A WIN-WIN:
Multi-year flexible funding is better for people and better value for donors
CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
INTRODUCTION 4
KEY FINDINGS 5
RECOMMENDATIONS 6
CASE STUDIES 7
Demonstrating the Efficiencies of MYF 7
A Comparative Analysis of Short- and Long-term Cash Transfer Programmes in Somalia 7
Demonstrating the Effectiveness of MYF 10
Case 1. Implementing Sida's Humanitarian Framework Agreement and Programme-Based Approach in Cameroon and Central African Republic 10
Case 2. PRO-Jeunes Youth Livelihoods Programme in Côte d'Ivoire 13
CONCLUSION 15
NOTES 20

BOXES
Box 1. Details of the DFID and Sida Grants 7
Box 2. Sida PBA Grant Details and IRC-Donor Relations 11
Box 3. IRC Mastercard Foundation PRO-Jeunes Partnership Details 13

FIGURES
Figure 1. Longer-term programme in Somalia cost 44% less in delivery for every dollar transferred 8
Figure 2. Larger and durable latrines reach nearly 20 times as many people per dollar spent in Ethiopia 9

ANNEXES
Annex I. Key elements of the IRC cash programmes funded by DFID and Sida in Somalia 16
Annex II. Data used for the Systematic Cost Analysis (SCAN) of IRC's cash programme in Somalia 17

ACRONYMS
CAR Central African Republic
DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development
DI Development Initiatives
ECHO European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
GBV Gender Based Violence
IDP Internally Displaced Person
IRC International Rescue Committee
MYF Multi-Year Financing
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
PBA Programme-Based Approach
RRM Rapid Response Mechanism
SCAN Systematic Cost Analysis
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report was co-authored by Farida Bena, Daphne Jayasinghe, Lauren Post and Caitlin Tulloch at the International Rescue Committee, with support from Niklas Rieger and Angus Urquhart at Development Initiatives. The authors are grateful for the thoughtful insights, edits and suggestions from colleagues at the IRC, particularly Sarah Charles, Laurence Leclercq, Lucian Lee, Mohamed Hussein Nasib, Zoë Mermelstein, Khusbu Patel, Aska Pickering, Isabela Roper, Helen Stawski, Natalia Strigin and Imogen Sudbery, as well as staff implementing programmes in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire and Somalia.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Multi-year and flexible humanitarian funding supports better outcomes and delivers efficiencies. Evidence of the benefits of multi-year flexible funding has steadily grown in recent years; numerous studies—published by think tanks, humanitarian organisations and UN Agencies, and commissioned by donors—point to effectiveness and efficiency gains in programme quality. Bilateral donors have also raised their multi-year contributions, in part thanks to the Grand Bargain commitment to increase multi-year humanitarian planning and funding, but the needle has not moved far enough. As the COVID-19 pandemic threatens to increase the cost of humanitarian response and shrink aid budgets, the case for better value for money is more relevant than ever.

Why then is the vast majority of humanitarian programming still short-term? The picture is incomplete due to lack of data, particularly on what happens after funding has reached UN agencies, which receive more than half of all humanitarian financing. What is known is that even as bilateral donors increase multi-year commitments, most implementing partners, including NGOs, national and local organisations, have seen little increase in the multi-year amounts they receive, as the latest Grand Bargain annual independent report confirmed. Until UN agencies cascade multi-year and flexible funding to frontline responders, the full potential of multi-year flexible funding will not be realised.

This report by International Rescue Committee (IRC), with support from Development Initiatives (DI), builds on the already strong evidence base for multi-year flexible funding. A comparative analysis of two cash programmes in Somalia funded by DFID and Sida, which draws on data collected using the Systematic Cost Analysis (SCAN) tool developed by IRC with Save the Children and Mercy Corps, provides preliminary indications of quantifiable cost efficiency gains of multi-year funding. And three case studies—two multi-sector programmes in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Cameroon supported through Sida’s Programme-Based Approach (PBA) and a youth livelihoods programme in Côte d’Ivoire funded by the Mastercard Foundation—reveal the qualitative benefits of multi-year, flexible financing.

In particular, five key findings emerge:

1. **Multi-year funding can lead to notable cost-efficiency gains.** For example, comparing similar short-term and long-term cash transfer programmes in Somalia showed that while the short-term programme incurred $0.67 in delivery costs for every $1 transferred to clients, the longer-term programme costs only $0.37 to transfer the same amount—a saving of 44 percent.

2. **Multi-year funding can make programme delivery more effective.** Evidence from IRC programs in Côte D’Ivoire, CAR, and Cameroon reaffirm a range of potential benefits of multi-year funding, including improved programme design, time to start-up in new locations effectively, and greater staff retention. These efficiency gains ultimately improve programme effectiveness, with more time to deepen trust with local partners and communities—essential to strengthening partnerships and realising the ambition of localising aid.

3. **Cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, benefit from multi-year financing.** The multi-year nature of the PRO-Jeunes programme has been critical to achieving gender norms changes, which are necessary for women to access non-traditional employment sectors safely. Predictable and flexible financing can also support the addition of gender transformative interventions that build on the core programme, such as engaging men in IRC’s Gender-Based Violence (GBV) programming in Cameroon.

4. **Gains from multi-year funding are highest when they benefit from flexibility as well.** When agencies secure longer-term funding and enjoy sufficient flexibility within funding arrangements, they can respond quickly to changing circumstances and emerging needs. This model is more efficient than under shorter-term, less flexible funding where agencies must re-negotiate donor agreements or apply for new funds.

5. **Effective multi-year programming requires investments of time and resources to establish means of working, shifting organisational practices and culture, and building trust with public donors and private funding partners.** In-country staff require dedicated resources and time to transition to a more adaptive, long-term approach.

There is no excuse to delay aid reform any further. To better serve our clients, particularly in light of the deepening needs produced by the COVID-19 crisis, the humanitarian community must do better—and faster.

Key recommendations for donors and UN agencies are therefore to:

1. **Agree to set a target at this year’s annual Grand Bargain meeting for more multi-year flexible funding to frontline responders and joint problem-solve between donors and UN agencies to overcome political and technical barriers to effective pass-through mechanisms by the five-year Grand Bargain anniversary in 2021;**

2. **Provide more accurate and timely data on the multi-year, flexible funding cascading to frontline implementers; and**

3. **Pilot innovative approaches on multi-year, flexible funding and take them to scale.**
INTRODUCTION

Conflicts last on average 37 years and refugee crises last on average a decade, requiring long-term financing to support protracted needs. Yet for too long, humanitarian financing has remained short-term (6-12 month grants). In addition, the vast majority of humanitarian financing has been earmarked, making it difficult for implementers to adapt their programmes as crises evolve.

Donors have made uneven progress towards disbursing more multi-year and flexible humanitarian financing over the past four years. As a positive step, more than half of Grand Bargain signatories reported activities towards Core Commitment 7.1a (Signatories increase multiyear collaborative and flexible planning and multi-year funding. Aid organisations ensure that the same terms of multi-year funding agreements are applied with their implementing partners) in 2019. Of this, 69 percent of donors scored “good” or “excellent” on progress—a significant increase from 30 percent of signatories in 2017. However, while some donors, such as Germany, ECHO, DFID and Sida, have made significant improvements in providing multi-year financing to UN and NGO partners, most UN intermediaries have fallen short on their commitment, passing on multi-year funding they receive in shorter-term disbursements to NGOs. And overall, there is room for improvement on flows of multi-year funding to first-line responders and on tracking these flows more transparently.

Some UN Agencies and bilateral donors have continued to request further evidence of the effectiveness and efficiency gains from multi-year financing in humanitarian contexts—even though they already agreed to increase their multi-year flexible financing through the Grand Bargain in 2016.

The evidence base is still growing, but there is already substantial evidence that demonstrates the benefits of multi-year and flexible humanitarian financing. Bilateral donors, UN Agencies, and NGOs have all contributed to this evidence base. Research to date shows multi-year financing can increase the effectiveness of programmes in humanitarian settings, as well as drive cost-savings. Case studies—including those captured here—have suggested that flexible, multi-year financing can enable:

- Strategic planning aimed at achieving outcomes, not just outputs;
- Improved relations with local actors and humanitarian access;
- Early and rapid response, and shifting of resources as needs evolve;
- Cost savings through staff retention, improved planning and reduced administrative burdens;
- More robust exit strategies and sustainable programming.

Beyond limited evidence against multi-year financing, other challenges are preventing donors and UN Agencies from implementing multi-year financing— in particular, bureaucratic impediments. For example, UNHCR claims its own financial rules prevent it from disbursing multi-year financing. In addition, there is a lack of incentives for donors to make reforms that would enable multi-year, flexible financing, as well as countervailing pressures on aid budgets and on donors for increased domestic aid visibility and accountability. Without stronger incentives and enforcement measures, accountability to the Grand Bargain has proven insufficient.

The COVID-19 pandemic makes the case for multi-year, flexible financing more relevant than ever. Longer-term, flexible financing for ongoing humanitarian crises better enables humanitarian responders to adapt their programmes to support the health crisis response. Further, the pandemic will require multi-year financing to support the long-term consequences of COVID-19 in humanitarian situations—which now confront a double emergency.

ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report contributes to the evidence base supporting multi-year and flexible financing as part of the Grand Bargain process. It directly responds to donors’ demand for more and better evidence that multi-year, flexible financing can be more effective and efficient than short-term grants, and identifies where and how different elements of predictability and flexibility in funding can enable effectiveness and efficiency gains. Key findings draw on case studies of International Rescue Committee (IRC) programmes in Côte d’Ivoire, CAR, and Cameroon to illustrate the effectiveness gains of multi-year, flexible financing and on two IRC cash programmes in Somalia to demonstrate the efficiency gains of multi-year, flexible funding.

Annex I presents key elements of the IRC cash programmes analysed in the report. Annex II provides additional background information and data used for the analysis of these programmes.

This report is produced by IRC with support from Development Initiatives (DI).
**KEY FINDINGS**

Five key findings emerge from the two case studies and SCAN analysis.

1. **Multi-year funding can lead to notable cost-efficiency gains.**

Comparing similar short-term and long-term cash transfer programmes in Somalia showed that longer-term funding led to significantly more cost-efficient delivery of assistance. While the short-term programme incurred $0.67 in delivery costs for every $1 transferred to clients, the longer-term programme costs only $0.37 to transfer the same amount—a saving of 44 percent.

2. **Multi-year funding can enable improved programme design and make programme delivery more effective.**

Evidence from IRC programmes in Côte D'Ivoire, CAR and Cameroon reaffirm a range of potential benefits that multi-year funding can enable. These include:

- *improved programme design* enabled through initial one-year process of collaborative and evidence-based programme design as part of long-term strategy
- *time to conduct effective start-up activities in new locations*
- *improved programme effectiveness through learning and programme adaptation*, with enhanced benefits where multi-year funding is also flexible to allow for quick and easy re-prioritisation of shifts in programme focus
- *particular benefits for certain types of inherently long-term programs*, where outcomes are achieved incrementally over time, such as livelihoods programmes, or where programmes require procurement and investment in infrastructure
- *greater staff retention*, reducing administrative costs of recruitment, and improving programme efficiency and effectiveness through learning and retained programme knowledge
- *deepened relationships* with clients and other stakeholders, which allow affected populations more time to recover from the crisis and regain control over their lives
- *building institutional relationships with communities and other stakeholders*, deepening local trust of the IRC and its programmes necessary foundations for effective programming and ultimate delivery of programmes to local partners
- *deeper and ongoing access* to areas of humanitarian intervention thanks to higher and better engagement with local actors.

3. **Cross-cutting issues, such as gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, benefit from multi-year financing.**

Shifting behaviors and social norms tends to happen over time, not overnight. The multi-year nature of the PRO-Jeunes programme has been critical to achieving norms changes, which are necessary for women to safely access non-traditional employment sectors, such as in the cotton value chain. In this case, the longer-term financing enabled IRC to support transforming gender norms by engaging positive female role models active in the cotton value chain to encourage communities to allow young women farmers to participate in a male dominated sector.

Predictable and flexible financing can also support the addition of gender transformative interventions that build on the core programme. In Cameroon, for instance, IRC was able to add aspects to its core Gender Based Violence (GBV) programming, such as engaging men in accountability practices and providing tailored empowerment programming for adolescent girls.

4. **Gains from multi-year funding are highest when they benefit from flexibility as well.**

Confirming existing evidence, multi-year and flexible funding combined can enable rapid response and adaptation to changing humanitarian needs. Where longer term funding is secured and there is sufficient flexibility within funding arrangements, agencies can respond quickly to changing circumstances and emerging needs. In CAR and Cameroon, multi-year funding provided by Sida combined with the Programme Based Approach, allowed for significant programme flexibility, with funding softly earmarked to outcome areas or locations in line with the country Strategic Action Plans. This enabled IRC to adjust programming to meet needs as they evolved during a crisis. This is a more efficient, quicker process than under shorter term, less flexible funding where re-negotiating donor agreements or applying for new funds would be necessary.

5. **Effective multi-year programming requires investments of time and resources to establish ways of working, shift organisational practices and culture and build trusted relationships with public donors and private funding partners.**

Multi-year financing provides a level of stability and predictability, and flexibility provides room to adapt programmes to meet changing needs. However, in-country staff require dedicated resources and time to transition to a more adaptive, long-term approach through which the greatest benefits can be drawn from multi-year and flexible funding. At the same time, establishing a close, trusting relationship with donors and partners can be a foundation for longer-term, more flexible and administratively light funding. Such close relationships can also enable added benefits through close and active involvement of public donors and private funding partners in programme design.
RECOMMENDATIONS

These findings represent further evidence that increasing flexible multi-year funding is one of the best ways to get lasting outcomes for affected populations and value for money for humanitarian donors. While producing additional supporting research is helpful, it needs to be matched by change in donor practice.

To improve the quality of humanitarian financing and ensure that more multi-year, flexible financing is available to implementers, donors and UN agencies should take the following actions:

1. **Agree to set a target at this year’s annual Grand Bargain meeting for more multi-year flexible funding to frontline responders and joint problem-solve between donors and UN agencies to overcome political and technical barriers to effective pass-through mechanisms by the five-year Grand Bargain anniversary in 2021.**

   As the five-year anniversary of the Grand Bargain approaches, donors and UN agencies must match the technical work on multi-year, flexible funding with a high-level agreement – including through Executive Boards – to unblock existing bottlenecks that hamper effective pass-through of this funding to frontline implementers. The agreement must lead to a one-year plan to increase multi-year flexible funding to frontline implementers and ensure the funding is passed through to them by a set target by 2021. Now more than ever, the response to the COVID-19 pandemic is highlighting the urgent need for this quality funding.

2. **Provide more accurate data on the multi-year, flexible funding cascading to frontline implementers.**

   Regularly publishing more granular data to existing platforms (OCHA’s Financial Tracking Service) and standards (IATI) on the multi-year, flexible funding going to partners on the ground is a matter of transparency. Donors and UN agencies in particular should discuss how to join efforts to ensure their stronger accountability for where multi-year and flexible funding goes - and how fast. For this data to be useful, it should be published and updated as regularly as possible, for example on a quarterly basis.

3. **Pilot innovative approaches on multi-year, flexible funding and take them to scale.**

   Initiatives to test new or different ways to channel more multi-year, flexible funding to the ground remain isolated. While some progress has been made, and there are now a growing number of funding arrangements that evidence the value of different properties of predictability and flexibility, there needs to be more sustained efforts to learn from and build upon these approaches and an agreement to take them to scale when they succeed. For the Grand Bargain to produce the transformational changes it set out to do in 2016, signatories should prioritise this discussion now, starting with the annual meeting in June 2020.
With the growing scale of humanitarian needs, efficiency is a key priority for donors and implementing agencies. Beyond merely cutting overheads, achieving efficiency requires reaching the most people with the most assistance for every dollar of resources at our disposal. Cost-efficiency analysis is a method for measuring the ratio of what a programme costs to the outputs it achieves. The IRC, Save the Children and Mercy Corps have developed a Systematic Cost Analysis (SCAN) tool to ensure that analyses are rigorous and consistent across our programmes. For cash transfer programmes, the standard is to measure the delivery costs—including things like targeting processes, transfer fees, post-distribution monitoring, and project and country management—necessary for every dollar which clients receive.

A comparative analysis of short- and long-term cash transfer programmes in Somalia

The humanitarian situation in Somalia is complex, intertwined with drought, floods, clan conflict, and a protracted war between Al Shabaab and the allied forces of the Federal Government of Somalia, assisted by the African Union Mission in Somalia. In 2018, about 5.4 million people in Somalia faced acute food insecurity (IPC Phases 2 and 3). In 2019, heavy rains in southern Somalia caused flash floods which damaged crops, arable land, household assets, roads, and other critical infrastructure. Beletweyne, a town in the Hiiraan region, was the most affected area; approximately 45,500 households were displaced, facing food insecurity and inadequate access to clean water, hygiene and sanitation services, and basic healthcare. In 2020, large swarms of locusts further threatened the country’s fragile food security situation.

To illustrate the greater efficiency possible with multi-year funding sources, the IRC conducted a comparative cost-efficiency analysis of two IRC cash transfer programmes in Somalia: one long-term, and one short-term. The former is part of Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS 2), funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) in Dhusamareb, Galkacyo, Burtinle and Galdogob from September 2018 to March 2022. The latter is part of Lifesaving emergency response to the health and economic needs of people in the flood-affected areas of Beletweyne, Hiiraan province, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) from November 2019 to May 2020. The Sida award covers a period of six months while the DFID award covers a period of 43 months, building on a previous four-year phase. The key characteristics of the two respective funding agreements and programmes are summarised in Box 1 and Annex 1.

A comparative analysis of these programmes showed that the longer-term funding led to significantly more cost-efficient delivery of assistance. While the short-term programme incurred $0.67 in delivery costs for every $1 transferred to clients, the longer-term programme cost only $0.37 to transfer the same amount—a difference of 44 percent (see Figure 1).

**CASE STUDIES**

**DEMONSTRATING THE EFFICIENCIES OF MYF**

IRC is implementing a multisectoral programme funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS 2). This was a multi-phase project that began in 2013; the second and current phase began in 2018 for a period of three and a half years, therefore benefiting from long-term engagement with the communities and a stable source of funding from the donor. The cash transfer programme that this report analyzes was implemented between July 2019 and March 2020. BRCiS 2’s allocation was $9,597,720 for 43 months. Within the long-term BRCiS project, three main sources of flexibility allowed for changes according to context: (1) budget flexibility allowed programme managers to adapt their programmes based on feedback from early warning systems; (2) within the main BRCiS grant budget, the consortium had set aside contingency budget lines called “Crisis Modifier” which could be activated in the event of emergencies—in this case the drought crisis in 2019; (3) those Crisis Modifier budget lines were found to be insufficient, so DFID provided additional top-up emergency funding to support the same households with more cash transfers during the drought crisis.

To respond to floods in southern Somalia, IRC also implemented the project Lifesaving emergency response to the health and economic needs of people in the flood-affected areas of Beletweyne, Hiiraan province from November 2019 to May 2020, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Sida’s total allocation to this programme was $521,485 for 6 months. This project was funded through Sida’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), an emergency response mechanism which enables a needs-based and fast humanitarian response immediately after a severe sudden onset humanitarian crisis or after a severe deterioration of an ongoing crisis: The RRM is an important tool for Sida’s humanitarian partners to launch a rapid response, access funding for crises where other funding may not be available, and respond when donor restrictions on existing secured funding don’t enable a response. Such awards are usually disbursed quickly after a crisis hits, but allow some flexibility to change activities and budget lines (this project included a budget realignment in December 2019 to account for an exchange rate gain).

**BOX 1. Details of the DFID and Sida Grants**

To respond to floods in southern Somalia, IRC also implemented the project Lifesaving emergency response to the health and economic needs of people in the flood-affected areas of Beletweyne, Hiiraan province from November 2019 to May 2020, funded by the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Sida’s total allocation to this programme was $521,485 for 6 months. This project was funded through Sida’s Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), an emergency response mechanism which enables a needs-based and fast humanitarian response immediately after a severe sudden onset humanitarian crisis or after a severe deterioration of an ongoing crisis: The RRM is an important tool for Sida’s humanitarian partners to launch a rapid response, access funding for crises where other funding may not be available, and respond when donor restrictions on existing secured funding don’t enable a response. Such awards are usually disbursed quickly after a crisis hits, but allow some flexibility to change activities and budget lines (this project included a budget realignment in December 2019 to account for an exchange rate gain).
The shorter, Sida-funded project is part of their Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) funding stream, which specifically targets severe sudden onset or severe deterioration of ongoing crises to provide a fast and needs-based humanitarian response. The multi-year funding was part of a large consortium project which allowed longer-term engagement with communities and relied on an existing financial relationship with the donor which could be used to channel assistance without additional paperwork or reporting. Within this long-term, large, and flexible project, IRC could reach more households and respond to the crisis quickly and efficiently instead of having to initiate new proposals every few months.

More generally, scale is one of the key factors which drives the cost-efficiency of humanitarian response in many sectors. Short-term programs can enable rapid response, particularly where flexible, multi-year funding is not available. At the same time, while the RRM mechanism remains a valuable funding tool, it is found that short-term programs can face significant difficulties in securing funding, identifying clients, and distributing aid to large numbers of people within their limited funding windows.

While these cost analyses provide the first quantitative evidence on the greater efficiency of long-term funding and programming, they come with some caveats. As with any comparative analysis, it is almost impossible to find two completely identical programmes to compare that only differ in the aspect of interest—in this case, the timeframe of funding. Thus there is a chance that other factors partly drive the observed cost differences, such as the needs of the target populations or the availability of mobile money platforms.

A sensitivity analysis showed that the slightly different transfer amounts per household did not drive the differences in cost-efficiency between the short- and long-term programmes. After adjusting the transfer amount for the short-term project to be equal to the average transfer amount with long-term project ($85 per household per transfer instead of $65 per household per transfer), the cost-transfer ratio for the multi-year project would still be 27 percent lower than for the short-term project ($0.51 versus $0.37).

Another reason to be confident in this evidence is that it clarifies some of the mechanisms through which longer-term programmes can increase efficiency; stronger relationships with beneficiary communities and investments in longer-term infrastructure for wider programme delivery.

Aside from effectiveness gains, longer-term funding enables deeper relationships with target communities which are also important for delivering efficient humanitarian assistance. Beyond the two cash programmes in Somalia analysed here, there are other relevant IRC examples of service delivery that demonstrate the added value of a longer-term investment in community engagement. In the case of sensitive service provision such as GBV case management or contraception, long-lasting relationships with beneficiary communities are crucial to wide take-up of these services. Comparative cost-effectiveness studies of family planning programmes have regularly shown that longer lasting—but more invasive—contraceptive methods such as IUDs are significantly more cost-effective than short-acting methods such as condoms. But delivering these longer-lasting methods requires a longstanding presence and deep trust with community members—feats which are difficult to achieve with short-term staff and presence:

“In order to achieve such large scale, the program funded not only medical and outreach staff, but also rehabilitation of health facilities’ rooms and extensive staff training. Additionally, the majority of clients in [this program] accepted long-acting methods, the provision of which requires more training and support than short-acting methods….Not only were many individuals reached, but these individuals were able to choose long-acting methods of contraception because of the available facilities and staff.”

Multi-year funding also enables investments in longer-lasting infrastructure which make larger scale service provision possible. When providing sanitation services to displaced populations, for instance, implementers have the choice of constructing simpler pit latrines or more complicated yet more durable concrete structures. The latter require more materials and trained staff to construct but they remain usable for many times the life of a less durable structure. An IRC study of eight latrine construction programmes in refugee camps in Ethiopia showed that programmes which were able to serve more people for a longer period of time, typically through the construction of larger blocks of durable latrines, reached nearly twenty times as many people per dollar spent as the smallest-scale programmes (see Figure 2).

**FIGURE 1. Longer-term programme in Somalia cost 44% less in delivery for every dollar transferred**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRANSFER AMOUNT</th>
<th>DELIVERY COST</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$1</td>
<td>Long-term funding 37 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1</td>
<td>Short-term funding 67 cents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1</td>
<td>Saving potential 30 cents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:** Cost analysis was performed according to IRC’s standard methodology, using the SCAN Tool.
FIGURE 2. Larger and durable latrines reach nearly 20 times as many people per dollar spent in Ethiopia
DEMONSTRATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MYF

CASE 1: Implementing Sida’s Humanitarian Framework Agreement and Programme-Based Approach in Cameroon and Central African Republic

Context and programme

Central African Republic (CAR) and Cameroon are among a number of African countries currently facing a protracted humanitarian crisis. CAR has seen persistent instability since 2013, when an alliance of armed groups overran the capital. The IRC began working in CAR in December 2006, following an eruption of violence that forced thousands to flee their homes. Military-political crises have continued over the past few years. Although the government and 14 armed groups signed a peace deal in February 2019, it has only been partially observed and conflict continues to drive displacement and food security. Today, armed groups effectively control more than two-thirds of the country. CAR is home to 600,000 IDPs and has driven 600,000 to neighboring countries—including Cameroon.

Until relatively recently, Cameroon had avoided the instability and violence that other countries in the central African region have experienced. However, three distinct humanitarian crises render the country increasingly vulnerable: an armed conflict in the Northwest and Southwest, militancy in the Far North, and an influx of refugees from neighboring CAR as well as from Nigeria. Since 2014, brutal war in Cameroon’s Far North region has devastated local communities and driven over a quarter of a million people from their homes, resulting in 2.1 million people in need of humanitarian aid. In 2016, escalated insecurity in the Northwest and Southwest regions—with clashes between non-state armed groups and the country’s defense and security forces—contributed to massive internal displacement and resulted in another 1.3 million people in need of aid in these two regions.

In both CAR and Cameroon, the IRC has recently received multi-year financing from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Funding is allocated through Sida’s Humanitarian Framework Agreement (HFA)—a multi-year agreement that allows select NGOs to secure funding for short- and long-term life-saving interventions. While most of the allocations through the HFA are granted on an annual basis, IRC secured a multi-year award for some countries, including CAR and Cameroon; in fact, IRC’s projects in these countries were among the first multi-year allocations provided by Sida through the HFA. IRC secured the multi-year financing primarily based on the existence of multi-year Humanitarian Response Plans at the country level. In addition to being multi-year, the funds are applied through a funding modality called the Programme-Based Approach (PBA). The PBA allows the financing to be softly earmarked, meaning the funds are allocated for a specific country strategy but not a specific project. There is also budget and programmatic flexibility to shift interventions within and across strategic outcomes in order to adapt to changing contexts and needs.

Through the multi-year PBA grants, the IRC benefits from a significant degree of strategic planning and flexibility to implement humanitarian interventions that are responsive to the evolving context and needs of the people it serves (see Box 2). As discussed below, multi-year, flexible financing has enabled IRC to respond to crises in CAR and Cameroon in ways that strictly earmarked and short-term financing simply would not have allowed.
Flexible, multi-year funding enabled IRC to be first responders in an emergency

Multi-year, flexible financing has allowed the IRC to respond faster and reach the most vulnerable in emergency situations. In CAR and Cameroon, IRC could quickly respond to emergency needs without any major budget or grant agreement changes. In 2018, conflict between armed groups in the commune of Mbrés reignited tensions that led to inter-community violence and displacement to the commune of Mala and its axes. In response, IRC teams extended their protection activities to Mala and Simandélé, supporting 243 newly displaced households with basic life-saving support, followed by recovery interventions; local leaders testified that IRC was the first organisation to respond to the crisis. IRC was able to quickly extend its project because it had already secured enough funding to cover the smaller-scale emergency; the grant agreement was not earmarked for specific locations or sectors; and the interventions were aligned with the overall strategic outcomes of the country Humanitarian Response Plan. In Cameroon, the IRC initiated a rapid response in February 2019 to meet the pressing needs of crisis-affected people in Goura, which had seen the arrival of 35,000 Nigerian refugees. PBA funding enabled the IRC to respond immediately and distribute 50 WASH kits while it awaited approval for additional financing to support the response. The IRC subsequently rehabilitated water points for Goura IDP camp.

Multi-year funding allowed for a sustained and phased programmatic approach, beyond initial emergency response

Multi-year financing has supported a phased programmatic approach, supporting longer-term outcomes that one year of programming does not traditionally achieve. In CAR, IRC was able to continue to work with and support women-led Community-Based Organisations (CBOs) that were supported in the first year of the project to achieve longer-term outcomes. In Year 1, the CBOs had received cash for the income-generating activities and in Year 2, the CBOs were able to build their own shop. Looking ahead, they intend to set-up new income-generating activities. Similarly, in the Far North of Cameroon, the programme was first able to deliver basic needs and cash, followed by supporting income generating activities and Village Savings and Loans Associations (VSLAs). This process takes time; a lack of programmatic phasing, threatens the achievement of outcomes and risks a return to negative coping strategies to meet basic needs.

In addition, multi-year financing allowed the IRC to introduce additional aspects to its programme in Cameroon over time. Building on its core Gender-Based Violence (GBV) programming, IRC was able to add a gender transformative aspect to the programme, Engaging Men in Accountability Practices, as well as tailored empowerment programming for adolescent girls in humanitarian crises, Girl Shine. IRC was able to effectively plan for adding these aspects to the core programme because the financing was already guaranteed through the multi-year allocation and they had the freedom to adjust their planning and resources.

Multi-year funding arrangement provides time necessary to build trust with communities and other stakeholders through sustained programming

Multi-year financing has enabled IRC to build relationships with communities and other stakeholders, deepening local trust of the IRC and its programmes. Effective programming requires cultivating relationships with a range of local and national actors over time. In CAR, multi-year financing enabled IRC to provide emergency assistance and humanitarian recovery response beyond the peak of the crisis. IRC’s continued presence during these phases of crisis and recovery helped increase community acceptance and participation in programmes. Similarly, in Cameroon, the IRC’s programming over two years in some of the same localities in Mayo Sava and Logone-et-Chari has contributed to greater links and trust with the community. For example, IRC’s community-based protection programming in the Far North has, over time, moved from a heavy training component to lighter follow-up on action plans because trust has been built between IRC and the protection committees IRC helped establish.
Protection committees have assumed increasing autonomy as they lead in identifying and mobilizing support to address emergency needs and protection risks.

Flexible and sustained funding has enabled the IRC to gain and maintain access to new areas, such as Southwest Cameroon, where access must be negotiated with local actors. The multi-year financing provides IRC with sufficient time to conduct the activities necessary to enter new areas, such as stakeholder mapping, building trust with security actors, and building staff capacity for humanitarian negotiations. Single-year funding would have necessitated separate start-up costs as well as a two to three months delay in programming to hire and train staff.

**Flexibility of funding enables programme adaptations and improved outcomes**

The application of multi-year financing combined with the PBA model, which allows for significant programme flexibility, has enabled IRC to adjust programming to meet evolving needs during a crisis. For example, just over a year into the programme in Cameroon, new needs emerged in the Southwest. IRC was able to pivot and extend its programming to the Southwest without having to secure approvals from Sida. In Cameroon, the IRC also added small-scale interventions to respond to new needs over time, such as constructing a solar-powered water network system and a WASH sensitisation in response to a cholera outbreak. Moreover, needs of some targeted populations shifted throughout implementation as IDPs settled in communities rather than separately in camps. Instead of constructing 25 latrines and showers in camps, IRC seamlessly shifted its approach to support construction of 200 family latrines, ensuring families could meet their sanitation needs safely and protect themselves from sanitation and hygiene-related diseases. Under a typical short-term, less flexible financing arrangement, this process would not have been as swift. IRC would have had to gain approval from the donor to change the project, or potentially apply for new financing to support the effort.

In addition, because the PBA supports the realisation of strategic outcomes and is less focused on specific outputs, financing through the mechanism can better support integrated and multi-sectoral interventions. In Cameroon, IRC has experienced a shift in integration through referrals across teams. For example, Women’s Protection and Empowerment staff are referring legal assistance for GBV cases to Protection and Rule of Law staff; Economic Recovery and Development staff are referring civil documentation cases to Protection and Rule of Law staff; and Women’s Empowerment and Protection staff are referring support for income generation activities for survivors of GBV to Economic Recovery and Development staff.

**Efficiencies and capacity building through staff retention and reduced administrative burdens**

In both CAR and Cameroon, staff retention over the years of the project has created cost-efficiencies and enabled staff capacity building. In CAR, some staff who were hired to work as part of the first year of the project were kept on to implement activities in the second year of the programme. These experienced staff have been able to build on lessons they learned in their first year and apply them to the new intervention areas in the second year.

IRC’s experience in Cameroon has been similar. If the grant had been just one year and required applying for a second year to continue the program, the IRC would very likely have had to close out the programme for two to three months to hire and train new staff.

In addition to efficiencies from staff retention, multi-year flexible financing also reduces administrative costs and burdens typically experienced with short-term, earmarked grants. The multi-year nature of the financing removes the need to apply for no cost extensions, and the flexibility of the grant allows for programme adaptations without donor approval. Take IRC’s financing from Sida overall as an example. Across IRC’s 14 humanitarian projects and programmes and nine Rapid Response Mechanism projects funded by Sida in 2018, a total of 15 projects requested amendments requiring Sida approval to adjust interventions to the evolving needs and context. However, none of the PBA programmes submitted a request, as these countries were empowered to adjust their strategy of intervention and adapt to new emergencies without having to seek approval from Sida. This significantly saves staff time which can then be dedicated to other priorities like implementing the programme.

**Challenges with implementing the multi-year PBA financing**

While multi-year and flexible financing provides stability, predictability, and room to adapt programmes to meet changing needs, it requires dedicated resources and time for country staff to transition to a more adaptive, long-term approach. This can prove challenging in a fast-paced environment, with acute needs and little time to completely shift organisational culture and habits. Although IRC has traditionally planned programmes based on long-term outcomes, it was less familiar with how to work with flexible financing. IRC therefore had to build its adaptive management capacity by supporting staff to develop a different set of planning, budgeting and decision-making processes. IRC has increased its support and coaching for the country programmes through a part-time dedicated adviser and in-country design and implementation workshops to ensure that it capitalises on the benefits of multi-year and flexible financing.
55.5 percent) and 36 percent of young people between 15 to 35 (the secondary completion rate for girls is 42.7 percent and boys education with disparities in education between girls and boys. Only 35.5 percent of children have completed lower secondary Challenges in education and employment constrain progress. Côte d’Ivoire has experienced protracted instability and economic insecurity for over 20 years. Although there has been some growth and recovery over the last decade, poverty rates remain high. Challenges in education and employment constrain progress. Only 35.5 percent of children have completed lower secondary education with disparities in education between girls and boys (the secondary completion rate for girls is 42.7 percent and boys 55.5 percent) and 38 percent of young people between 15 to 35 years of age are unemployed.

Context and programme
Côte d’Ivoire has experienced protracted instability and economic insecurity for over 20 years. Although there has been some growth and recovery over the last decade, poverty rates remain high. Challenges in education and employment constrain progress. Only 35.5 percent of children have completed lower secondary education with disparities in education between girls and boys (the secondary completion rate for girls is 42.7 percent and boys 55.5 percent) and 38 percent of young people between 15 to 35 years of age are unemployed.

The Mastercard Foundation multi-year partnership offered the opportunity to design a holistic livelihoods programme that benefits from private sector and civil society partnerships and technology to achieve long-term labour market integration. The programme can take a genuinely client centered approach by including skills training and services to support marginalised and vulnerable youth. Having a well-designed programme like this in place, that can continue to build livelihoods remotely and sustainably while expanding evidence, is more important now than ever as COVID-19 triggers economic downturn and increases vulnerability.

The PRO-Jeunes youth livelihoods programme is a five-year IRC project supported by the Mastercard Foundation, with $8.4 million committed over the duration of the project from 2016 to 2022 (see Box 3 for more details). Built on a close and trusting relationship with the partner, funding is both multi-year and flexible, which has enabled detailed, reflective programme design, review and adaptation over time. This is particularly well-suited to the needs of a livelihoods programme, which must support the evolving needs of clients in light of market realities.

Through our partnership with Mastercard Foundation, the IRC has co-designed a programme that responds to these challenges and, following a successful pilot, it is yielding positive economic outcomes for marginalised youth in Côte d’Ivoire. The PRO-Jeunes programme targets vulnerable, economically and socially marginalised youth between the ages of 15 and 30 in rural and urban Côte d’Ivoire. IRC works through vocational training centres, youth and women’s organisations to recruit 10,000 youth, at least 60 percent of whom are women. The training includes a combination of technical vocational training, business skills training and social and emotional skills to build self-esteem, confidence and agency—particularly empowering for women entrepreneurs.

Multi-year funding principles of partnership and evidence-based, innovative co-creation
Prior to establishing this livelihoods programme, the IRC largely delivered short-term, emergency food security and voucher programmes to meet basic needs in Côte d’Ivoire, financed through one-year emergency funding. Following the 2010 conflict, IRC Côte d’Ivoire established its first multi-year livelihoods programme in 2014. This project helped identify the potential for more sustainable programming that local stakeholders could eventually adopt and replicate. In 2016, drawing on this experience, IRC partnered with the Mastercard Foundation in a funding arrangement rooted in co-creation, partnership, and learning and evidence generation. The multi-year funding arrangement included a one-year process of collaborative and evidence-based programme design, local partnership establishment, and joint field visits to identify areas for groundbreaking piloting and innovation. This co-creation process was central to the agreement and met the shared objectives of both IRC and the Mastercard Foundation.

This true partnership engagement has continued throughout project implementation with regular visits from Mastercard Foundation staff. These visits have elicited fruitful discussion on adaptations to further improve programme delivery, continuous liaison support to potential partners and additional funding sources, as well as flexibility to account for context changes—most recently resulting from movement limitations due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Box 3. IRC and Mastercard Foundation PRO-Jeunes Partnership Details
IRC’s PRO-Jeunes partnership with the Mastercard Foundation is for five years, covering November 2016 to June 2022. Initial total allocation is $8.4 million, equally split across the five years of the project.
IRC has flexibility to make major realignments to the budget and outcomes with the Mastercard Foundation on an annual basis, allowing for rapid adjustments in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
The funding is targeted at achieving economic outcomes for marginalised youth and after two and a half years of project implementation, Mastercard Foundation has allowed IRC to increase the age range for participation in the project to 30 years old, which has remarkably expanded the programme’s reach and inclusion of vulnerable clients.

Long-term livelihood programming essential to youth opportunities in rural agricultural
Livelihoods programmes like PRO-Jeunes must be implemented over several years to establish productive partnerships that yield results. A multi-year partnership is therefore a key criteria for success. For example, IRC partners with cotton sourcing company Olam/SECO in the rural Tchologo region to work with young agriculturalists over the course of four years and integrate them into the company’s cotton supply chain. Olam facilitates access to their producer communities and works with IRC to negotiate improved youth access to productive land. In addition, Olam supports youth participants over the course of one to two production cycles with technical training and access to quality inputs on a credit basis, followed by ongoing support through farmers’ groups and markets. In parallel, the IRC provides comprehensive business and socio-emotional skill training, mentorship, and support around business plan development.
This partnership has given youth entrepreneurs transferable skills for long-term economic opportunities and the experience to establish their own agricultural businesses. The programme also works to transform gender norms by engaging positive female role models active in the cotton value chain to encourage communities to allow young women farmers’ participation in the male-dominated cotton value chain. The programme’s longer duration is paramount to achieving related behavioral and social norms changes that are prerequisite for women to access non-traditional sectors and jobs safely, thereby contributing to gender equality outcomes.

Multi-year funding to leverage technology solutions and enable progress over time

Technology through e-learning and information sharing via mobile phones can expand the reach and retention of trainees. In contexts with limited infrastructure and low digital literacy, multi-year funding provides the necessary time to procure and establish infrastructure. The IRC was able to establish an e-learning format in both urban and peri-urban settings allowing youth to learn largely at their own pace so as to accommodate their different responsibilities while their coaches can continually assess progress and adjust their support to each individual.

Learning, adapting and improving over time and pivot to continue programming during COVID-19

The multi-year approach has allowed IRC to learn, adapt, refine and improve programme delivery over time. For example, the e-learning content has been adapted based on feedback from youth and partners: more women could be recruited through new partnerships with local youth and women’s organisations and established interpersonal networks, while the age criteria for targeting was increased to 30 and under to align better with local standards.

Long-term partnership allowed for investment in an e-learning platform which has proved invaluable in light of COVID-19-related movement restrictions in some parts of Côte d’Ivoire. The programme is using an almost uninterrupted delivery of training supplemented by WhatsApp, Facebook live and YouTube videos. The peer-to-peer learning and support provides motivation and vital emotional support for isolated youth.

Multi-year partnerships enable assessment, learning and adaptation of approaches

The multi-year PRO-Jeunes programme provides an opportunity to assess the most productive combination of training and services, particularly in areas of programming with a limited humanitarian evidence base, and adapt programming in a way impossible through shorter-term funding. IRC is taking this opportunity to partner with the World Bank’s Gender Innovation Lab (GIL) to explore the impact of integrating intra- and inter-personal socio-emotional and mindfulness skills learning into youth training on their individual and economic outcomes. Initial evidence points to these skills improving self-esteem and yielding higher economic returns, especially for women entrepreneurs. A Randomised Control Trial (RCT) as part of the multi-year programme allows IRC and GIL to identify the specific types of ‘soft skills’ programming that can enhance both women’s economic opportunities and broader gender equality outcomes, thereby improving the PRO-Jeunes programme while also contributing to sector-wide evidence and learning.

Programme efficiencies and long-term localisation through networking and retention

Multi-year funding can instill confidence in the programme and help with uninterrupted continuity and staff retention during a project. The core team delivering PRO-Jeunes has been in place since its start-up phase, which has helped with the project start-up including establishing offices in new locations for IRC programmes without incurring additional, unanticipated recruitment costs. The long-term relationships and partnerships the team has developed are also key to the programme’s continuity and sustainability. To successfully hand over delivery of the programme to local partners, it is vital to build trust over time and transfer learning through local partnerships. This approach is an example of programming that bridges crisis and development responses towards longer-term development.

Multi-year programming yields positive outcomes

Outcomes for the 825 youth enrolled in the pilot phase of PRO-Jeunes are positive and already show promising results. Those participating saw an average 28 percent increase in income and average monthly expenditure doubled from baseline to endline. 60 percent of those completing the ‘Learn2Earn’ training are now in part- or full-time employment.
CONCLUSION

The findings presented in this report are consistent with and build on pre-existing evidence that multi-year, flexible funding produces better outcomes, both in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of the aid provided. Longer time frames allow, among others, for improved programme design, deeper engagement with affected communities and tangible gains in the living conditions of target populations, including women and girls. The case studies included in this report highlight that multi-year, flexible funding can have particular benefits for inherently longer-term interventions, such as livelihoods programmes, and in complex, evolving and protracted crises. Compared to short-term projects, multi-year funding can produce significant cost savings and higher value for money overall.

Of particular interest are the mutually reinforcing benefits of predictability and flexibility combined, provided through multi-year and softly or unearmarked funding, as well as the benefits of additional elements of grant arrangements that enable flexibility and adaptability. More time to implement activities, together with the ability to re-allocate the funding in response to shifts in programme focus or based on learning within programs, means that the humanitarian intervention can respond, and respond better, to actual needs as they evolve. This is an overarching finding to keep in mind as the humanitarian sector is striving to adapt to the fast-pacing spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in humanitarian settings.

While more research can further unpack the dividends paid by multi-year, flexible funding, evidence alone will not be enough to encourage a significant increase in the use of this financing mechanism, especially in support of frontline responders. What is still missing is a high-level, political dialogue on how to remove existing barriers to increasing multi-year, flexible funding and what opportunities it can offer for stronger synergies with other systemic aid reform priorities, such as localisation and transparency.

As donors, UN agencies and aid organisations intensify their efforts to respond to the COVID-19 pandemic, scaling up the use of additional, fast, multi-year and flexible funding on the ground must become a top priority to realise the promise of the Grand Bargain in the year ahead: delivering more effective and more efficient humanitarian aid.
# ANNEX I

**Key elements of the IRC cash programmes funded by DFID and Sida in Somalia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Long-term funding: Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS 2)</th>
<th>Short-term funding: Lifesaving emergency response to the health and economic needs of people in the flood-affected areas of Beletweyne, Hiraan province</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grant period</strong></td>
<td>43 months</td>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total costs of cash transfer activities</strong></td>
<td>$1,059,334</td>
<td>$208,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cost-transfer ratio</strong></td>
<td>$0.37</td>
<td>$0.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of households</strong></td>
<td>2316 HHs in 4 locations (some HHs received up to 6 transfers)</td>
<td>640 HHs in 1 location (HHs received 3 transfers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$70-85/HH/transfer (depending on location)</td>
<td>$65/HH/transfer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total amount of cash transferred</strong></td>
<td>$771,060</td>
<td>$124,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Location(s), client(s), transfer(s)</strong></td>
<td>Dhusamareb: 132 HHs received 6 transfers of $85/HH/transfer.</td>
<td>Beletweyne: 640 HHs received 3 transfers of $65/HH/transfer. All HHs received 1 transfer per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhusamareb: 168 HHs received 5 transfers of $85/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dhusamareb: 400 HHs received 2 transfers of $85/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galkacyo: 746 HHs received 5 transfers of $70/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burtinle: 478 HHs received 6 transfers of $70/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Burtinle: 192 HHs received 3 transfers of $70/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Galdogob: 296 HHs received 3 transfers of $70/HH/transfer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All HHs received 1 transfer per month.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ANNEX II

Data used for the Systematic Cost Analysis (SCAN) of IRC's cash programmes in Somalia

*Project Name:* Lifesaving emergency response to the health and economic needs of people in the flood-affected areas of Beletweyne, Hiraan province

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Start Date:</th>
<th>November 2019</th>
<th>End Date:</th>
<th>May 2020</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Value of Cash Transferred:</strong></td>
<td>$124,800</td>
<td><strong>Total Cost of Cash Transfer Activity:</strong></td>
<td>$208,733</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Direct Project Costs:** Costs that are only closely linked to programme activities that can be related to one or some specific projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Cost Item</th>
<th>% to Activity What % used for cash transfers?</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materials &amp; Activities</td>
<td>Multipurpose cash transfer</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$132,530.75</td>
<td>63.49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PDM surveys and endline survey</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer costs</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary registration</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Staff</td>
<td>Resilience Manager</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$14,816.64</td>
<td>7.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Coordinator</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Officer</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Assistant</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pension and gratuity</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Health Insurance</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Life Insurance</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel &amp; Transport</td>
<td>Beneficiary registration</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$3,722.39</td>
<td>1.78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local Travel</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Per diem</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Staff</td>
<td>ERD Technical Advisor</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$2,661.91</td>
<td>1.28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ERD Technical Unit Fringe</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Direct Shared Costs:** Costs that are linked to programme activities that cannot be easily related to specific projects. These costs are shared among all projects in a specific office, usually (but not always) for the running and management of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Staff</td>
<td>$21,093.69</td>
<td>10.11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Expenses</td>
<td>$10,074.55</td>
<td>4.83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Staff</td>
<td>$6,367.48</td>
<td>3.05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel &amp; Transport</td>
<td>$3,799.85</td>
<td>1.82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials &amp; Activities</td>
<td>$6.47</td>
<td>0.003%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>$3.41</td>
<td>0.002%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indirect Costs:** Costs that support headquarters operations and overall management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Cost Recovery</td>
<td>$13,655.85</td>
<td>6.54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Project Name:** Building Resilient Communities in Somalia (BRCiS 2)

**Start Date:** July 2019  
**End Date:** March 2020

**Value of Cash Transferred:** $771,060  
**Total Cost of Cash Transfer Activity:** $1,059,334

### Direct Project Costs: Costs that are only closely linked to programme activities that can be related to one or some specific projects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Cost Item</th>
<th>% to Activity</th>
<th>What % used for cash transfers?</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materials &amp; Activities</td>
<td>MPCT- Burtinle</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>$803,929.01</td>
<td>75.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPCT- Galkacyo</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPCT- Dhusamareb</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bank Fees</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Meetings</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Distribution</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Vehicle IRF Verification</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Monitoring</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPCT for Vulnerable drought (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer fees (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary registration (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Distribution Monitoring (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPCT for Vulnerable drought (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer fees (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary registration (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Distribution Monitoring (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MPCT for Vulnerable drought (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transfer fees (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beneficiary registration (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Post-Distribution Monitoring (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Staff</td>
<td>Livelihoods Coordinator (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>$71,629.51</td>
<td>6.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Officer (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Development Officer (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Livelihoods Officer (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Women Econ. Empowerment Officer (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihoods Officer (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Livelihoods Officer (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fringe Benefits (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fringe Benefits (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fringe Benefits (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Livelihood Officer (DH)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood Officer (DH)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood Assistant (DH)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Resilience Manager (GA)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Livelihood Officer (GA)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Livelihood Officer (GA)</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Community Development Officer (GA)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Position</td>
<td>Benefits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Econ. Empowerment Officer (GA)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Livelihood Officer (MQ)</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Livelihood Officer (DH) Benefits</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Officer (DH) Benefits</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Assistant (DH) Benefits</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Livelihood Officer (GA) Benefits</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Officer (GA) Benefits</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community Dev. Officer (GA) Benefits</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilience Manager (GA) Benefits</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women Econ. Empowerment Officer (GA) Benefits</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Coordinator (GW) Benefits</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr. Livelihood Officer (GW) Benefits</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sr. Livelihood Officer (MQ) Benefits</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Travel & Transport**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Accommodation (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Accommodation (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Accommodation (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Accommodation (MQ)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Accommodation (NB)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Per Diem - ERD (DH)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Per Diem - ERD (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel - Per Diem - ERD (GW)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle Operations (GA)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Advisors ERD</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Per diem</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local travel</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance travel</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical assistance travel</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International Staff**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Technical Advisors</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Expat Benefits</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERD Technical Unit</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical Unit Fringe</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Direct Shared Costs:** Costs that are linked to programme activities that cannot be easily related to specific projects. These costs are shared among all projects in a specific office, usually (but not always) for the running and management of operations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Staff</td>
<td>$64,811.12</td>
<td>6.12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office Expenses</td>
<td>$17,128.83</td>
<td>1.62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel &amp; Transport</td>
<td>$10,503.36</td>
<td>0.99%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Staff</td>
<td>$7,532.60</td>
<td>0.71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials &amp; Activities</td>
<td>$8.60</td>
<td>0.001%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>$1.53</td>
<td>0.0001%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Indirect Costs:** Costs that support headquarters operations and overall management.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cost Category</th>
<th>Category Total</th>
<th>% of Total Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indirect Cost Recovery</td>
<td>$60,385.12</td>
<td>5.70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 DI, Multi-year humanitarian funding: global baseline and trends, 4.

3 Calculations based on FTS data for 2019 available from this link: https://fts.unocha.org/data-search/results?usageYears=2019&search_type=boundary. These calculations represent the share of all first-level humanitarian funding from government donors and EU institutions received by UN agencies and UN pooled funds. In 2018, UN agencies also received 45% of reported multi-year humanitarian funding (see DI, Multi-year humanitarian funding: global baseline and trends, 5).


8 See DI, Multi-year humanitarian funding: global baseline and trends.


13 Cabot and Sida, The Value for Money ocaleNd Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding, 37.


15 NRC and FAO, Living up to the Promise of Multi-Year Financing, 22.

16 DI and NRC, Field Perspectives on Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding and Practice.


24 The process for securing multi-year financing and for piloting the PBA were separate.

International Rescue Committee (IRC) responds to the world’s worst humanitarian crises and helps people to survive and rebuild their lives. Founded in 1933 at the request of Albert Einstein, the IRC offers life-saving care and life-changing assistance to refugees forced to flee from war, persecution or natural disaster. At work today in over 40 countries and 29 cities in the United States, we restore safety, dignity and hope to millions who are uprooted and struggling to endure. The IRC leads the way from harm to home.