priorities and the expertise of non-government partners operating in the country. These pilots can build on previous Bank experience of partnerships with non-government actors and apply learning to new contexts with the goal of mainstreaming non-government partnerships across Bank operations.
- The Bank should include specific descriptions of non-government partnership models that it will seek to employ across a range of contexts, including those affected by conflict, in the Partnership Charter that was proposed in the Evolution Roadmap to establish principles for working with partners.

Box 2: Humanitarian partnerships for government system strengthening: Social protection

Scaling social protection is a longstanding World Bank priority, with a recent expanded focus on "adaptive social protection" (ASP). ASP links social protection with disaster risk management and climate change adaptation, making it more rapidly available, shock-responsive and scalable while supporting communities' ability to prepare, cope and adapt to shocks (climate-related or other). The World Bank identifies institutional arrangements and partnerships as one of the four building blocks for implementing ASP, emphasizing the importance of "bridging the humanitarian-government divide."

Increasing the number of people reached in the immediate and long term and enhancing the shock responsiveness of social protection in fragile settings require more and better partnerships. The Bank has financed social protection partnerships with U.N. agencies and NGOs in diverse settings to facilitate rapid scale, inclusion and program continuity. For example, after funding to the Yemeni government was suspended in 2015, the Bank funded the U.N. Development Fund (UNDP) and U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) in the **Emergency Crisis Response Project** to finance urgent cash programs while preserving existing social protection delivery by subgranting to two Yemeni service delivery institutions. In Somalia, the Bank supports the government in setting up its first shock-responsive safety net; at the same time, the Bank is engaging with humanitarian agencies (World Food Program and UNICEF) to **leverage some of their experiences and skills** until Somalia is ready with its own delivery systems. In addition, through its financial support of the **Building Resilient Communities in Somalia** consortium, the World Bank helped NGOs (including the IRC) pilot a **scalable social safety net** that provided chronically vulnerable households with regular monthly cash transfers for two years, with additional top-ups during emergencies.

Humanitarian partners can support program design thanks to their decades of experience in delivering humanitarian cash assistance interventions, disaster risk management, assisting governments in reaching displaced communities and applying a fragility-sensitive lens to social assistance efforts. Their expertise in adapting programs and activities to evolving situations can help ensure business continuity, impact and innovation despite potential surges in conflict and violence. For example, the Bank supported the **Sahel Adaptive Social Protection Program** (SASPP) in six Sahelian countries, which proposes a scenario stoplight system linked to cascading **levels of security risks,** working with **humanitarian and U.N. partners** to conduct monitoring, share data and enhance access to and reach of cash transfers. The SASPP includes a pillar focused on productive inclusion and women's empowerment, working with **NGO partners** to provide technical assistance to the Bank and governments for implementation of this pillar. Impact **evaluations show** that it has helped women diversify incomes and improved perceptions of women's economic participation.

BOX 3: Humanitarian partnerships for government system strengthening: Education

More than **224 million children affected by crises** need educational support. They encounter various barriers in accessing quality education and early childhood development. Despite growing and vast need, investment in FCV settings and hard-to-reach communities is limited, undermining education systems that meet the needs of children in conflict-affected LDCs.

The World Bank **prioritizes delivering education** in these settings, remaining engaged during times of crisis and active conflict. The Bank can play a significant leadership role in improving education and early childhood development outcomes in countries affected by FCV and convening partnerships for impact that include governments, NGOs, schools and communities.

IRC's **Ahlan Simsim** program is a good illustration. In six years, the initiative launched dozens of programmatic pathways that have reached more than 3 million people across Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. IRC's research and evaluation show that coupling interventions (caregiving, health, nutrition, education) across sectors can yield greater efficiencies and more responses. Key to this is a focus on outcomes rather than outputs to ensure that the programs are designed to respond to evolving needs. Applying a people-first approach means that program partnership models could be reshaped and redesigned as needed and consider the needs of people, local governments and civil society to guide exactly what needs to be scaled up.

The main pathway to scaling programs is partnership with mandated government ministries. For example, in Iraq, the Ahlan Simsim team partnered with the Ministry of Education to address a stark shortage of pre-primary programs—more than 90% of Iraqi children do not attend any kind of pre-primary education program. A school readiness program designed with the ministry was integrated into the first two weeks of school for incoming first-graders and, following its success, the Ministry of Education has made public commitments to scale up the program to all primary schools, showing lasting benefits for both impact and scale.

IDA—as the main source of development finance in the new geography of extreme poverty—is central to the World Bank's new mission. The IDA21 replenishment is a critical moment for Bank leadership and stakeholders to secure investment and operationalize the financing and operating model reforms that IDA needs to meet the moment. This requires ambitious donor contributions, realignment of financing mechanisms and improvements in disbursement and delivery by changing the risk calculation and operationalizing and regularizing new partnerships to maximize IDA impacts in conflict-affected LDCs. These are fundamental steps toward accomplishing the new World Bank mission to end extreme poverty on a livable planet and enable the Bank to reach marginalized groups affected by crises with impactful interventions at scale.