WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PROMOTE, SUPPORT AND FACILITATE SOLUTIONS PROCESSES IN THE EARLY STAGES OF DISPLACEMENT?
ABOUT THE REGIONAL DURABLE SOLUTIONS SECRETARIAT (REDSS)

The search for durable solutions to protracted displacement situation in East and Horn of Africa is a key humanitarian and development concern. This is a regional/cross border issue, dynamic and with a strong political dimension which demands a multi-sectorial response that goes beyond the existing humanitarian agenda.

The Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) was created in March 2014, with the aim of maintaining a focused momentum and stakeholder engagement towards durable solutions for displaced and displacement-affected communities.

The secretariat was established following extensive consultations among NGOs in the region, identifying a wish and a vision to form a body that can assist stakeholders in addressing durable solutions more consistently. ReDSS is managed through an Advisory Group comprising of 11 NGOs: DRC, NRC, IRC, World Vision, CARE International, Save the Children International, OXFAM, ACTED, INTERSOS, Mercy Corps and Refugee Consortium of Kenya with DRC and IRC forming the steering committee.

The Secretariat is not an implementing agency but a coordination and information hub acting as a catalyst and agent provocateur to stimulate forward thinking and policy development on durable solutions for displacement affected communities in East and Horn of Africa. It seeks to improve joint learning and research, support advocacy and policy development, capacity building and coordination.

About IRC

The International Rescue Committee responds to the world’s worst humanitarian crises and helps people whose lives and livelihoods are shattered by conflict and disaster to survive, recover, and gain control of their future.

The IRC’s Horn and East Africa region consists of some of the world’s most complex ongoing crises – South Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and Burundi – as well as the neighboring countries most impacted by the conflict and natural disaster induced migration caused by these crises: Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania. Zimbabwe, which is an increasingly fragile state, is also part of this dynamic region. IRC serves as co-chair to the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) based out of Nairobi, Kenya. IRC is also member to the global Solutions Alliance, based out of Geneva, and has been a founding member of Solutions Alliance Somalia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

IRC and ReDSS would like to thank the refugees and host community members who provided information and shared their experiences, as well as the representatives of government, donors, UN agencies and NGOs who participated in this study. Without their involvement it would not have been possible to complete this report and spotlight the critical issue of early solutions planning. We would also like to express our gratitude to the IRC field teams in Kiryandongo (Uganda) and Kakuma (Kenya) who took time out of their busy schedules to arrange and facilitate the field trips. Finally David Glendinning, for conducting the research and writing this report.

This publication was commissioned by ReDSS and IRC and conducted by David Glendinning.
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An approach that defines an area, rather than a sector or target group, as the main entry point. All stakeholders, services and needs are mapped and assessed and relevant actors mobilized and coordinated with. (IRC).

A durable solution is achieved when the displaced no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement. It can be achieved through return, local integration and resettlement. (IASC framework).

Early solutions planning encompasses steps to build the self-reliance and resilience of refugees and host communities, as well as prepare refugees for future durable solutions, in the early stages of displacement. For the purposes of this report, the timeframe for “early solutions planning” covers actions that can be taken pre-displacement, as well as during the first 3 years of an influx of refugees. (IRC and ReDSS).

The local, regional and national governmental, social and economic structures within which refugees live. (UNHCR).

Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to, avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. (Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement).

A combination of the resources used and the activities undertaken in order to live. Resources include individual skills (human capital), land (natural capital), savings (financial capital), equipment (physical capital), as well as formal support groups and informal networks (social capital). (DfID).

Local integration as a durable solution combines three dimensions. Firstly, it is a legal process, whereby refugees attain a wider range of rights in the host state. Secondly, it is an economic process of establishing sustainable livelihoods and a standard of living comparable to the host community. Thirdly, it is a social and cultural process of adaptation and acceptance that enables the refugees to contribute to the social life of the host country and live without fear of discrimination. (Fielden/UNHCR).

Situations where the displaced “have lived in exile for more than 5 years, and when they still have no immediate prospect of finding a durable solution to their plight by means of voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement”. (UNHCR).
ReDSS Durable Solutions Framework

A rapid assessment tool to assess to what extent durable solutions have been achieved in a particular context. The Framework contains 30 indicators that relate to: a) Physical Safety – safety and security; b) Material Safety – adequate standards of living, access to livelihoods, restoration of housing, land and property; and, c) Legal Safety – access to documentation, family reunification, participation in public affairs, access to effective remedies and justice.

Refugee

A person who “owing to well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country” (Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1A(2), 1951).

Resilience

Resilience is the ability of people, households, communities, countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to, and recover from shocks and stresses in a manner that reduces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive growth. (USAID).

Resettlement

The transfer of refugees from an asylum country to another State that has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. (UNHCR).

Reintegration

The achievement of a sustainable return to country of origin i.e. the ability of returnees to secure the political, economic and social conditions to maintain their life, livelihood and dignity. (Macrae/UNHCR).

Self-Reliance

The social and economic ability of an individual, household or community to meet basic needs (including protection, food, water, shelter, personal safety, health and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity. (UNHCR).

Social Cohesion

The nature and set of relationships between individuals and groups in a particular environment (horizontal social cohesion) and between those individuals and groups and the institutions that govern them in a particular environment (vertical social cohesion). Strong, positive, integrated relationships and inclusive identities are perceived as indicative of high social cohesion, whereas weak, negative or fragmented relationships and exclusive identities are taken to mean low social cohesion. Social cohesion is therefore a multi-faceted, scalar concept. (World Vision).

Transitional Solutions

A framework for transitioning displacement situations into durable solutions, requiring a partnership between humanitarian and development actors, refugees and host communities, and the participation of local actors through area-based interventions. Transitional solutions seek to enhance the self-reliance of protracted refugees, IDPs and host communities alike. (ReDSS/Samuel Hall 2015).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3RP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (for the Syria regional response)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTED</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRRF</td>
<td>Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSO</td>
<td>Civil society organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>DRA</td>
<td>Department for Refugee Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FGD</td>
<td>Focus group discussion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IASC</td>
<td>Inter-Agency Standing Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Internally displaced person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>The Intergovernmental Authority on Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>INGO</td>
<td>International non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>KII</td>
<td>Key informant interview</td>
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<tr>
<td>KISEDIP</td>
<td>The Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National development plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental organization</td>
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<td>NRC</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPM</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAS</td>
<td>Refugee Affairs Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReDSS</td>
<td>Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat</td>
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<tr>
<td>ReHoPE</td>
<td>Refugee and Host Population Empowerment strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRC</td>
<td>Regional Refugee Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRRRP</td>
<td>Regional Refugee Response Plan (for the South Sudan regional response)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDG</td>
<td>Sustainable Development Goals</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPLM</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement</td>
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<td>STA</td>
<td>Settlement Transformative Agenda</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHABITAT</td>
<td>United Nations Human Settlements Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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</table>
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHY FOCUS ON EARLY SOLUTIONS PLANNING?

Current studies and literature have argued that strategies for solutions should start at the onset of displacement. Solutions planning is most commonly initiated after displacement becomes protracted, by which point refugees are often dependent on humanitarian assistance. Given the unlikelihood of return or resettlement in the early stages of displacement, a solutions-oriented approach must inevitably have a primary focus on building refugee self-reliance and resilience in the country of asylum.

Adopting an approach that also engages government, development and private sector actors, and provides support to host communities and local institutions, is critical.

Focusing on the South Sudanese refugee caseload in Kenya and Uganda, this study sought to identify i) challenges and opportunities vis-à-vis early solutions planning, and ii) practical actions that can be taken to operationalize early solutions planning. The primary sources of data for this study were interviews with 69 key informants - representatives of governments, donors, the UN and NGOs - and 7 focus group discussions with refugees and host community members.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Uganda is a much more conducive environment for early solutions planning than Kenya

Uganda’s refugee policy provides a wide range of rights, including freedom of movement and the right to work. Refugees are allocated a plot of land for cultivation in a settlement, and refugees and host communities have traditionally accessed the same government-run services. Kenya’s policy of encampment has severely limited opportunities for self-reliance, inhibiting engagement in business, trade and other livelihood opportunities. Whereas the environment in Uganda offers a good starting point for early solutions planning, in Kenya there is a need to identify opportunities within a restricted policy framework and develop strategies for increasing those opportunities through influencing policy change. In terms of global refugee-hosting environments, Kenya is much more the norm.

Despite the differences in the policy environment and attitudes towards refugee hosting, the response to South Sudanese displacement in both Kenya and Uganda since December 2013 has been very much in emergency mode, with a focus on receiving and stabilizing new populations, and an ongoing care and maintenance approach. A number of common constraints to early solutions planning were identified by key informants across the two countries:

- South Sudanese refugees are located in poor, marginalized areas, where there is a lack of opportunities to work, trade or earn an income.
- Operational agencies often lack time, funding and expertise for longer-term thinking and planning.
- There is a lack of inclusive fora where solutions are discussed jointly by humanitarian, development and government actors, and limited space for such discussions within existing humanitarian coordination mechanisms.
- There is a lack of information on who is likely to come and in what number, and, after refugees have arrived, a lack of data on who the refugees are, particularly their previous means of livelihood and their skills and assets.
• Traditional mindsets around how to respond to displacement inhibit innovative new approaches and partnerships between humanitarian, development, private sector, host communities and refugees.

There are some signs of a shift towards a more solutions-oriented approach in the refugee response in both countries. For example, the Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy in Uganda and the (KISED) in Kenya are examples of national and local-level planning that prioritize building the self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local institutions, although there have been challenges and concerns related to both initiatives which are highlighted in the full report.

Within the region, there are also some promising signs of increased engagement of development actors. The recently established Regional Secretariat for Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) will play a key role in engaging member states in policy dialogue and forging partnerships between humanitarian and development actors. The IGAD Secretariat is funded by the World Bank, and reflects their increased investment in addressing forced migration in the region. The European Union has also introduced the Trust Fund for Africa, which places a strong focus on addressing forced displacement through humanitarian, resilience and development approaches.

THE WAY FORWARD

Adopting a more solutions-oriented approach in the early stages of displacement is dependent on making a number of wide-ranging improvements in how displacement is responded to, and who is involved. There must be a more inclusive, less mandate-driven approach that engages a wide range of actors - government, humanitarian, development, private sector, host communities and refugees - from the outset. Government leadership in early solutions planning at both national and local level is crucial, as is the need to broaden government engagement beyond refugee departments, which are often disempowered and removed from the refugee policy-making levers. There must be meaningful participation of refugees, host communities and local institutions in developing solutions-oriented approaches, and adequate measures to ensure voice and accountability during their implementation. Specific recommendations are outlined in detail in the full report. A brief summary is provided below:

**Scenario planning and preparedness must be improved.** Systematic preparedness is crucial in laying the foundations for early solutions planning. The starting point for this is making better predictions: what is the background and skills of the people who are most likely to come? and what are the most likely numbers of the influx? Answering these questions will enable early engagement with government on site identification and preparation; early sensitization of potential: host communities; and assessment of the absorption capacities of local services.

**Humanitarian, development and government actors must engage in joint planning.** Assessments of immediate humanitarian assistance and protection needs must be complemented by a deeper, area-based analysis process geared towards understanding the impact of displacement on refugee hosting areas and how best to increase the self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local
institutions. The development of collective, measurable outcomes for refugee hosting areas should flow from this process. Collective outcomes should encompass emergency life-saving and humanitarian needs, strengthened systems for local services delivery, increased economic opportunities, and increased capacity of local institutions, as well as positive changes in refugee policy that would support these. The measurability of such outcomes would also help to generate evidence of what works in solutions-oriented programming from the outset onwards.

**Mechanisms for coordination around joint planning and collective outcomes must exist, with a wide and inclusive participation.** These mechanisms should be separate from, but connected to, the humanitarian coordination structure, and must provide a space where joint analysis and the development of joint outcomes can take place. Government leadership must be fostered. Most crucially, coordination must meaningfully engage refugees and host communities.

**New funding modalities that reduce the fragmentation of humanitarian and development monies must be introduced.** Options to explore include: pooled funding mechanisms and multi-donor trust funds that combine humanitarian, development and resilience elements; using development funding to leverage policy change through “compact” approaches; and multi-year result-based financing.

**Human resource capacity to focus on longer term planning activities in the early stages of displacement must be increased** through the early engagement of individuals with non-traditional specialisms - such as urban planners, experts in local government development and community-driven development, and agriculturalists.

**Mindsets must change.** For humanitarian actors, this will entail a recognition that the humanitarian community is not equipped to address all aspects of displacement. For many host governments, this will entail a shift in attitude from refugees as “burdens” to refugees as potential “assets”. For development actors, this will entail a greater acknowledgement of displacement as a development issue. Changing mindsets necessitates a focus on shifting the incentives and rewards within organizations/institutions, and building capacity on durable solutions.

**Finally, a comprehensive refugee response must consider the bigger picture.** This study focused on what can be done in the early stages of displacement in countries of asylum. Such efforts to advance transitional solutions in host countries must not occur in a vacuum, and need ultimately to be part of a wider effort. Many host governments will remain reluctant to open up their refugee hosting environments if return to country of origin or resettlement to a third country remain marginal solutions. The root causes of conflict in countries of origin need to be addressed more comprehensively to increase opportunities for the world’s refugees to return and reintegrate. Furthermore, there needs to be a greater global commitment to responsibility sharing through the increased availability of resettlement places.
South Sudanese refugee woman at her farm in West Nile, Uganda. © William Vest-Lillesøe/DRC
INTRODUCTION

To advance the learning agenda on the urgent topic of solutions to displacement, the Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (ReDSS) has commissioned a series of studies. The most recent of these, which came out in summer 2016, “Review of Durable Solutions Initiatives in East and Horn of Africa: good practices, challenges, and opportunities in Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, and Somalia,” reviews fourteen ongoing initiatives on durable solutions in these countries and highlights best practices, bottlenecks, and recommendations for ways forward to improve coordination, providing opportunities and entry points into an actual durable solutions system.¹

Building on previous ReDSS studies and recommendations, this current study focuses on what can be done to promote, support and facilitate solutions processes in the early stages of displacement.

To examine the issue of early solutions planning, the study focuses specifically on refugees who have sought asylum in Kenya and Uganda since the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan in December 2013. Between them, Uganda and Kenya are hosting just under half of the 943,803 South Sudanese refugees registered by UNHCR since December 2013.² Efforts to bring about peace between the warring parties in South Sudan culminated in a peace agreement signed in August 2015. This failed to stop localized conflict from continuing and people seeking refugee in neighboring countries. In July 2016, fighting erupted once more in Juba, spreading to other locations across the country. This fighting has led to a new influx of refugees into the two countries.³ The short-term outlook for peace in South Sudan is grim, and conditions across the county are not conducive to a large-scale return of refugees.

In a region that has been marred by recurrent and protracted displacement in the last decade, the quest for durable solutions for refugees and other displaced persons is increasingly high on the agenda for donors, governments and key stakeholders. Displaced persons have often times found themselves depending entirely on emergency assistance and humanitarian aid that falls short of delivering long-term solutions or facilitating their self-reliance. Host governments are ultimately responsible for protecting, respecting and promoting the rights of refugees, however, their laws and policies often inhibit refugee self-reliance and integration.

Current studies and literature, supported by both humanitarian and development actors, have argued that strategies for solutions should, in principle, start at the onset of displacement. Solutions planning is most commonly initiated after displacement becomes protracted, by which point refugees may likely be dependent on humanitarian assistance, and early opportunities to build refugee self-reliance may not have been maximized. While the focus and priority in the first stage of a displacement crisis is to uphold basic minimum standards for saving lives and ensuring protection, efforts should also be invested in identifying how the policy environment (particularly the extent to which refugees have freedom of movement and the right to work) and the immediate response can evolve over time to enhance future prospects for durable solutions. Initial decisions about stakeholder engagement and involvement, coordination mechanisms, and sequencing of approaches can either inhibit or enable refugees’ ability to live productive lives in dignity in countries of asylum. These decisions can also help to lay the foundations for future durable solutions.

Given the unlikelihood of return or resettlement in the early stages of displacement in most instances, a focus must inevitably be placed upon efforts to build self-reliance and resilience in the country of asylum. Adopting a more development-focused approach, engaging development actors from the outset and more flexible, multi-year funding have been identified as critical needs. However, there remains a gap in terms of how to operationalize strategies that advance durable solutions in the early stages of displacement.

¹ http://www.regionaldss.org/research-and-information-management
² South Sudan Situation: Regional Emergency Update- September 18-30. UNHCR. Access at: http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php
³ Uganda alone received 190,014 South Sudanese refugees between 8 July and 3 October 2016
AIMS OF THE STUDY

Focusing on South Sudanese refugees in Kenya and Uganda, the study had three specific objectives:

1) Analyze the extent to which the policy environment, current responses, strategies and initiatives support progress towards durable solutions.
2) Identify challenges and opportunities vis-à-vis early solutions planning, recognizing the specific differences in opportunities for self-reliance and the protection space experienced by refugees in Uganda and Kenya.
3) Identify practical actions that can be taken to operationalize a solutions-oriented approach in the early stages of displacement.

The next section of this report outlines the methodology used for this study. This is followed by an overview of the global level discourse on solutions. After this, the findings from the study at regional and then country level are presented. Finally, recommendations are made for operationalizing early solutions planning.

METHODODOLOGY

OVERALL APPROACH

The overall approach of the research was exploratory using qualitative methods. The research engaged with a wide range of stakeholders and literature to analyze the policy and operational environments in the two countries and the extent to which they support advances towards durable solutions in the early stages of displacement. A literature review encompassing research, policy and programming documents at the global, regional and national levels underpinned the research. The primary sources of data for this study were key informant interviews with stakeholders including representatives of governments, donors, the UN and NGOs, and focus group discussions with refugees and the host communities. The focus group discussions were held in and around Kiryandongo refugee settlement in Uganda, and Kakuma refugee camp and Kalobeyei refugee settlement in Kenya.

In order to build consensus and encourage ownership of the findings and recommendations in the final report, various consultations were held, including:

- A validation meeting with ReDSS members on the inception report.
- A review of the draft of this report by ReDSS member agencies and other NGOs, UN agencies and donors.
- Separate validation workshops for donors and NGOs, and for UN agencies.

ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK

The key questions that the research sought to answer were explored through: (i) an environmental analysis, focused on the legal and policy frameworks, the key actors and architecture of the response, and other contextual factors; and, (ii) an analysis of the response to date to displacement from South Sudan. This is represented in the tables on page 13:
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS:
Is the environment conducive to an approach that advances solutions?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legal and policy framework</th>
<th>Actors and architecture</th>
<th>Other contextual factors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National and local laws, policies and regulations pertaining to refugees and durable solutions</td>
<td>Actors involved in addressing displacement from South Sudan</td>
<td>Access to land, services, markets, employment and trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government incentives for, and commitment to, implementation of the above</td>
<td>Mechanisms for coordination and planning</td>
<td>Resources, capacity and assets of refugees</td>
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<td>Engagement of refugees and host community in the above</td>
<td>Refugee-host community relations</td>
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<td>Sources of funding</td>
<td>Safety and security</td>
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WHAT BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING SOLUTIONS ARE PRESENTED BY ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS?

RESPONSE ANALYSIS: Does the response maximize opportunities for advancing solutions?

- Strategies and plans in place - humanitarian, development, resilience
- Successes/gaps/constraints in terms of advancing solutions within the response

MOVING FORWARD: What change is required?

- Changes in policy? If so: How might national and local policies be adapted or changed to better address prospects for durable solutions at the onset of displacement in the two countries?
- Changes in strategies? If so: What actions should be taken at the onset of a refugee influx to develop and operationalize strategies that support and/or facilitate progress towards durable solutions?
- Changes in roles and responsibilities? If so: What should be the role of humanitarian and development actors, governments, local authorities and the private sector in advancing solutions in the early stages of displacement? What should be the role of the displaced and host communities?
- Changes in funding? If so: What funding mechanisms and funding sources are required to encourage planning and programming for solutions?
METHODS OF ENQUIRY

Literature review
A review of literature pertaining to durable solutions was undertaken, with a particular focus on what can be done in the early stages of displacement. This included:

> Relevant regional and national legislation and policy on durable solutions.
> Research on durable solutions, transitional solutions and protracted displacement at the global, regional and national levels, including research previously conducted by ReDSS.
> Strategy and programming documents publicly available as well as those shared by research participants, including those relating to specific country-level initiatives.
> Donor publications and policies that focus on or give reference to durable solutions.

A full bibliography can be found at the end of the report.

Key informant interviews (KIs)
The primary source of data collection in this study was from interviews with key stakeholders. These included: government representatives; representatives of national civil society organizations; INGOs; UN agencies; refugee and host community leaders; and, academics who have conducted relevant research in the region.

The questions were tailored to each individual respondent. The interviews aimed to:

> Provide insight on the range of solutions initiatives, strategies and interventions currently in place or planned for post-December 2013, South Sudanese refugees.
> Provide understanding of how national and local policies, as well as other contextual factors, help or hinder solutions.
> Provide information on successes, promising practices, challenges and bottlenecks in advancing solutions in the early stages of the response.
> Generate ideas on what adaptations and changes could be made to current policies, strategies and initiatives to enable a more solutions-oriented response from the outset of a refugee crisis.

The consultant met with 69 key informants, the majority of these in one-on-one interviews, during the study period. A list of key informants can be found in Annex II.

Focus group discussions (FGDs)
Specific areas of enquiry for the FGDs included:

> The extent to which refugees are able to progress towards self-reliance.
> The extent to which refugees and host communities feel engaged in the development and implementation of strategies and programming.
> The extent to which refugees are able to make plans for their future in the early stages of displacement.
> Changes that refugees and host communities would like to see in policies and programming.

9 FGDs were conducted - 6 with refugees and 3 with host community members. Each FGD had between 8 and 12 participants aged between 18 and 30. All FGDs were separated by sex apart from the host community group in Kakuma. Those who participated in the FGDs are referred to as “refugee respondents” or “host community respondents” throughout the report.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

> It was originally intended for Ethiopia to be included in this study, however, due to delays in obtaining a visa for the consultant and the declaration of a state of emergency in Ethiopia during the study period, it was eventually decided to just focus on Uganda and Kenya.
> The consultant visited Kiryandongo refugee settlement in Uganda but due to time constraints was unable to visit Adjumani, where the highest concentration of South Sudanese refugees are located.
> Due to time constraints, the study focused predominantly on refugees living in camps and settlements. A comparison with those living outside of camps would be a valuable future endeavor, however, it was not possible within the timeframe of this study.
> Recommendations for strategy and operations in the two countries are focused at the macro-level: policies, planning, coordination and funding. The scope of this study did not allow for specific recommendations on sector programming and projects.

GLOBAL LEVEL DISCOURSE ON SOLUTIONS

PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT IS THE NORM

Traditionally, humanitarian actors have talked of 3 durable solutions processes for refugees: voluntary return to country of origin and subsequent reintegration, resettlement to a third country, and local integration in the country of asylum. All three durable solutions options are inhibited in a number of ways. Resettlement remains an option open to a very small proportion of refugees: in 2015, 81,000 refugees were resettled globally, which equates to less than 1% of the total global number of refugees. “Full” local integration, with citizenship as its endpoint, is a similarly rare durable solution. Notable examples have to date been confined to very long-term and/or smaller caseloads. Continuing conflicts, lack of rule of law and lack of access to land and property in countries of origin prevent return in safety and dignity for most of the world’s refugee caseloads. In 2014, the number of refugees voluntarily repatriated was the lowest in three decades.

Against this backdrop, an initial action of seeking sanctuary from conflict and persecution often evolves into years of protracted displacement for refugees, either in camps with limited freedom of movement and opportunities for self-reliance, or in urban settings with limited protection space. Today, protracted displacement lasts 17 years on average. Displacement is not a temporary problem with a short-term fix.

THE RESPONSE TO PROTRACTED DISPLACEMENT: THE CURRENT BUSINESS MODEL IS NOT WORKING

The humanitarian system, and current response modalities, are inadequate to address the medium to long-term needs of forcibly displaced people. There is a recognized need to shift away from short-term humanitarian strategies and funding, with a primarily “care and maintenance” focused approach delivered in camps. Those arguing for change highlight several areas for reform:

The need for a more development-focused approach:

The involvement of development actors from the very onset of displacement can lead to improved protection and self-reliance strategies, which lay the foundations for durable solutions to be realized. Actors including the World Bank, UNDP, UNHCR and OCHA have highlighted the need for a more developmental approach. Niels Harlid, head of the global Solutions Alliance, has called for “all actors to accept that conflict-induced forced displacement is predominantly a development issue with humanitarian elements – and not the other way around”.

The so called displacement-development nexus has been recognized in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development which highlights forced displacement as a factor that can potentially reverse development progress. The call to “leave no one behind” means that achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) requires inclusion of the most vulnerable (i.e. displaced persons). The New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2016, strongly encourages “joint responses involving all…actors in order to strengthen the nexus between humanitarian and development actors.”

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4 Notable examples are the provision of permanent residency status to 10,000 Angolan former refugees in Zambia, and the Tanzanian government’s decision to grant citizenship to over 160,000 Burundian former refugees who had been in country since the 1970s.


9 For more information on the Sustainable Development Goals, visit: http://www.sustainablegoals.org.uk/displacement-and-development/

Furthermore, there is a growing recognition that when humanitarian and development actors work together, they need to do so under a unified frame, or set of collective outcomes. The need for collective outcomes was highlighted in the Secretary General’s report on the World Humanitarian Summit, in which he highlighted that “more stakeholders aligned themselves with this core commitment than with any other core commitment.” These stakeholders included 34 member states and 60 NGOs.

The need for area-based approaches in refugee hosting areas:
Refugees are usually located in very marginalized areas of the countries that host them. A more development-focused approach is understood to necessitate a shift away from short-term, camp-based programming, which runs in parallel to host community service delivery, towards area-based approaches that focus on building self-reliance and resilience among refugees, host communities and local institutions. The approach also calls for closer involvement of central and sub-national government in refugee management and protection, with these ideally integrated into national and local development plans. An area-based approach also entails the integrated delivery of services, with refugees and host community members accessing the same services. Strengthening social cohesion is also a crucial element in an area-based approach, both horizontally (between refugees and host communities) and vertically (between displacement affected communities and service providers).

The need to reduce fragmentation in humanitarian and development funding:
This is increasingly recognized by donors and the UN. The European Union’s 2016 communication “Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance” highlights that “forcibly displaced people are often excluded from programmes and activities carried out by development actors”, while at the same time host communities often do not benefit from humanitarian assistance targeting refugees.

The need to shift perceptions of refugees as a burden:
Refugees are often regarded as a burden by host governments, host communities and many among the humanitarian and development communities. The arguments made after the recent influx of refugees into Europe - that refugees drain public budgets, stretch services to breaking point, take jobs from nationals and drive down wages - can be heard in all refugee hosting contexts. Such mindsets often result in policies that encamp refugees and create dependency on humanitarian assistance. While there is without a doubt a potential for negative social and economic effects for countries hosting refugee populations in the short term, a growing body of research suggests that these effects can be positive if managed correctly in the medium to long-term. A critical factor to enable solutions-oriented policy and programming in the early stages of displacement is to change perceptions about refugees, away from refugees as a burden towards refugees as individuals who bring skills and assets and have the potential to be economically active and contribute to the development of the areas that host them. This shift in perceptions of refugees is a crucial element of increasing the protection space for refugees and increasing their rights, such as freedom of movement and the right to work.

The need for a more flexible solutions language, especially in the early days of a response:
Given the unlikelihood of resettlement or return in the early stages of displacement, early solutions planning will inevitably place a focus on increasing self-reliance and enabling gradual advances in the local integration of refugees in their country of asylum. Local integration should be viewed as an incremental pathway with intermediate outcomes that can be categorized as material/economic (e.g. improving refugee and host community livelihoods), physical/social (e.g. building social cohesion between refugees and host community) and legal (e.g. advancing the right to work, or access to government-run health and education services). The indicators outlined in the ReDSS Durable Solutions Framework are a useful means of measuring these outcomes. In recent years, new language has entered the displacement lexicon, most notably the idea of “transitional solutions”, where displaced populations can become self-reliant while contributing economically, without the specific end goal of naturalization. Such approaches can help to equip refugees for any of the three durable solutions. For example, refugees with enhanced skills and

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13 European Commission (2016). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance
savings will be more likely to return early, and will be better prepared for reintegration if conditions become conducive for return to their country of origin.

**ReDSS Durable Solutions Framework**
The Framework is a rapid assessment tool to measure the extent to which durable solutions have been achieved in a particular context. The Framework contains 30 indicators that relate to a) Physical Safety – safety and security b) Material Safety – adequate standards of living, access to livelihoods, restoration of housing land and property c) Legal Safety – access to documentation, family reunification, participation in public affairs, access to effective remedies and justice.

The need to think about solutions from the very outset of a response:
All of the above points to the critical need to think about solutions from the very outset of an emergency. Initial decisions about stakeholder engagement and involvement, coordination mechanisms and modalities of supporting refugees, can either hinder or help to lay the foundations for future durable solutions. The need to plan early for durable solutions is well recognized. Volker Turk, UNHCR’s Assistant High Commissioner for Protection has stated that “[UNHCR’s] understanding of solutions has evolved and now acknowledges the importance of self-reliance and community-based activities from the onset of displacement”.16

While the above-mentioned needs are well recognized, and seemingly undisputed, the practicalities of operationalizing and implementing solutions strategies at the early onset stage are less clear and there are few examples of contexts where this has been attempted. A key part of this study was therefore to understand the barriers that exist to operationalizing such approaches in the early stages of displacement.

16 Statement to the 64th session of UNHCR’s Executive Committee
Kakuma IV refugee camp - 2014, Axel Fassio / DRC
THE REGIONAL CONTEXT

CONFLICT IN SOUTH SUDAN

Violent internal conflict broke out in the Republic of South Sudan in December 2013 when longstanding tensions within the country’s ruling party, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM), boiled over into armed conflict in the nation’s capital, Juba, and spread. There have been several attempts to negotiate and implement a cessation of hostilities – the latest of which resulted in a peace agreement signed in August 2015 – but these efforts have largely proved ineffectual and have been broken by both parties. In July 2016, renewed fighting erupted in several locations across the country. Conflict in South Sudan has produced 1,045,420 refugees since December 2013 spread across Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Sudan and the Central African Republic (there are an additional 115,140 South Sudanese refugees who were displaced before December 2013 in the region). With over 70% of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda and Kenya being under 18, the conflict and resulting displacement have often been referred to as a “children’s crisis”. Inside South Sudan, there are an estimated 1.61 million IDPs.

The number of South Sudanese refugees is expected to rise. In September, the security situation deteriorated in the Central Equatoria region, which borders both Kenya and Uganda. At the time of writing, an estimated 100,000 people are trapped in the town of Yei due to fighting in the area. Restrictions on civilian movement due to insecurity and military operations have been reported in multiple locations in Greater Equatoria. Refugees in Uganda have reported that friends and family members plan to join them when and if these restrictions lessen. As the third anniversary of the outbreak of conflict in South Sudan approaches, it is worth bearing in mind that rates of displacement peak on average 4.1 years after the start of an influx.

The short-term outlook for peace in South Sudan is grim, and large-scale return movements are not foreseeable any time soon. Localized conflict is ongoing in many parts of the country, food security is worsening, and the leaders of the two main factions show no signs of returning to peace negotiations, or honoring their commitments in the 2015 peace agreement.

THE REGIONAL RESPONSE TO SOUTH SUDANESE DISPLACEMENT

The overall responsibility for coordination of the humanitarian response to regional displacement from South Sudan lies with UNHCR’s Regional Refugee Coordinator (RRC). Current humanitarian protection and assistance needs, as well as priorities, strategies and funding requirements, are outlined in the Regional Refugee Response Plan January to December 2016 (RRRP). The Plan was developed in December 2015, but later revised in May 2016 due to an increased influx of refugees. The process of developing the RRRP is led by UNHCR in consultation with other UN agencies and NGOs. It is important to note that the RRRP focuses solely on humanitarian needs, is developed by humanitarian actors, and is divorced from development planning, unlike the Regional Refugee Resilience Plan for the Syria response (also known as “3RP”), which incorporates a resilience component under the custodianship of UNDP. The response to displacement from South Sudan in all countries has been marked by funding shortfalls. The total funding requirements outlined in the RRRP for 2016 are US$ 701,606,726. As of 13 September 2016, the RRRP was only 20% funded.

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17 South Sudan Situation Information Sharing Portal. Access at: http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php
18 UNHCR South Sudan Factsheet for September 2016.
19 UNHCR South Sudan Factsheet for September 2016.
20 World Bank (2016) Forcibly Displaced: Toward a development approach supporting refugees, the internally displaced, and their hosts.
21 Revised South Sudan Regional Response Plan 2016
22 UNHCR South Sudan Situation: Regional Emergency Update (16 September-30 September).
INCREASED ENGAGEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT ACTORS IN FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN THE REGION

An exciting new development in the management of forced displacement in the Horn of Africa region is the establishment of the Regional Secretariat for Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which will support a holistic response to forced displacement in the region. The Secretariat will aim to ensure that displacement in the region is addressed as a developmental challenge as well as a humanitarian one and that governments take responsibility for, and lead, development responses in refugee hosting areas. The Secretariat is in its infancy - it is currently staffing up and developing a strategic plan. Given the convening power of member states that IGAD has, it is hoped that the Secretariat will be able to make positive strides in generating learning and in influencing policy change that will make the regional environment more conducive for early solutions planning.

The IGAD Secretariat is funded by the World Bank, and reflects the institution’s increased focus on addressing forced migration in the region. The Secretariat is being funded as part of a $175 million regional investment by the World Bank in helping to mitigate the impact of displacement on refugee hosting countries and support the local and transitional solutions agenda by investing in local government capacity, basic services, environmental protection and livelihoods. The European Union has introduced the EU Trust Fund for Africa with a Horn of Africa window that places a strong focus on addressing forced displacement through humanitarian, resilience and development approaches. UNDP have also increased their focus on forced displacement in the region.

OVERVIEW OF COUNTRY CASE STUDIES

The cases studies in Uganda and Kenya helped to illuminate many of the barriers and opportunities that can exist for early solutions planning. The parameters of early solutions planning are set first and foremost by the legal and policy environment. Refugee policy in these countries differs greatly - Uganda’s open approach and focus on building self-reliance versus Kenya’s encampment policy and current focus on shrinking asylum space. However, it should be noted that Uganda’s more generous refugee policy currently finds itself under considerable pressure due to the large influx of South Sudanese refugees. Whereas the policy environment in Uganda offers a reasonably good starting point for early solutions planning, in Kenya there is a need to identify opportunities within a restricted policy framework and develop strategies for increasing those opportunities through influencing policy change.

Despite the differences in the policy environment and attitudes towards refugee hosting, many of the barriers to early solutions planning identified by participants in this study were similar across the two countries. The response to South Sudanese displacement in both Kenya and Uganda since December 2013, has been very much in emergency mode, with a focus on receiving and stabilizing new populations and an ongoing care and maintenance approach. A number of common constraints to early solutions planning were identified across the two countries:

Despite this, there are some signs of a shift towards a more solutions-oriented approach in the refugee response in both countries. The Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE) strategy in Uganda and the Kalobeyi Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDLP) in Kenya are tentative examples of national and local level planning focused on building the self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local institutions, although there are challenges and concerns with both of these initiatives. There is also an increased engagement of development actors in both countries, and the emergence of some multi-year funding opportunities for NGOs.

These findings are unpacked in greater detail in the individual country sections below.

**UGANDA**

**CURRENT DYNAMICS OF DISPLACEMENT FROM SOUTH SUDAN**

Uganda is currently hosting 481,494 refugees from South Sudan, of which only a very small proportion (22,483) were displaced before December 2013.\(^24\) This number has increased dramatically in 2016, with intensified fighting in the Equatoria states. 44,429 refugees arrived between January 1 and July 7, and 190,014 between July 8 and October 3.\(^25\) The majority of South Sudanese refugees are located in some of the most remote, poorest parts of the country in the North and Midwest, in the districts of Adjumani, Kiryandongo, Arua, Yumbe and Kyangwali. The speed of the influx has necessitated expanding existing sites and opening new sites during 2016.

Uganda continues to face a much larger influx of South Sudanese refugees than other countries in the region, and is likely to see continued high numbers entering the country. An assessment conducted by Reach in South Sudan found that nearly all major roads to Uganda are blocked by parties to the conflict and that “most people wish to come to Uganda, and the only thing holding them back is their inability to safely leave. If road access to Uganda improves, large numbers of refugees are likely to come across the border”.\(^26\) Despite this, much greater numbers continue to come to Uganda rather than Kenya. This is likely because of the longer border and greater number of access routes from South Sudan to Uganda. It is also possible that Uganda’s refugee policy means that refugees see it as a more appealing country of asylum.

\(^{24}\) South Sudan Information Sharing Portal. Access at: http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=229
\(^{25}\) South Sudan Regional Emergency Update (16 September – 30 September). UNHCR.
\(^{26}\) Reach (2016). Situation Overview: Displacement and Intentions in Greater Equatoria. South Sudan, 2 September 2016
BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EARLY SOLUTIONS PLANNING

A generous refugee policy offering potential for self-reliance

Uganda’s refugee policy, which is most commonly described as generous, progressive and exemplary, is conducive to early solutions planning. Uganda hosts the third largest number of refugees in Africa and it has been well documented that it grants them considerable rights in comparison to its neighbors. *Prima facie* recognition is provided to refugees from South Sudan. The 2006 Refugee Act and 2010 Refugee Regulations have established a settlement-based approach, whereby refugees are allocated a plot of land for cultivation in a settlement. Refugees have freedom of movement; the right to work and own a business; equal access to primary education, healthcare and basic social services; and are able to obtain personal identity documents. A focus has also been placed on integrated service delivery, with refugees and host communities accessing the same government-run services.

Despite being a positive example within the region, Uganda’s refugee policy is not perfect. Although it provides refugees with rights that enable advances in social and economic integration, full legal integration in the form of citizenship currently remains out of reach for first generation refugees, their children and their grandchildren.27 Discussions, advocacy and legal action about refugees and citizenship are ongoing.28 Although refugees are given tenure for the land they are allocated in settlements, there is no mechanism for obtaining ownership and they are prohibited from building permanent structures. These factors do not in themselves severely inhibit early solutions planning, however, they do have bearing on the extent to which refugees can become locally integrated over a longer period of time.

A relatively high level of social acceptance of refugees

The hospitality of the Ugandan government and Ugandan communities toward refugees is partly due to the fact that many Ugandans have at one time been displaced themselves, including some government officials. The cultural, linguistic, and ethnic affinities between Ugandans and refugees from neighboring countries are often cited as another contributing factor to the openness of Uganda’s refugee policy.29 Host communities’ respondents in Kiryandongo refugee settlement saw more positives in the presence of refugees than negatives both historically and with the recent influx. Specifically referring to the significantly increased refugee population since 2013, they highlighted a number of benefits to refugee hosting, including:

- There are now more people to sell things to e.g. vegetables, fruits, palm mats.
- The health clinics tend to be better stocked. One female respondent remarked: “Refugees have brought joy to pregnant women and others.”
- Improvements in education: respondents highlighted that there is now a school lunch program and scholastic materials have also been distributed.

Kiryandongo refugee settlement is in Midwest Uganda close to the town of Bweyale. The settlement is home to over 70,000 refugees, the vast majority of whom are part of the new caseload i.e. they arrived after December 2013. In August 2016, the settlement reached capacity and new arrivals were no longer accepted. The consultant visited Kiryandongo as part of this study.

Host community respondents in Kiryandongo also listed a number of less positive factors: the price of items in the market has increased; perceptions that some refugee were hostile and unwilling to integrate; and a feeling that the UN and NGOs are there for the refugees and that they receive a disproportionate amount of support relative to host communities. They highlighted that organizations need to make more effort to understand the needs of host communities. Despite this, participants were on the whole more positive than negative about the presence of refugees. Key informants highlighted that host community attitudes were similar in other South Sudanese refugee hosting locations in Uganda.30

28 For a summary of latest developments, visit: http://citizenshiprightsafrica.org/the-eligibility-for-refugees-to-acquire-ugandan-citizenship/.
Local governments in Uganda have also appeared enthusiastic to accommodate refugees who have come from South Sudan since December 2013. This was exemplified recently by the local government clearing the road to a newly established refugee settlement in Yumbe within a couple of days. Incentives for hosting refugees are provided through the National Development Plan II (NDP II), through increased investment in services and development at the district-level. Through the NDP II, refugee-hosting areas are recognized as being in need of special attention due to the added demands of hosting displaced populations. Despite this, a number of key informants highlighted that local government currently lacks the capacity to deal with the current influx, and is not significantly empowered to take a leadership role at the district level.

The incentives for local government to engage in refugee management in Uganda need to be matched with investments in strengthening their capacities to deal with refugee influxes, support for incorporating refugee management into District-level development plans and a greater decentralization of responsibilities for refugee management.

While Uganda’s policy affords an array of rights, opportunities for self-reliance are currently limited for South Sudanese refugees

After increases in the refugee population throughout 2014, 2015 and the first half of 2016, Uganda has seen a dramatic spike in the number of refugees since the outbreak of fighting in South Sudan in July 2016. With rates of arrival regularly over 2,000 refugees per day the response has very much been in emergency mode. The recent revision of the RRRP acknowledged this: “Given the current need to cope with the provision of life-saving services to the larger number of new arrivals and due to resource limitations, the livelihoods sector has had to be deprioritized for this Regional RRP revision”.31 As highlighted above, Uganda is likely to see a continued increase in refugees.

This goes to demonstrate that even with a policy geared towards self-reliance, it is does not automatically follow that a more developmental approach will be taken in the early stages of displacement. With the focus on receiving, assisting and stabilizing a vulnerable population, a number of key informants highlighted that the response has felt very reactive and there has not been the space or the funding to focus on activities more geared towards building self-reliance. This highlights a lack of space within the response architecture for early solutions planning, the need for increased human resource capacity and the availability of more flexible funding to enable medium and longer term planning.

The current influx is clearly placing Uganda’s refugee policy under strain, and while the policy affords a wide array of rights to refugees, opportunities for self-reliance are currently lacking:

- **Education:** Very few opportunities exist for refugee children to progress beyond primary school. In Kiryandongo refugee settlement, which continued to receive new arrivals up to August 2016, there are 5 primary schools within the settlement for children to attend. There is only one private secondary school. With only a handful of scholarships available, the vast majority of students are unable to afford the fees. Refugee respondents highlighted the need to increase opportunities for education at secondary level as a major priority. They also highlighted protection risks related to dropping out of school: they reported that dropping out of school had led to cases of early marriage and some boys being sent to South Sudan to fight. A 2015 assessment in the refugee settlements in Adjumani also found that there “is minimal access to secondary education for those in the camps”.32

- **Livelihoods:** Settlements for South Sudanese refugees are located in some of the poorest areas of the country. For many refugees, these locations provide little opportunity for livelihoods beyond some subsistence farming and petty trading, as well as casual labor.33 There is also a lack of clarity in the wording of the Refugee Act, leading many refugees to unnecessarily seek out work permits (and employers to demand work permits of refugees).34 Refugee respondents...
in Kiryandongo highlighted a lack of opportunities to earn an income and support themselves beyond food assistance. No participants had been able to obtain employment locally. They all said that the current reduced plot size in Kiryandongo was not enough for subsistence, but rather just enough to complement the existing food ration (the plot sizes are smaller than this in the refugee hosting district of Adjumani, where they have decreased in size from 50m x 50m to 30m x 30m, and in some instances 25m x 25m). Such assertions were echoed by operational agencies working in Kiryandongo. Many key informants highlighted the inadequacy of the scope and duration of current livelihood support. Many also felt that there is too much focus on supporting agriculture given the profile of the refugee caseload - many are pastoralists, and young people are not necessarily interested in agriculture.

The need for much greater investment in interventions that build the self-reliance of new refugees, starting with increasing access to secondary education, and increasing economic opportunities, including building skills in non-traditional livelihoods, was strongly emphasized by refugee respondents and key informants alike. Host community respondents highlighted a number of similar challenges, and so it will be important to ensure that they are integrated into future livelihoods programming. Humanitarian funding streams are far from able to meet this need. There is now an increased engagement of development actors (see below), however, their engagement in analysis and planning and related development financing was lacking at the outset of the crisis.

ReHoPE offers potential for a solutions-oriented approach from the outset

Refugee management and protection have been incorporated in national development planning through a government initiative called the Settlement Transformative Agenda (STA), which is anchored in the National Development Plan (NDP II 2016-2020) and provides an inclusive, area-based development strategy for refugee hosting communities. To support the STA, UN agencies, the government and the World Bank have developed a joint strategy, known as Refugee and Host Population Empowerment (ReHoPE), which provides a framework for joint self-reliance and resilience programming of up to $350 million over 5 years. Both the STA and ReHoPE build upon previous refugee management strategies in Uganda.

Despite being positive about its focus and potential to bring humanitarian and development actors together, at the time of interview most key informants were unclear about the status of the ReHoPE strategy, and many felt that its development had not been an inclusive process. After these interviews were conducted, however, a detailed draft ReHoPE Strategic Framework document was circulated in mid-October for review and input by a number of key stakeholders. The draft strategic framework has the following overall objective:

“To strengthen collaboration between humanitarian actors, development partners, and the private sector, under the leadership of the Government of Uganda, to enhance resilience and self-reliance of refugees and host communities in the refugee hosting areas.” It aims to enhance self-reliance and resilience at the community, household and systems-levels (see text box for further details).”

35 IRIN (2016). Is a Model Refugee Policy in Africa Doomed?
ReHoPE - Strengthening Resilience at 3 levels

At household level:
- Target the most vulnerable in refugee hosting districts.
- Ensure they have access to the support needed to become resilient following a graduation approach.
- Ensure access to consumption support, access to financial literacy through VSLAs, and access to social and productive services.

At community level:
- Empower communities to plan, implement and account for activities that enable both household and community resilience.
- Use a community driven development approach with activities focused on environmental infrastructure and those that support household livelihoods (e.g. market infrastructure).

At the systems level:
- Help integrate community - level participation into government systems (planning, implementation and accountability).
- Progressively enhance the social service delivery system and capacity while integrating services with local government systems.
- Support local government capacity to better coordinate, plan, implement, monitor and adjust the system according to experience.

The next step is going to be the development of a project implementation manual, which will include a common results framework for the ReHoPE strategy with outcome level indicators, and a set of program management tools. Implementation of the strategy is slated to commence in 2017. ReHoPE can potentially provide a common framework with collective outcomes for addressing forced displacement around which different levels of government and humanitarian and development actors can coalesce. Going forward, it will potentially offer an opportunity to place a focus on self-reliance and resilience from the outset of displacement.

Donor interest in the framework is high and much depends on them following through with long-term funding commitments. Another key area is the willingness of a diverse range of actors to work together, and putting in place an inclusive coordination structure, which engages a wide constituency of stakeholders beyond UN agencies, the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and donors, including different entities of government, NGOs and the private sector. The central engagement and leadership of local governments must be fostered. Most crucially, ensuring mechanisms for refugee and host community voice and accountability will be key. As well as generating learning on the interventions under ReHoPE, it will be important to generate learning on the process itself in terms of modalities of planning, coordination and stakeholder engagement.

Increased engagement of development agencies and donors in addressing forced displacement in 2016
Although the ReHoPE strategy is not yet being implemented, the increased engagement of development actors is a positive sign for when the strategy is rolled out in 2017. Some notable examples are listed below:

> The World Bank is supporting the STA through a soft loan in four Districts: Arua, Adjumani, Isingiro and Kinyandongo. The project adopts an area-based planning approach with a focus on providing livelihood opportunities, improving infrastructure, and protecting the environment.

> The EU Trust Fund for Africa is supporting a consortium of NGOs (led by the Danish Refugee Council). The project will run over 3 years and its focus will be improving livelihoods, creating a strong business environment, mitigating conflict between refugees and host communities, and increasing access to education.

37 OPM is the department of government charged with refugee management in Uganda
UNDP recently conducted a livelihoods assessment at a newly established refugee settlement in Yumbe District, with both short and long-term recommendations for livelihoods and education interventions.

A livelihoods sector coordination group led by UNHCR and UNDP has recently been formed.

No inclusive forum where solutions are central to discussions

A humanitarian coordination mechanism exists with Kampala-level meetings (focused on all refugees, but predominantly South Sudanese refugees in recent times) and sector working groups led by UNHCR and OPM. Key informants were positive about UNHCR and OPM’s coordination role. Beyond these meetings with traditional humanitarian actors, there currently exists no widely inclusive platform where solutions can be discussed by a wide range of actors, including those focused on development. During 2016, discussions have taken place about forming a Solutions Alliance national group in Uganda. There have been a few meetings and a draft terms of reference is in circulation among donors and UN agencies. In October 2016, the global Solutions Alliance hired consultants to look at different national Solutions Alliances that have been formed: this included a visit to Uganda. Many actors on the ground questioned the added value of having a national Solutions Alliance in Uganda, at the time of writing, it remains unclear as to whether there will be a national Solutions Alliance will be launched.

Before launching a national Solutions Alliance in Uganda, it will be important to consider both current and planned coordination mechanisms, and what the “value-add” will be. The proposed coordination structure under ReHoPE, while not currently operational, will potentially provide an inclusive national and district-level coordination platform. Regardless of the final decision on exact mechanisms, ensuring that coordination is inclusive, and in particular puts government at national and district-level at its center, will be critical in the successful implementation of ReHoPE.

Uganda is likely to be a pilot country for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (The CRRF)

A key outcome of the September 2016 UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants was the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF). The CRRF, included as an annex to the “New York Declaration,” outlines a series of measures to be taken during a refugee response including the engagement of a broader set of development and private sector actors. The CRRF document itself is fairly vague, but the experience of applying the CRRF will lead to the development of a detailed “refugee compact” by 2018.

At the time of writing it looks likely that Uganda will be chosen as a pilot country for the roll out of the CRRF. Should this be the case, it will be important to learn from the past as well as the present - as highlighted above Uganda has a long history of implementing self-reliance strategies for refugees. Secondly, there is a danger that a proliferation of plans, initiatives and structures could confound the process of adopting a more solutions-oriented approach in the early stages of displacement. Rolling out the CRRF should not be seen as an additional initiative, creating new work and structures, but should rather be closely aligned to the ReHoPE strategy.

38 Bidibidi refugee settlement in Uganda was established in August 2016 due to the continued influx of South Sudanese refugees. It currently hosts over 100,000 refugees and will have an eventual capacity of 180,000. Source: South Sudan Regional Emergency Update (16 September-30 September). UNHCR.
39 For more information, visit: http://refugeesmigrants.un.org/summit
KEY FINDINGS FROM UGANDA

- Uganda’s refugee policy, although not perfect, offers a good starting point for early solutions planning when combined with the historically welcoming environment for refugees in Uganda.
- This policy has been under increasing strain since 2013: local services have been stretched and the traditionally generous allocation of land to refugees has been reduced.
- The response to South Sudanese displacement has been largely focused on receiving and stabilizing new populations, with an ongoing focus on care and maintenance. Humanitarian funding shortfalls and the size of the influx have largely influenced this, although the absence of development actors and financing in the early stages of the displacement was also a major contributing factor. The current lack of fora for solutions-oriented discussions, which is inclusive and engages a wide range of actors, has also inhibited a solutions-focused response.
- ReHoPE offers a potentially exciting new framework around which a wide range of actors can coalesce for more joined up humanitarian-development interventions from the outset. Moving forward with implementation, the ReHoPE process needs to be much more inclusive.
- Ahead of the roll out of ReHoPE in 2017, there are some encouraging signs of an increased engagement of development actors, most notably the World Bank.

KENYA

CURRENT DYNAMICS OF DISPLACEMENT FROM SOUTH SUDAN:
The total active population of South Sudanese refugees in Kenya stands at 91,191, including 50,703 who have arrived since December 2013.40 Kenya therefore has a much lower number and rate of new arrivals than Uganda, and the proportion of the South Sudanese caseload displaced before December 2013 is much higher. The vast majority of these refugees live in Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana County in the north west of Kenya, which is one of the poorest, most marginalized regions of the country. Less than 2,000 South Sudanese refugees have been registered in urban settings - Nairobi and Mombasa - since December 2013.

In June 2015, approximately 1,500 hectares was allocated for a new refugee settlement in Kalobeyei, approximately 10km by road from Kakuma. The articulated plans for the settlement are along the lines of the Ugandan approach, with refugees receiving larger areas of land, provision of integrated services for refugee and host community and further focus on improving the socio-economic conditions of both refugee and host community. The Kalobeyei Integrated Social and Economic Development Programme (KISEDIP), which will run from 2016-2030, is currently being developed by UNHCR, in collaboration with the World Bank and other UN agencies. The plan is very much in its infancy, with approximately 4,000 refugees currently at the site out of a proposed final number of 60,000.41

BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR EARLY SOLUTIONS PLANNING IN KENYA:

A restrictive refugee policy, with some room to maneuver
When asked about factors inhibiting early solutions planning in Kenya, most key informants began by highlighting the restrictiveness of the refugee policy. For 25 Years, Kenya has hosted refugees from across the region, and the government has traditionally operated an open-door policy including prima facie refugee status determination. Throughout this period, the Kenyan government has operated an encampment policy with restricted freedom of movement, which has limited opportunities for self-reliance and inhibited engagement in business, trade and other livelihood opportunities.42 While refugees are allowed to work according to the terms of the 2006 Refugees Act, several key informants highlighted

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41 This was at the time of the consultant’s visit on 13 October 2016
42 Encampment was legitimized by law by GAZETTE NOTICE NO. 1927 dated 28th March 2014
that obtaining work permits remains almost impossible and the reality is that few South Sudanese have access to the formal employment market.\(^{43}\) A system of parallel service delivery has largely persisted, with refugees predominantly accessing services provided by the UN and NGOs separate from host communities. Host communities have limited access to markets in refugee camps and vice versa.

In recent years, Kenya’s asylum regime has undergone substantial changes in a context of heightened security mostly due to incidences of violent extremism in Kenya attributed to Al-Shabaab.\(^{44}\) A number of key informants pointed to the “securitization of refugee management” in Kenya, and highlighted that the government’s primary interest in refugee management has been national security rather than refugee protection. Although these changes were instituted particularly in relation to Somali refugees, other refugee caseloads, including the South Sudanese, have also been affected. In response to a series of terrorist attacks, the government issued relocation directives in 2012 and 2014 requiring refugees in urban areas to relocate to designated camps - those of Somali origin to Dadaab and those of other nationalities to Kakuma. These directives were followed by a severe crackdown on refugees and asylum seekers living in urban areas where thousands were arbitrarily arrested and detained or forcibly relocated to the camps, and hundreds were unlawfully deported to Somalia.\(^{45}\) In 2016, the Government announced that Dadaab refugee camp, which houses predominantly Somali refugees, will close. The date for closure is currently set at 30 May 2017.\(^{46}\)

A Refugee Bill is under consideration by the Kenyan Parliament, and a refugee policy has been under development for some time now. UNHCR and a number of NGOs consulted during this study were actively engaged in providing input to these documents with the Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA).\(^{47}\) Despite efforts to include language around local integration and increasing refugee self-reliance, key informants who were involved in the process felt it unlikely that either a new Refugee Act or a final policy document would contain any significant changes. Refugee policy in Kenya, at least as it exists in law and writing, seems unlikely to change for some time.

Kenya’s refugee policy would therefore appear to offer limited opportunities for early solutions planning. However, a number of key informants engaged in policy work did point to some flexibility and vagueness in the implementation of Kenya’s refugee policy. For example, refugees continue to live in urban areas of Kenya despite the previous directives, although they receive limited assistance and have little protection space. There are currently 62,872 refugees registered in Nairobi (although only a very small minority of these are South Sudanese).\(^{48}\) Secondly, the existence of the Kalobeyei settlement, and the plans for its development, have to date remained unopposed (although not embraced) by central government, and offer an example of potentially increased space for new approaches to supporting (non-Somali) refugees under decentralization in Kenya. Whereas Uganda offers a conducive refugee policy for early solutions planning, the starting point in Kenya must be: (i) to identify opportunities within a restrictive policy environment to implement solutions-oriented approaches: and, (ii) develop strategies to widen these opportunities through influencing policy change.

Refugee hosting locations offer very limited opportunities for self-reliance

The words of an 8 year-old study by Danish Refugee Council and CARE still ring true:

“The main reason why improvements of socio-economic conditions in the camps are very gradual and levels of self-sufficiency are still limited is obvious: the refugees are confined in a semi-desert area with very limited economic opportunities.”\(^{49}\)

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43 This is due to a combination of administrative barriers and the fact that the process for obtaining a work permit is not well known by refugees.
44 Al Shabab/Shabaab is an Islamist militant group fighting the government in Somalia. It has also carried out a number of terrorist attacks in Kenya.
47 The DRA was dissolved in 2016 and replaced with the Refugee Affairs Secretariat.
Opportunities for early solutions planning are inhibited in Kenya by the areas where refugees are located. Turkana County (where Kakuma Camp is located) has high illiteracy rates, a high level of poverty, and health indicators that are among the worst in Kenya.\textsuperscript{50} Refugee respondents highlighted that employment is rare (beyond those who do incentive work for NGOs), and other opportunities to earn an income are lacking. One refugee remarked: “there is nothing for us to integrate into.”

There is a continued dependence on humanitarian assistance\textsuperscript{51}. In Kakuma refugee camp for example, only 8% of the adult refugee population engages in formal livelihoods and/or has other means of survival than humanitarian assistance.\textsuperscript{52} A recent UNHCR and WFP vulnerability study in Kakuma found that 96% of refugees cannot sustain themselves without food assistance.\textsuperscript{53}

Despite this, there is evidence to suggest that the social and economic impact of refugee hosting in Turkana have been more positive than negative. A 2015 ReDSS and Samuel Hall study identified a number of contributions that refugees make to the local economy including through trade, remittances, taxation and providing employment.\textsuperscript{54} The World Bank has also recently conducted a study looking at the social and economic impacts of refugee hosting in Kakuma. The report is not yet published, however, the initial findings that have been presented indicate that the impact has been more positive than negative: “refugee presence has led to early development of housing and land markets and more wage jobs and higher real wages in certain sectors. On the other hand, it aided the dislocation of livestock-based livelihoods.”\textsuperscript{55} Despite the immediate and valid analysis that Turkana is a poor, marginalized region with limited opportunities to offer, there is a need to dig further and assess the economic sub-sectors that have a potential for growth and labor creation.

**Refugee-host community relations are strained**

In focus group discussions at Kakuma, both refugees and host community respondents painted a negative picture of relations between the two communities. The host community highlighted a number of issues that cause tensions:

- The scarcity of water;
- The stretching of local services, particularly health and education services. For example, host community respondents reported crowding in the classrooms of local schools. This can be felt particularly when the refugee numbers in Kakuma are higher;
- A feeling that refugees have everything provided for them: rations, clothes, shelter, free schools, etc;
- Refugees collect firewood from the local area, which is a scarce resource;
- A feeling that community land has been given away to refugees by local leaders without properly consulting the host community;
- A sense that many refugees are ungrateful for the land provided to them by the host community; and
- Cases of child labor: refugees employing local children and providing them with very little.

Although host community members acknowledged that support from Kakuma-based UN agencies and NGOs to the host community has increased in recent years, they still felt that this was inadequate. There was a sense that refugees have all of their needs catered for, while the host community is largely overlooked. One participant remarked: “it is only the visiting consultants who speak to the local community.”

Refugee respondents voiced fears of harassment, attack and rape when going outside of the camp or Kalobeyei settlement. They highlighted that this is most likely to occur when they are collecting firewood.\textsuperscript{56} For those living in Kalobeyei, such incidents were most likely to occur when they were traveling between the settlement and Kakuma town.\textsuperscript{57} Despite such ongoing violent incidents, it was generally felt by


\textsuperscript{51} Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2015. UNHCR

\textsuperscript{52} Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016: Programming for Solutions. UNHCR

\textsuperscript{53} Kimetrica (2016). Refugee Vulnerability Study Kakuma, Kenya. Commissioned by UNHCR and WFP.


\textsuperscript{55} Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016: Programming for Solutions. UNHCR

\textsuperscript{56} There is a firewood distribution in Kakuma camp every 3 months, but refugees run out of supplies before the new distribution.

\textsuperscript{57} The journey is most commonly made to spend their vouchers. Vouchers can be used with vendors in Kalobeyei, however, FGD participants complained that their prices were significantly higher than in Kakuma.
FGD participants and key informants that conflict and tensions between refugees and host community have decreased over recent years, particularly as a result of the dialogue and engagement between the leadership of both communities.

There is a clear need for increased engagement between the UN agencies and NGOs based in Kakuma and the host community, including sensitization on the situations that refugees flee from and how decisions are made to support refugees versus host community. Opportunities for greater investment in integrated local services, and livelihood programming that benefits both the refugee and host communities, must also be explored.

Refugee response has very much been in an emergency mode, with an ongoing focus on care and maintenance

The effectiveness of the refugee response in building self-reliance has been severely hindered by funding shortfalls. In 2015, less than half of the funding needs for Kakuma were met.\(^{58}\) UNHCR have highlighted “the unsustainability of the current model of refugee assistance.”\(^{59}\)

Given this, it has been difficult for the response to move beyond an emergency mode for new arrivals, and continued provision of care and maintenance for those already in Kakuma. Understandably, this is where the priority has to lie with limited humanitarian funding, but what it usually means is that plans to build self-reliance, provide skills training and other support to livelihoods receive only a small amount of the limited humanitarian funding. According to UNHCR’s Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016 document, only 3% of funding will go to the livelihoods sector. The same UNHCR document highlights the following priorities for 2016: “besides the development of the new site [the Kalobeyei refugee settlement], [the priority] will be to arrest the worrying nutrition situation of the population which deteriorated in 2015…In addition, the increased rate of new arrivals …has shown that the operation is still in emergency mode and needs to focus on accommodating new arrivals.” This clearly highlights the inadequacies of humanitarian funding streams to comprehensively address the needs of refugees, and in particular increase their self-reliance, and the need for an area-based approach with development interventions and financing. Appeals focusing on humanitarian needs do not attract the type of development funding that is required to build refugee self-reliance over the longer term.

Key informants working for operational agencies and donors were generally quite pessimistic when asked about the extent to which refugee self-reliance can be increased, citing many of the factors already mentioned above- the restrictive policy environment and lack of freedom of movement, the location in which South Sudanese find themselves and funding shortfalls. A number of humanitarian agencies are supporting life skills trainings, vocational training, business planning, financial literacy and savings and loans associations in Kakuma. There are limitations to what can be achieved, however. The local job market is limited and those trained are highly unlikely to obtain a work permit. It is difficult to avoid a saturation of skills.

THE KALOBEYEI SETTLEMENT

The establishment of the Kalobeyei settlement could potentially represent a positive shift in terms of refugee management in Kenya. It is certainly a recognition that the current approach to managing refugees is clearly not working. Recognizing the severe limitations of self-reliance in an environment like Kakuma, the 15 year plan combines elements of strengthening income-earning opportunities urban and agricultural and livestock development, integrated

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58 Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016: Programming for Solutions. UNHCR
59 Kenya Comprehensive Refugee Programme 2016: Programming for Solutions. UNHCR
service delivery and private sector engagement. Kalobeyei will be developed as a settlement rather than a camp and the intention is that the site will become an urban center. The site is intended to eventually host 60,000 refugees with an additional 20,000 host community members benefitting from the initiative.

At the time of writing the site is in its early stages of development. Around 4,000 South Sudanese refugees were living there in October 2016, in temporary housing. Infrastructure is under construction and water is being trucked into the site. It was originally intended for Kalobeyei to be a decongestion site for Kakuma, with the priority being given to refugees who have a higher level skills and self-reliance. However, new arrivals from South Sudan are being placed at the site and 13,500 refugees will also be transferred to Kalobeyei from Dadaab. It is likely that the site will fill up quickly and the extent to which it will decongest Kakuma may prove limited if significant numbers of new refugees arrive from South Sudan.

The development of the Kalobeyei refugee settlement would seem inconsistent with the government’s current focus on shrinking asylum space (i.e. the planned closure of Dadaab refugee camp). However, the settlement has been planned with the Turkana county government rather than central government, and suggests that decentralization in Kenya may bring with it some increased potential for solutions-oriented approaches. Central government has not publicly objected to the plan, although the fact that Kalobeyei is not listed in law as a refugee hosting area is a concern. It is also unclear the extent to which refugees will be given any formal land usage rights, and whether restrictions on refugee movement will be relaxed for those living in Kalobeyei.

It should be noted that the consultant was unable to secure meetings with some of the key actors involved in the conceptualization and planning of Kalobeyei. Accounts of the process to date and assessments of its future success were varied, however, key informants expressed more negative than positive thoughts on Kalobeyei. Many key informants questioned the feasibility of the plan and, particularly, the viability of agriculture at the site, given that Kalobeyei is located in semi-arid lands with limited economic opportunities. Others highlighted the absence of a clear, widely available implementation plan, and felt that the initiative to date had been heavily humanitarian-led. The need to invest in the local government, building their capacity and empowering them to take leadership of the initiative was strongly highlighted. The need for much greater sensitization and inclusion in planning of the host community was further emphasized. As well as ensuring a more inclusive, local government-led process moving forward, it will also be important to see if there is applicable learning from other programs in Kenya that have supported devolution.

Key findings from Kenya

- Kenya’s refugee policy severely limits opportunities for refugee self-reliance. As well as identifying the limited windows of opportunity within the policy for solutions-oriented approaches, there is a need to explore ways in which these opportunities can be expanded through influencing policy change.
- Like Uganda, the response to displacement from South Sudan has been in emergency mode, with an ongoing care and maintenance approach. Refugee locations and humanitarian shortfalls have inhibited a focus on building self-reliance; however, this can also be attributed to a lack of engagement of development actors and funding in responding to displacement.
- The Kalobeyei refugee settlement potentially represents a new approach to refugee management in Kenya, although there are concerns over the feasibility of the plan. There needs to be more clarity over the longer term plan, and county government needs to be capacitated and empowered to lead its implementation.
- Looking beyond Kalobeyei, a sizeable population will remain in Kakuma and there is a need for a more joined up approach to address their needs and build self-reliance over time some of the Kalobeyei investment should also be shared with those remaining Kakuma.

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60 This number represents the current non-Somali caseload in Dadaab. At the time of writing, the movement was planned to start on 7 November.
This study sought to understand the factors that help or hinder early solutions planning and to identify ways in which a solutions-oriented approach can be operationalized in the early stages of displacement.

The cases studies in Uganda and Kenya helped to illuminate many of the barriers and opportunities that can exist for early solutions planning. The parameters of early solutions planning are set first and foremost by the legal and policy environment. Refugee policy in these countries differs greatly - Uganda's open approach and traditional focus on building self-reliance versus Kenya's encampment policy and current focus on shrinking asylum space.

Despite the differences in the policy environment and attitudes towards refugee hosting, the response to displacement from South Sudan in both Kenya and Uganda has been very much in emergency mode, with a focus on receiving and stabilizing new populations and an ongoing care and maintenance approach. A number of factors inhibiting early solutions planning were identified, including the lack of economic opportunities in areas in which refugees live; the lack of time and capacity in operational agencies to develop a longer term vision; the lack of development actors and financing in the early stages of displacement; and “traditional mindsets” about how refugee situations should be responded to.

Adopting a more solutions-oriented approach in the early stage of displacement is dependent on making a number of wide-ranging improvements in how displacement is responded to and who is involved. These improvements relate to a number of operational factors, including better forecasting of displacement and preparedness; more collaborative humanitarian and development approaches to assessment and analysis and the development of joint, measurable outcomes for refugee hosting areas; and more flexible, multi-year funding sources to support the achievement of these outcomes. Other required improvements relate to behavioral and attitudinal factors, such as the need to change mindsets and build capacity among operational actors and host governments. Recommendations are outlined in the next section of this report. A theory of change, which outlines the changes that need to occur for early solutions planning to be operationalized, is also contained in Annex I.

The recommendations are underpinned by a number of key requirements for responses in refugee hosting areas:

> There needs to be a more inclusive, less mandate-driven approach that engages a wide range of actors - government, humanitarian, development, private sector, refugees and host communities from the outset. This must be matched with a shared accountability among these actors for meeting joint outcomes for refugee hosting areas.

> The approach should be multi-sectoral, recognizing that a diverse range of interventions and technical specialties contribute to solutions from the outset.

> There must be ongoing policy dialogue to widen the “solutions space,” with particular emphasis on freedom of movement, the right to work and greater flexibility in where refugees can live.

> Governments’ leadership in early solutions planning must be fostered at both national and local levels. Humanitarian and development actors need to engage with a broad range of government actors beyond refugee departments, which are often disempowered and removed from the refugee policy-making levers. They should also place a focus on increasing the capacity of and incentives for government (particularly at sub-national level) to take on this leadership role.

> There needs to be meaningful participation of refugees, host communities and local institutions in developing solutions-oriented approaches and adequate measures to ensure voice and accountability during their implementation.

> Support to refugee hosting areas should be tailored to the specific skills, assets and vulnerabilities of refugees and host communities and based upon a strong understanding of local context (institutions, markets and income earning opportunities).

> There must be investment in generating evidence of what works, not just in terms of solutions-oriented interventions, but also in the process itself (methods of planning, coordination and funding). Examining bottlenecks in moving forward with solutions-oriented approaches illuminates wider systemic issues around bridging the humanitarian-development divide. Given this, there
also needs to be a commitment to learning from other spheres where this issue is being tackled, such as the resilience agenda and disaster risk reduction.

Finally, a comprehensive refugee response must consider the bigger picture. This study focused on what can be done in the early stages of displacement in countries of asylum. Such efforts to advance transitional solutions in host countries must not occur in a vacuum and need ultimately to be part of a wider effort. Many host governments will remain reluctant to open up their refugee-hosting environments if return to their country of origin or resettlement to a third country remain marginal solutions. The root causes of conflict in countries of origin need to be addressed more comprehensively to increase opportunities for the world’s refugees to return and reintegrate. Furthermore, there needs to be a greater global commitment to responsibility-sharing through the increased availability of resettlement places.

**RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EARLY SOLUTIONS PLANNING**

1. **Scenario planning and preparedness should be strengthened to lay the foundations for early solutions planning**

The geographical areas covered in this study have hosted refugees for decades, with periodic repatriations and influxes during that timeframe. New displacement is the norm rather than the exception. It can be expected but can it be better predicted?

Systematic preparedness is crucial in laying the foundations for early solutions planning. The starting point for this is making better predictions: *what is the background/skills of the people who are most likely to come? And what are the most likely numbers of the influx?* Better scenario planning around these questions will enable:

- Early engagement with government on site identification and preparation, including adequate planning for land allocation and shelters. This will help to avoid situations of overcrowding in camps and settlements and the selection of sites that are more conducive to refugee self-reliance.
- Early sensitization of potential host communities to mitigate the risk of tensions once refugees have arrived.
- The identification of potential livelihoods opportunities for refugees based on their background and skills (e.g., focusing support on agriculture if that is the background of the most likely group of people who will come).
- Early engagement and mobilization of non-traditional actors, including the private sector, so that they are ready to engage from the outset, as well as mapping of existing development activities/projects in potential refugee hosting areas.
- Early assessment of the absorption capacities of local services and the capacities of local authorities to deal with an influx.

There are some useful tools available to support this process, including those produced by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC)\(^{61}\) and UNHCR,\(^{62}\) but more consideration needs to be given to the sources of information and the methods of collecting such information. Data that will help to inform scenario planning includes:

- Information on the intentions of IDPs and those currently staying in countries of origin, as understood through interviews in countries of origin or with refugees in countries of asylum.
- Early warning Information and conflict analysis from existing mechanisms and initiatives, such as IGAD’s Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism,\(^{63}\) and the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat’s information and analysis on migration trends and drivers.
- Conflict analysis conducted by experts in this area.

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61 IASC Emergency Response Preparedness Guidelines
62 UNHCR Preparedness Package for Refugee Emergencies
63 Although CEWARN has been primarily focused on cross-border pastoralist conflicts to date, it is planning to expand its focus to include a broader typology of conflicts.
2. **Area-based early solutions analyses need to be conducted in refugee hosting areas**

Methods and approaches of assessing immediate humanitarian assistance and protection needs at the outset of an emergency need to be complemented by a deeper, area-based assessment and analysis process geared towards understanding the impact of displacement and how best to increase the self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local institutions. This process will contribute to informing medium to long-term sectoral priorities in refugee hosting areas and must engage government, development and private sector actors from the outset. Some key areas of enquiry include:

- Understanding who the refugees are: what are their skills, capacities and assets, and what are the specific differences in these based on age, gender, and other diversities?
- The absorptive capacity of local services and how local service delivery plans should change as a result of displacement.
- Analysis of markets and income earning opportunities in places of displacement (the engagement of local private sector actors in assessments here will be key).
- The impact of refugee hosting on social cohesion, focusing particularly on tensions/conflict related to land, access to services and employment opportunities.
- Mapping of existing development activities, funding and priorities in refugee hosting locations, and understanding how displacement is and should be impacting upon these.

While recognizing the importance of having such information, it will be important to not let gathering it get in the way of initial humanitarian assessments. As such, area-based assessments should be conducted separately while there continues to be an influx. Joint humanitarian-development assessments would be too cumbersome and would slow the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

However, the disconnect between humanitarian and development action in refuge-hosting areas often stems from a lack of joint analysis. Although humanitarian and development focused assessments should be conducted separately in refugee-hosting areas, it is important that humanitarian and development actors, ideally under the leadership of government, come together to do an early solutions analysis based on the assessments conducted. This early solutions analysis should take place within the first year of an influx.

3. **Humanitarian, development and government actors should develop collective outcomes for addressing forced displacement, which incorporate efforts to build self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local institutions.**

The development of collective, measurable outcomes for refugee hosting areas, which would flow from the early solutions analysis process outlined above, would help host governments and humanitarian and development actors to work side by side and towards a common goal from the early stages of displacement onwards. Outcomes should articulate the immediate, medium and longer-term changes to be brought about in refugee hosting areas, and must be developed based on a clear understanding of the skills, assets and vulnerabilities of refugees and host communities.

Collective outcomes should encompass emergency life-saving and humanitarian needs, strengthened systems for local service delivery, increased economic opportunities, increased capacity of local institutions to manage refugee influxes and improvements in social cohesion. Adequate measures of refugee and host community self-reliance should also be included, using the ReDSS Durable Solutions Framework as a tool.

The measurability of such outcomes would also help to generate evidence of what works in solutions-oriented programming. Furthermore, they would provide a common framework for funding and would help to reduce the fragmentation of humanitarian and development financing.

A wide range of actors must be engaged in this process to ensure shared ownership and accountability. Collective outcomes should be articulated within the first year of an influx and cover a period of at least two years. Ideally, the process should be led by host governments with close support of the UN country team.
and a wider engagement of donors, the NGO community and the private sector. Critically important is the need to ensure refugee and host community voice in the process and strong measures of accountability through ongoing consultation and feedback, as well as measures for participatory monitoring.

The ReHoPE strategic framework offers a promising national level example. The next stage of the process is to develop a common results framework that all actors must feed into. At the regional level, another useful example from which to learn is the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan (the 3RP) developed for countries affected by the Syria refugee crisis. Whereas the South Sudan Regional Refugee Response Plan is focused primarily on humanitarian needs over a one-year period, the two-year 3RP places a heavy emphasis on a resilience component, for which UNDP is the custodian. The 3RP process has not been without challenges and is not presented here as a perfect model, however, regional planning for South Sudanese refugees should also seek to include a resilience component moving forward.

4. Mechanisms for coordination around joint planning and collective outcomes should exist and include wide participation and government leadership to the greatest extent possible.

Many research participants felt that there was no current space within the humanitarian coordination architecture for longer term planning around solutions. Others highlighted that these discussions were ongoing - at the level of UN country team, central government and some donors - but that they, and other actors, were sidelined from them. The common theme running through these recommendations is the need for the meaningful engagement of a wider range of stakeholders. But what are the mechanisms for achieving this?

Humanitarian and development actors are understandably averse to the creation of new coordination structures without first understanding what the value-add will be. Therefore, before creating new structures it is important to examine what already exists. Coordination for early solutions planning must create the space for longer term planning in the early stages of displacement. This space should be separate from, but connected to, the humanitarian coordination structure and must enable joint analysis (see recommendation 2) and the development of joint outcomes (see recommendation 3) to take place. Coordination for early solutions planning needs to also engage a wide range of stakeholders beyond the humanitarian sphere. It must extend beyond the UN country team and a select group of donors.

Government leadership must be fostered at national and sub-national levels and parallel UN-led systems should be avoided to the greatest extent possible. The engagement of a diversity of key government actors should also be sought, looking beyond the refugee department to relevant government ministries as well as sub-national government. Humanitarian and development actors therefore need to place a focus on increasing the capacity and willingness of governments to take leadership in refugee management and protection. In Uganda, for example, the prioritization of refugee hosting districts under the NDPII has helped to shift the incentives for local government engagement in addressing displacement. Investments must also be made in capacitating and empowering government, particularly sub-national government, to take the lead role in refugee management and protection and incorporate refugee management into local development plans.

Crucially, coordination structures must also seek to meaningfully engage refugee and host community members. Local/international NGOs and private sector actors also need to be given a seat at the table and increased influence in decision-making around solutions planning. At the regional level, the IGAD Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration will play a crucial role in convening and ensuring collaboration between a wide range of government (asylum and origin countries), humanitarian and development actors.

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64 In Uganda, for example, a number of actors are questioning the need to introduce a new national chapter of the Solutions Alliance given existing coordination fora and the proposed ReHoPE coordination structure.
5. Action to influence policy change for an environment more conducive to early solutions planning should be ongoing, collaborative and targeted

This study examined two very different refugee policies. Kenya’s focus on encampment, and limitations on areas in which refugees can live, move and work, is much more typical globally. In most countries, early solutions planning will require identifying opportunities within restrictive refugee policies, as well identifying how those opportunities can be expanded through influencing policy change. From the outset of an influx, humanitarian and development actors must place a focus on collaboratively analyzing the legal and policy framework as it pertains to refugee self-reliance and dignity, building on and joining existing efforts, and identifying opportunities to collectively influence policy barriers. Key considerations must be:

- **The harmonization of advocacy efforts**: Engaging a wide range of actors can bring different levels of influence and also enable arguments to be presented from different angles. For example, development donors will likely have more potential to influence policy change than humanitarian agencies (see recommendation 6) and economic arguments for relaxing restrictions on refugees’ right to work might be most powerfully presented by local private sector actors.

- **Considering who will benefit**: While humanitarian and development actors should promote the rights of all refugees, there is also a need to be pragmatic and focus advocacy efforts on particular groups or categories of refugee for whom change might be most achievable. For example, there may be individuals with particularly skillsets (e.g. teachers, medical professionals) for whom the issuance of work permits could be prioritized and restrictions on freedom of movement relaxed.

- **Evidence**: Policy proposals must be supported by evidence. For example, what evidence can be presented on the economic and social benefits of refugees being allowed to live outside of camps?

- **Targeting**: It is important to understand who holds the real power to bring about change in policy. Often, this is not the refugee department which, although responsible for day-to-day refugee management, is often removed from the policy-making levers. Efforts should be made to engage a wider range of ministries (at central and line ministry level) including those for labor, interior affairs, health, immigration and education.

6. New funding modalities that reduce the fragmentation of humanitarian and development resources need to be explored and operationalized

The funding environment was cited as a major constraint to early solutions planning by key informants in both countries. Those interviewed highlighted funding shortfalls, the lack of multi-year funding, and the need for improved donor coordination (particularly between humanitarian and development donors). The current study did not have the time to make a full exploration of possible funding modalities but this is an area worthy of further enquiry. Having joint outcomes and a common framework (see recommendation 3) would certainly help to reduce the disconnect between funding streams in refugee hosting areas. The increased availability of multi-year funding opportunities for operational agencies is essential to then program against these comprehensive plans. It will also be important to learn from and build upon the resilience architecture and funding that has emerged in the region and Somalia in particular. A number of other funding modalities should also be explored:

- **Pooled funding mechanisms and multi-donor trust funds that combine humanitarian, development and resilience elements, such as the EU Trust Fund for Africa (see text box on page 38);**

- **Using development funding to leverage policy change.** For example, in October 2016 it was announced that the UK government, the World Bank and the European Union are embarking on a new initiative to build two industrial parks in Ethiopia. The support is contingent on 30% of the newly-created jobs being made available to refugees, which would necessitate a change in Ethiopia’s refugee policy.\(^{66}\)

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65 Refugees do technically have the right to work in Kenya after obtaining a work permit. Few, in reality, are able to obtain one, however, due to administrative procedure and a lack of knowledge of the process.

**EU Trust Fund for Africa**

One priority under the Horn of Africa window is actions that addresses “the developmental and protection needs of people suffering long-term displacement, both refugee/IDP and returnee populations, and host and return communities. They should focus on durable solutions, improving protection space, in particular for the most vulnerable groups, including the provision of and access to basic services, appropriate reception conditions, and capacity building for authorities, generating income, creating jobs, education and livelihood opportunities, fostering social cohesion amongst the refugee and host communities, and raising awareness about the perils of irregular migration and criminal networks.”

- Strategic orientation document for the EU Trust Fund

> The provision of long-term concessional financing that supports development gains in refugee hosting countries, such as that provided under the World Bank’s new Global Concessional Financing Facility.\(^67\)

> Multi-year results-based financing, with later tranches of funding to be released only if specific pre-agreed results (aligned to the joint outcomes’ - recommendation 3) are achieved.

**7. Human resource capacity should be increased to focus on longer-term planning activities in the early stages of displacement.**

One of the major constraints highlighted by operational agencies was the lack of space/human resources to think beyond life-saving activities and short-term strategies. There is a clear need to open up space and increase human resource capacity to focus on early solutions analysis and the development of joint outcomes (see recommendations 2 and 3). This can be achieved through:

i. The early engagement of individuals with non-traditional specialties. Such specialties could include urban planners, labor market specialists, experts in local government development and community-driven development, and agriculturalists. Needs will vary with each particular crises, but such a pool of experts should be available from the very onset of displacement. Options to explore could include:

> Expansion of existing rosters or creation of new rosters of experts with some of the above-mentioned specialisms. UNHCR’s recently created livelihoods roster is a good example of this-deployments have a specific focus on conducting livelihoods assessments and developing livelihood strategies.

> Increased secondment of technical experts with some of the above-mentioned specialisms from donor agencies and among UN agencies.

ii. The creation of national level surge capacity of service providers (particularly in the health and education sectors). This would help to increase the absorptive capacities of local services from the onset of displacement and would support an integrated service delivery approach.

iii. Training individuals on existing emergency and humanitarian rosters on early solutions planning.

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8. Mindsets must be changed by shifting incentives and rewards, as well as building capacity

Respondents across all categories - government, donors, UN and NGOs - highlighted that if solutions are going to be prioritized early then mindsets must change both within their own entities as well as others. For humanitarian actors, this will entail a willingness to give up a degree of control in refugee response to other actors (local and national governments, development actors, private sector), and a recognition that the humanitarian community is not equipped to address all aspects of displacement. For many host governments, this may entail a shift in attitude from refugees as “burdens” to refugees as “assets.” For development actors, this may entail a greater acknowledgement of displacement as a development issue. Changing these mindsets necessitates a focus on shifting the incentives and rewards, and building capacity by:

> Understanding the motivations of different actors for engaging in forced displacement.
> Generating evidence that demonstrates positive social and economic impacts of refugee hosting; and how new approaches can influence this. Proving the financial argument is also important: does a greater up-front investment of development funding really lead to a more cost effective response over time?
> Changing incentives within organizations/entities:
- Organizational leadership needs to champion new approaches to addressing forced displacement at the outset and prioritize collaboration with development and humanitarian actors in addressing forced migration.
- Organizations need to develop policies and positions on forced displacement and their role in addressing it.
- Rewards structures for country and regional leadership need to shift toward taking longer-term approaches and delivering on outcomes. Such shifts should be reflected in performance objectives of senior managers.
- Results-based funding: Receiving multi-year funding should be dependent upon proposals being in line with collective outcomes defined above (see recommendation 3), and later tranches of funding should only be released if progress is made towards these.
> Building skills and capacity:
- Increased training opportunities on solutions in the early stages of displacement are required targeting humanitarian, development and government actors. In addition to building new skills, such trainings must offer an opportunity for participants to share ideas, learn from one another and discuss barriers/opportunities for early solutions planning. ReDSS has already started rolling out a durable solutions training in the region (see text box).

**ReDSS Durable Solutions Training**

This training is a key opportunity for humanitarian and development technical staff to foster a common understanding on durable solutions in their region/country; increase knowledge on legal frameworks, criteria and indicators used to measure progress towards solutions; and formulate recommendations for the development of a common approach involving all relevant actors. The training content was developed with the guidance of a Steering Committee made up of IGAD, the World Bank, UNHCR, humanitarian and development donors and ReDSS member agencies. The training package is now being rolled out in Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda and at the regional level.
## ANNEX I: THEORY OF CHANGE FOR EARLY SOLUTION PLANNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOAL:</th>
<th>The self-reliance and resilience of refugees, host communities and local institutions is increased in the early stages of displacement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>LONGER TERM OUTCOMES</strong></td>
<td>Evidence-based solutions strategies are implemented in the early stages of displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEDIUM TERM OUTCOMES</strong></td>
<td>Increased evidence base for early solutions planning approaches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHORT TERM OUTPUTS</strong></td>
<td>Increased investment in research and learning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROBLEM TO BE ADDRESSED</strong></td>
<td>Lack of opportunity and clarity around how to promote facilitate and support solutions in the early stages of displacement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CHALLENGES</strong></td>
<td>Lack of engagement of wide range of stakeholders beyond humanitarian sphere</td>
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## ANNEX II: KEY INFORMANT LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1  Agaba Smart</td>
<td>InterAid (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2  Agnes Olusese</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (Kenya)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3  Alex Musili</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>4  Allison Oman</td>
<td>World Food Programme (Regional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>5  Andie Lambe</td>
<td>International Refugee Rights Initiative (Uganda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6  Andrew Maina</td>
<td>Refugee Consortium of Kenya (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>7  Angela Barbra Aiko</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee (Uganda)</td>
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<td>8  Angela Rugambwa</td>
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<td>9  Anita Oberai</td>
<td>USAID (Kenya)</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 Ann Defraye</td>
<td>World Food Programme (Regional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11 Annie Gacukuzi</td>
<td>PRM (Uganda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 Ari Weiss</td>
<td>Reach (Regional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 Aude Galli</td>
<td>Regional Durable Solutions Secretariat (Regional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>14 Bafaki Charles</td>
<td>Office of the Prime Minister (Uganda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>15 Benon Babumba</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency (Uganda)</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 Caroline Njuki</td>
<td>IGAD Secretariat on Forced Displacement and Mixed Migration (Regional)</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Cate Osborne</td>
<td>Norwegian Refugee Council (Kenya)</td>
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<td>18 Charles Sekatatawa</td>
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<td>21 David Clapp</td>
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<td>22 David Kang’ethe</td>
<td>Danish Refugee Council (Kenya)</td>
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<td>23 David Lopua</td>
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<td>24 Doris Kawira</td>
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<td>30 Harriet Holder</td>
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<td>33 Josephine Waruguru Kiguru</td>
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<td>Wouter de Cuyper</td>
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